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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores how Political Correctness (PC) is discursively constructed and has 
emerged in contemporary society as a cultural signifier for a new politics of language and 
identity. The thesis begins by arguing that the literature has not adequately reconciled the 
various tensions which continue to underlie how PC is defined and understood. In doing so it 
examines how the celebration and prevalence of anti-PC rhetoric has emerged alongside our 
increasing intolerance of ‘politically incorrect’ forms of discourse (such as racist or 
homophobic language). It also considers why varying levels of PC might be present (and 
absent) within different levels of discourse. 
 
The project uses data from popular cultural and media sources which draw upon the 
multifarious and increasingly participatory nature of our public domain. The data sources 
include newspaper articles and editorials; a parliamentary debate; the social media site 
Twitter; popular comedy and political cartoons. In order to conduct a socio-cultural analysis, 
the research incorporates the use of various discourse and visual analytical approaches 
including Bakhtinian dialogism; Bourdieu’s capital theory; Barthesian semiology and Hall’s 
representational analysis.  
 
The thesis argues that our preoccupation with disputes of offence (or ‘PC disputes’) has 
acquired an increasingly individualised dimension. It suggests that our concern with group 
rights and identity politics may overshadow how the giving or taking of offence is also 
attached to the diverse ways in which individual identity is felt and experienced. In particular, 
it argues that the assertion of offence is increasingly grounded in the hurt offence is felt to 
cause to the beliefs which form our sense of self-hood or personal identity. The project 
maintains that disputes of offence relating to wider inequalities (like racism or sexism) are 
more usefully understood through exploration and recognition of both their broader and 
individualised contexts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ii 
Acknowledgments 
 
I am particularly grateful to my supervisors, Professor Elaine Campbell and Professor 
William Outhwaite, for their immeasurable support, guidance, encouragement and good 
humour throughout the previous four years.  
 
I would also like to thank friends and family for their patience and support throughout the 
completion of this thesis including Tony and Audrey Fearon, Geoff and Stanley.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iii 
Contents 
 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ i 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... ii 
Contents .................................................................................................................................... iii 
List of Figures ......................................................................................................................... .vii 
Chapter 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1    
1.1        The Research Context: Framing the culture and language of offence ........................... 1 
1.2        Aims and Outcomes of Thesis: Making sense of ‘PC disputes’ and the culture  
             of offence ....................................................................................................................... 5 
1.3        Thesis Outline ................................................................................................................ 7 
Chapter 2.  A Genealogy of PC .............................................................................................. 11   
2.1        Introduction .................................................................................................................. 11 
2.2        PC as a floating signifier .............................................................................................. 13 
2.2.1     The discursive origins of PC ........................................................................................ 13 
2.2.2     The resignification of PC ............................................................................................. 14 
2.2.3     PC as a mobile cultural signifier ................................................................................. 15 
2.2.4     The contextual nature of PC ....................................................................................... 18 
2.2.5     Summary and implications of analysis ........................................................................ 20 
2.3        A Foucauldian genealogical analysis of the emergence of PC ................................... 21 
2.3.1     The Genealogical Method ........................................................................................... 21 
2.3.2     Till Death Us Do Part and the conditions of emergence of PC................................... 22 
2.3.3     Political Correctness and the shifting nature of offence ............................................. 27 
2.4        Summary and Conclusion ............................................................................................ 27 
Chapter 3.  PC and the Academy .......................................................................................... 30 
3.1        Introduction .................................................................................................................. 30 
3.2        The case against PC ..................................................................................................... 31 
3.3        PC as a flawed progressive project .............................................................................. 36 
3.4        PC as a myth  ............................................................................................................... 40 
3.5        The sociological view of PC and its implications for further research ........................ 42 
 
  iv 
Chapter 4.  ‘A puzzle without a solution’1? Researching PC ............................................. 47 
4.1         Introduction ................................................................................................................. 47 
4.2         Research Questions ..................................................................................................... 47 
4.3         Methodological Overview .......................................................................................... 50 
4.4.        Political Correctness and forms of news discourse................................................. ... 52 
4.4.1      Reading British newspapers ........................................................................................ 53 
4.4.2      Listening to parliamentary debate ............................................................................. 54 
4.4.3      Following Twitter and the reporting of ‘Twitter Storms’ .......................................... 55 
4.5         Political Correctness and Popular Comedy................................................................. 56 
4.5.1     Using capital theory to explore why Jimmy Carr is ‘edgy’ and Chubby Brown             
            ‘offensive’  ..................................................................................................................... 57 
4.5.2      Is there a ‘new offensiveness’? Using Bakhtinian dialogism to make sense of the 
              appeal of politically incorrect discourse ................................................................. .. 59 
4.6         Political Correctness and Political Cartooning ....................................................... ... 62 
4.6.1      Using intertextual analysis to explore discourses of offence ...................................... 62 
4.6.2      The reporting of a ‘cartoon crisis’: Using representation theory to explore the 
              British media response to the Danish Muhammad cartoons....................................... 64 
4.6.3      Using Barthesian semiology to ‘demystify’ Jesus and Mo ......................................... 67 
4.7         Reflections on the research process ............................................................................ 70 
4.8         Summary and Conclusion ........................................................................................... 72 
Chapter 5. Political Correctness and the production of news ............................................ 74 
5.1         Introduction ................................................................................................................. 74 
5.2        ‘I’m not touchy. However I do take offence at being accused of being politically  
              correct’2: Discourses of PC within British broadsheet newspapers ............................ 75 
5.3         Parliamentary Discourse: the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill .............................. 82 
5.3.1      Parliamentary Discourse and the role of MPs ........................................................... 82 
5.3.2      Brief contextual background to the bill ...................................................................... 82 
5.3.3      Debating same sex marriage in the House of Commons ............................................ 83 
5.4         The Paris Brown ‘Twitter Storm’ ............................................................................... 90 
5.4.1      The emergence of Twitter and social media ............................................................... 90 
                                                          
1
 This quote from Paul Berman (1992:5-6) is taken from a lengthier description of the difficulties surrounding 
any attempt to conceptualise or account for PC. 
2
 This quote is taken from a Daily Telegraph article written by Ruth Dudley Edwards in 2012 which is used in 
the project as a data source. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.ruthdudleyedwards.co.uk/journalism12/Dtelblog12_ (Accessed 15
th
 April, 2015) 
  v 
 
5.4.2      Brief background to the Paris Brown case ................................................................. 91 
5.4.3      The reporting of a Twitter Storm ................................................................................ 92 
5.5  Summary and conclusions .......................................................................................... 97 
Chapter 6. Comedy and Political Correctness ................................................................... 102 
6.1  Introduction ............................................................................................................... 102 
6.2 An historical overview of PC and British comedy ................................................... 103 
6.2.1      Mapping PC and British comedy ............................................................................. 103 
6.2.2      The Pre-PC era ......................................................................................................... 104 
6.2.3      The PC era .............................................................................................................. . 105 
6.2.4      The Post-PC era ........................................................................................................ 108 
6.3         A cultural analysis of ‘offensive’ humour ................................................................ 112 
6.3.1      Comedy and the new ‘liberal orthodoxy’.................................................................. 112 
6.3.2      Defining offensive humour and politically incorrect humour................................... 112 
6.3.3      Data analysis ........................................................................................................... 114 
6.4         Making sense of ‘edgy’ comedy and the ‘new offensiveness’ ................................. 126 
6.4.1      Identifying the ‘new offensiveness’ in British comedy .............................................. 126 
6.4.2      Is ‘the joking rebel’ subversive or conservative?: Data analysis of ‘edgy’  
              humour ...................................................................................................................... 127 
6.4.3      Summary and conclusions ........................................................................................ 137 
Chapter 7. Political Cartoons and ‘offensiveness’ ............................................................. 140 
7.1         Introduction ............................................................................................................. . 140 
7.2         Political Cartooning and the significance of religious identity ................................. 142 
7.2.1      The history and nature of cartoon satire ................................................................... 142 
7.2.2      Religious identity, offence and the ‘Post-Secular’ Society ....................................... 145 
7.2.3      Religion and Political Cartooning in the 21
st
 century .............................................. 147 
7.3         Reporting Discourse.................................................................................................. 148 
7.3.1      The role of the Political Cartoonist ........................................................................... 148 
7.3.2      An intertextual reading of discourses of offence ...................................................... 148 
7.4         Creating Discourse .................................................................................................... 155 
7.4.1      Cartoons as creators of discourse............................................................................. 155 
7.4.2      Background to the Danish Cartoon Crisis ................................................................ 155 
7.4.3      Representational analysis and the Danish Cartoons ................................................ 156 
  vi 
7.4.4     Background to the ‘Jesus and Mo’ web comic, and the denunciation  
              it has provoked .......................................................................................................... 163 
7.4.5      A Semiotic study of the Jesus and Mo cartoons ........................................................ 165 
7.5 Summary and conclusions ........................................................................................ 170 
Chapter 8. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 172 
8.1         Introduction: ‘the paradox of PC’ ............................................................................. 172 
8.2         ‘…political correctness [is] more easily recognised than defined…’ 
              (Hughes, 2010:9): How Political Correctness has been conceptualised  
              throughout the thesis ................................................................................................. 173 
8.3        ‘a censorious movement to be mocked’: Linking the negative signification of PC  
              to the literature review and research objectives ........................................................ 174 
8.4         Drawing conclusions regarding the ‘paradox of PC’ ................................................ 176 
8.4.1     ‘Political correctness is liberal in its aims but often illiberal in its practices  
              (Hughes, 2010:4): Has PC generated a liberal orthodoxy?..................................... 176 
8.4.2     ‘My favourite noise in comedy is the laugh followed by the sharp intake of breath’3: 
              What is the appeal of politically incorrect discourse? ............................................. 182 
 8.4.3    ‘Offence, both given and received, hinges on the dynamic conflict between values, 
              held by different cultures, groups, individuals or generations’. (Rowson, 2009:5):   
             Why are we preoccupied with disputes of offence? ................................................... 188 
8.5        Looking towards ways of exploring offence and the politics of self-hood................ 194 
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 196 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 This quote is from the comedian Jimmy Carr and is taken from a 2009 interview with The Guardian 
newspaper.[Online] Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2009/nov/05/jimmy-carr-paralympics-
joke (Accessed 10th April 2015) 
  vii 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Tweet sent by the former Shadow Minister, Emily Thornberry MP, on  
20
th
 November 2014 .................................................................................................................... 1 
 
Figure 2: Extract from the article ‘Is this foul-mouthed, self-obsessed Twitter teen really  
the future of British policing?’ by Russell Myers in The Mail on Sunday, April 2013 ............ 93 
 
Figure 3: Martin Rowson cartoon of Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens from  
New Humanist magazine, November 2007 ............................................................................. 140 
 
Figure 4: Steve Bell cartoon of the then government ministers, John Prescott and  
David Blunkett, from The Guardian, December2004 ............................................................ 144 
 
Figure 5: Martin Rowson cartoon of God and Richard Dawkins from New Humanist 
magazine, May 2010 ............................................................................................................... 149 
 
Figure 6: Martin Rowson cartoon depicting clergy from the Church of England from  
The Guardian, July 2010 ........................................................................................................ 150 
 
Figure 7: Martin Rowson cartoon of the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese conflict from  
The Guardian, July 2006 ........................................................................................................ 152 
 
Figure 8: Martin Rowson cartoon of George Bush and Tony Blair from The Guardian,  
June 2006 ................................................................................................................................ 154 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 
 
Chapter1. Introduction 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
Figure1. Tweet sent by Emily Thornberry, MP, on 20
th
 November 2014 
 
1.1 The Research Context: Framing the culture and language of offence   
 
In November 2014 the MP, Emily Thornberry, resigned from the Labour party’s front bench 
after having posted a tweet during the Rochester and Strood by-election. The tweet showed a 
terraced house with three England flags draped from the windows and a white van parked 
outside. The message simply said ‘Image from Rochester’. In the media furore which 
followed, the tweet was decried as ‘offensive’, ‘snobbish’ and ‘sneering’4. The Labour leader, 
Ed Miliband, also wrote in the Daily Mirror newspaper of his anger with the tweet which he 
argued ‘conveyed a sense of disrespect about a family in Rochester’5. The offence generated 
by Thornberry’s tweet dominated the discussion surrounding a high profile by-election in 
which contentious argument about immigration, the rise of the UK Independence Party 
(UKIP) and the decline of traditional party politics had hitherto set the media and political 
agenda. It also helps illustrate how a culture has emerged in which the giving and taking of 
offence has an important power to shape headlines or affect the conditions of debate. In this  
                                                          
4
 Emily Thornberry subsequently apologised for having caused offence after her tweet was widely reported by 
the British media. The Sun newspaper was amongst those offended by the tweet and referred on its front page to 
‘Snob Labour MP’s dig at White Van Man’s England flags’. See [Online] Available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/21/us-britain-politics-flag-idUSKCN0J514U20141121 (Accessed 01 
February 2015) 
5
 [Online] Available at: http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/ed-miliband-furious-emily-thornberry-4671545 
(Accessed 01 February 2015)         
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instance the resignation of Emily Thornberry also demonstrates how giving offence may have 
significant consequences for those who offend. 
 
This project arose from a desire to grapple with the sociological significance of our 
preoccupation with disputes of offence including the discursive alignment of the language of 
offence to the reification of political correctness (PC) in recent decades.  In particular, the 
aims of the project were generated by some of the ways in which the emergence of the 
language of PC
6
 has changed how we view disputes concerning racism, sexism or other 
forms of prejudice. Undoubtedly, the language of PC has emerged alongside important social, 
cultural and political change regarding attitudes towards racism or sexism. An important 
component of this has involved linguistic change which discourages the use of racist, sexist 
or homophobic language. This sort of linguistic reform - often attributed to PC - has been 
usefully described by Cameron (1995) as constituting a progressive ‘verbal hygiene’ 
movement which involves viewing language as something that shapes as well as reflects 
broader values. However, there has also been a significant backlash against what is regarded 
as the culture of censoriousness surrounding many ‘PC disputes’ and much of this is 
predicated on the view that open debate has become compromised or curtailed by people’s 
willingness to take offence over utterances deemed as ‘racist’ or ‘sexist’. The frequency with 
which disputes of offence (such as the controversy provoked by Emily Thornberry’s tweet) 
pervades media discourse contributes to the sense that a culture has emerged in which the 
assertion of offence increasingly directs both the nature of the topic up for discussion
7
 and 
what may or may not be legitimatised as appropriate or ‘correct’ discourse within that 
discussion. One of the motivations for this research project is the way in which arguments 
against racism or homophobia have become discursively realigned or reappraised within 
contemporary discourse as ‘PC’ arguments. A consequence of this is that arguments about 
what constitutes racism or homophobia have come to be viewed as sustained or produced by 
a ‘new’ politics or culture of offence. It is this juxtaposition of PC as something to disparage 
in spite of its non-discriminatory and progressive goals that this thesis explores.  
 
                                                          
6
 By ‘language of PC’ I refer in this project both to the direct use of the term ‘PC’ and its derivatives (such as 
‘politically correct’ or ‘politically incorrect’) and the discourse which surrounds the debate about PC (such as 
the argument it generates about the nature of offence or inequality). The language of PC, therefore, will 
incorporate a range of viewpoints about the nature of political correctness both positive and negative.  
7
 For example, during the Rochester by-election the offence provoked by Thornberry’s tweet propelled it into a 
major news story which eclipsed the discussion of policy issues associated with the campaign. 
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Sociological analysis has addressed the negative way in which PC is viewed by focusing 
primarily on how PC is purported to unduly  prioritise the avoidance of offence and promote 
linguistic change as the principal way of advancing social and political equality (see e.g. 
Ehrenreich, 1992; Hall, 1994; Cameron, 1995; Lakoff, 2000; Fairclough, 2003).  Studies have 
also considered the implications of various ‘offensive’ or ‘non-PC’ forms of social 
stereotyping using representations of gender, ethnicity, disability, class or sexuality (see e.g. 
Finding, 2008; Billig, 2010; Lockyer, 2010; Malik, 2010;Montgomerie, 2010). However, in 
order to make sense of how PC is discursively constructed around a ‘new’ politics of offence, 
sociological analysis has not produced a comprehensive study which encompasses different 
forms or levels of discourse. This thesis will, therefore, undertake an investigation of various 
discursive contexts which contain varying levels of ‘offensive’ or ‘non-PC’ discourse.  It will 
also explore the unresolved tensions which continue to surround the debate about PC using a 
socio-cultural analysis which deploys a range of power centred approaches to examine 
different popular cultural and media sources. This emphasis upon the role of culture locates 
the research within the field of cultural sociology and the thesis therefore contributes to the 
deeper understanding of how culture and cultural processes can help interpret and explain the 
sociological significance of disputes of offence. In doing so the project draws attention to a 
question arising from reflection upon some of the available literature (including that 
referenced in this paragraph):  PC has been approached and understood in the literature to be 
a phenomenon which discourages racist or otherwise ‘incorrect’ discourse and yet ‘non-PC’ 
representations within popular culture nevertheless retain a level of cultural acceptance and 
popular appeal. 
 
The controversy arising from the tweet posted by Emily Thornberry is therefore located 
within a wider culture in which the giving and taking of offence forms a prominent and 
newsworthy component. This case also helps us begin to consider more carefully why this 
project is undertaken as it draws attention to some of the general features of the socio-cultural 
landscape it will examine. Firstly, the tweet does not contain the use of any ‘obviously’ 
derogatory language or imagery. However, the image, together with its short message ‘Image 
from Rochester’ was understood immediately by many people to be offensive. The offence it 
provoked illustrates how meaning depends upon access to a shared language which allows 
people within a discursive community to interpret and make sense of the world around them. 
The tweet also demonstrates that visual imagery (as well as the written or spoken word) is an 
important form of language which carries with it the power to offend. In this respect, any 
  4 
comprehensive understanding of ‘offensive’ language must consider more than the use of 
‘offensive’ words or spoken utterances and also recognise the power of imagery to 
communicate meaning which is offensive to some, whether this might be a photograph or a 
political cartoon. Furthermore, the tweet also markedly demonstrates the contextual nature of 
offence: for example, it is unlikely that the image or words alone would generally have 
caused offence independent of the context or circumstances in which they were understood to 
have been used.  
 
Secondly, the controversy generated by this incident suggests that traditional ways of framing 
or discussing the culture of offence and political correctness may require re-examination. For 
example, amongst those offended by the tweet was The Sun newspaper which criticised at 
length the ‘snobbishness’ of Emily Thornberry. The popular tabloid is generally dismissive of 
the notion of political correctness, however, it was prominent amongst those demanding that 
Thornberry apologise for the offence she caused. We need, therefore, to develop a more 
nuanced understanding of the culture of offence and how disputes of offence may or may not 
become discursively attached to PC.  Of further significance are the reasons why the tweet 
was considered to be offensive. The image used included cultural signifiers (namely the 
draped England flags and white van) which have acquired a semiotic attachment to the 
identity and values associated with parts of the English working class
8
. The controversy this 
case generated was therefore imbibed with discussion of class prejudice and the modern 
Labour party’s disconnect from its traditional working class supporters. The emergence of the 
language of PC has developed alongside the strengthening of identity based politics which 
has tended to prioritise linguistic or cultural change rather than economic change based upon 
traditional class based politics. However, the Emily Thornberry tweet succeeded in 
discursively aligning class politics with the politics of offence. We need also, therefore, to 
develop an understanding of PC which addresses the appeal of the politics of offence in 
recent decades and how an increasing range of issues and subject matter are now debated 
within a discursive framework in which the language of offence is pre-eminent.  
 
                                                          
8
 The phrase ‘white man van’ has emerged as a popular stereotype in the UK and is often used to denote an 
aggressive or inconsiderate driver and tabloid reader, usually assumed to be working class.  The man whose 
home was ‘sneered’ at by Emily Thornberry was named ‘White Van Dan’ by the media and his own ‘Danifesto’ 
was published in The Sun newspaper setting out how he would run the country if in power. [Online] Available 
at: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/11/22/white-van-dan-emily-thornberry_n_6203580.html (Accessed 
11th February 2015) 
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1.2 Aims and Outcomes of Thesis: Making sense of ‘PC disputes’ and the culture of 
offence. 
 
This thesis undertakes an examination of the different meanings, paradoxes and disputes 
which inform and also obfuscate how PC is understood. In doing so it recognises how PC has 
emerged in recent decades as a powerful cultural signifier for a ‘new’ politics of language 
and identity. The thesis has three overarching aims. Firstly, it will undertake an exploration of 
the various meaning(s) attached to PC and ask whether PC can be accurately described as 
responsible for installing an illiberal culture of censoriousness in which ‘incorrect’ 
viewpoints are routinely prohibited or discouraged in spite of PC’s ostensibly progressive 
aims. In order to develop an answer it will revisit and engage with the popular critique of PC 
as an illiberal movement to be disparaged. An important purpose of this part of the research 
process will be to ascertain how, whether and to what extent a culture of censoriousness 
based upon excessive sensitivity towards the giving of offence does prevail across different 
levels of contemporary discourse.  
  
The second core aim will address a further paradox at the heart of the debate surrounding PC. 
It investigates why anti-PC discourse and rhetoric retain a level of popularity despite 
society’s increasing intolerance of racism or other forms of bigotry.  Also implicit in this 
matter is the question of how the celebration of politically incorrect forms of expression can 
be reconciled with the sense that a form of PC orthodoxy has been imposed upon many 
aspects of modern social life. In order to investigate this, the project will consider how the 
notion of political incorrectness should be characterised and explore what strategies or 
practices might help to legitimise politically incorrect forms of discourse within some 
discursive spaces. It will also explore whether any principal meaning can account for the 
appeal of politically incorrect utterances despite the offence this simultaneously generates.  
 
The third core aim will be to undertake an investigation that accounts for our preoccupation 
with ‘disputes of offence’ including the discussion the giving and taking of offence invariably 
generates throughout modern media. (This part of the research process also hopes to build 
upon some of the insights and analysis developed from having undertaken the first two 
research aims). The thesis will explore how and whether the emergence of new discursive 
spaces - particularly those generated by social media technologies – has contributed to the 
evolving nature or character of debate around disputes of offence. In attempting to account 
  6 
for the importance attached to social contestation surrounding ‘PC disputes’ the thesis will 
also question whether a culture of competing rights has arisen in which different groups or 
individuals vie to assert their right to offend or be offended.   
 
The thesis will refute the assertion that PC has imposed a culture of censoriousness which 
permeates across all levels of discourse explored in this study. However, it does argue that 
the conditions of debate have changed as a consequence of the emergence of the language of 
PC over recent decades and that this has created a less readable discursive environment. 
Within this environment discourse may utilise the language of PC in order to give credence to 
arguably ‘non-PC’ positions. However, the assumption that people share a disdain for racism 
or homophobia may also help legitimise politically incorrect utterances within other 
discursive contexts (such as the sharing of ‘ironically offensive’ jokes). Although the study 
does not suggest that particular viewpoints are prohibited throughout the different levels of 
discourse it examines, the thesis does maintain that what may be said (or what might be 
regarded as ‘offensive’) continues to be highly context dependent9.  In this respect, it 
contends that progressive goals may also contribute to the propagation of illiberal practices 
within some discursive contexts. The thesis will account for this by identifying how power is 
sometimes understood to operate in such a way that structural inequalities are reinforced by 
forms of expression considered ‘offensive’ to historically disadvantaged groups.  
 
The thesis contends that no single meaning or set of associations can account for the appeal 
of anti-PC rhetoric or the expression of politically incorrect utterances. It does, however, 
identify a range (or polyphony) of potentially incompatible voices which have been labelled 
‘politically incorrect’. These include those which deploy the use of irony to varying degrees 
as a way of deflecting critique of superficially ‘incorrect’ utterances. They also include voices 
which appear to explicitly celebrate forms of expression that reject the politics of language or 
identity associated with PC. The study contends that effective deployment of cultural capital 
skills is able to legitimise the use of some ‘offensive’ forms of expression despite the 
heightened sensitivity within society to the problems arising from racism or homophobia. 
Finally, it will argue that discourse which addresses or critiques (rather than celebrates) social 
problems like racism or sexism may also be potentially viewed as ‘politically incorrect’. It 
describes the backlash against political correctness – particularly the sense that it has 
                                                          
9
 By ‘context dependent’ I refer both to the specific location of a form of discourse (such as a parliamentary 
debate or exchange between users of social media) and who is engaged in that discourse. 
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inculcated a culture of excessive censoriousness – as strengthened by the classification of 
different and disparate voices in this way. (In other words, the conflation of a potentially 
wide range of utterances as ‘politically incorrect’ contributes to the sense that many forms of 
expression are felt to be ‘off limits’).  
 
Crucially, the thesis will recommend that disputes of offence should be understood as 
containing an individualised dimension which sits alongside a wider dimension 
encompassing the politics of group membership or group identity. It also suggests that the 
emergence of identity politics over recent decades has encouraged us to examine PC disputes 
primarily through analysis which focuses upon the importance of group identity rather than 
this individualised dimension. The thesis will draw this conclusion in light of its analysis of 
the highly subjective way in which offence is taken - a theme particularly highlighted  in its 
exploration of  discourse generated through new discursive spaces (such as online activity). It 
will argue that the user-led and relatively democratised nature of modern forms of media 
allow us to observe more directly the diversity of opinion which may exist within as well as 
between different groups regarding what is or is not felt to be ‘offensive’. In claiming this, 
the thesis does not refute the significance of power differentials between different social 
groups or how these help produce ‘PC disputes’ arising from grounds such as racism, 
religious identity or sexuality. However, it does argue that such disputes are increasingly 
embedded in what people consider as offensive to their sense of self-hood, and that this 
individualised dimension cannot be reducible to, or subsumed within, some of the broader 
categories of identity explored within this project in any predictable or obvious way. 
 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
 
Chapter Two, A Genealogy of PC, will address two key themes. Firstly, it traces the 
emergence and reification of PC over recent decades in order to provide an accurate socio-
cultural context from which the significance of disputes of offence can then be explored. In 
doing so, this chapter utilises the idea of the floating signifier which was originally developed 
by Levi-Strauss (1950) to demonstrate how the meaning of a concept or sign may not be 
stable. The chapter describes why and how this thesis will approach PC as a floating cultural 
signifier which is attached to a number of different meanings or signifieds. Secondly, the 
chapter also undertakes a Foucauldian genealogical analysis which considers the conditions 
through which the emergence of PC as a floating cultural signifier was made possible. It 
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draws upon the 1960s situation comedy Till Death Us Do Part in order to explore the 
contemporary discussion surrounding PC by conducting a ‘history of the present’ (Kendall 
and Whickham, 2000:4).  
 
Chapter Three, PC and The Academy, provides an evaluation of how the literature has sought 
to account for the various meanings attached to PC, particularly the negative signification of 
PC as an authoritarian movement which has generated an excessive fear of causing offence 
within contemporary society. In doing so it reviews a body of work which encompasses three 
broad positions. The first of these will entail an exploration of studies which claim that a 
prevailing culture of censoriousness has emerged which is attributable to PC.  The second 
will include a review of the available literature which has reasoned that although PC is 
underwritten by progressive and commendable aims, the narrative of excess surrounding it 
(including its prioritisation of the politics of language) has contributed to an anti-PC 
backlash. Thirdly, the chapter will examine studies advanced by those who reject the view 
that the term PC may be reasonably used to describe the emergence of a verifiable movement 
or phenomena, and instead prefer to view it as a concept co-opted and utilised by the political 
right in order to discredit the political left. Finally, this chapter will consider how the 
meanings attached to PC have been understood by relevant studies within each of the three 
core thematic fields used in the thesis to answer its research objectives. This part of the thesis 
will highlight the ways in which the literature has failed to fully reconcile some of the 
tensions which continue to encumber our understanding of PC. 
 
Chapter Four, ‘A Puzzle without a solution’?: Researching PC, will outline the research aims 
and objectives which underpin the thesis along with the different methodologies used to 
answer the research questions. It therefore provides a detailed description of the research 
design which will include an explanation of why each question is asked, and how each 
question will be investigated, analysed and answered.  In view of the synergistic nature of the 
methodological framework developed by this project, the methodology chapter also outlines 
why an eclectic range of power-centred discourse analytical models are chosen rather than 
any single methodology. Finally, the chapter will reflect upon the overall research context in 
which this project was undertaken, including the methodological issues and challenges this 
has produced. 
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Chapter Five, Political Correctness and the production of news,  undertakes an exploration of 
the first core research question using three case studies which focus upon a different fragment 
of discourse involving the (re)production of news or political affairs. Each study will make 
use of both senses of ‘discourse’ as defined by Gee (1999; 2010) in order to answer this 
question: in other words, the use of the word ‘PC’ and its derivatives are investigated within 
each data source together with the wider discursive context in which each source is located. 
The first case study explores discourses of PC within two broadsheet newspapers (The Daily 
Telegraph and The Guardian) and asks whether a liberal orthodoxy is identifiable within the 
source material or if particular arguments are discouraged or precluded in any way. The 
second case study undertakes a thematic analysis of the arguments made in the parliamentary 
debate in the House of Commons which led to the vote in favour of same sex marriage in 
2013. It queries how the discursive context in which debate takes place might impact upon 
the conditions of debate, including what may or may not be said as well as how things are 
said.  The third case study uses the Paris Brown ‘Twitter Storm’ of 2013 as source material10. 
It continues to explore the relationship between discursive context and how disputes of 
offence are enacted and understood. It also begins to consider how the emergence of new 
forms of media has contributed to our preoccupation with disputes of offence
11
. 
 
Chapter Six, Comedy and Political Correctness, will use contemporary British comedy as 
source material with which to answer the second core research question and its sub-questions. 
It does so using two overarching conceptual frameworks. Firstly, the chapter uses Bourdieu’s 
capital theory to help it consider how and why politically incorrect utterances are able to 
acquire a cultural legitimacy and acceptability despite the offence this might also generate as 
a consequence of changing social attitudes towards forms of social stereotyping. This part of 
the chapter will include a comparative analysis of the cultural capital resources held by two 
successful stand-up comedians - Roy ‘Chubby’ Brown and Jimmy Carr - together with their 
audience(s). Chapter Six also uses Bakhtinian dialogism to investigate why politically 
incorrect forms of expression continue to be celebrated within some levels of discourse.  In 
particular, it utilises the Bakhtinian concepts of the carnival and double-voiced discourse to 
explore whether contemporary forms of ‘edgy’ or ‘non-PC’ stand-up comedy can be usefully 
viewed as a carnivalesque subversion of ‘official’ PC cultural norms and values. 
                                                          
10
 Paris stood down from her role as newly appointed Youth Police and Crime Commissioner for the Kent 
Police Force Area after having sent a number of tweets considered by many people to be offensive.  
11
 The relationship between disputes of offence and the emergence of new media technologies is also considered 
in Chapter Seven.  
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Chapter Seven, Political Cartoons and ‘offensiveness’, examines the third research 
question(s) using political cartooning on the theme of religion and religious identity as source 
material. It will also build upon the analysis developed in the previous data chapters as it 
continues to explore how we should account for our contemporary preoccupation with 
disputes of offence - particularly in light of the importance the modern media attaches to such 
disputes. The chapter will use a range of methodological tools to do so. Firstly, it undertakes 
an intertextual analysis of cartoons by Martin Rowson which depict social contention over 
religious themes or have generated controversy surrounding matters of religious identity. 
This part of the chapter observes the regulatory power of the assertion of offence and is 
particularly interested in querying whether a culture of competing rights has emerged based 
around the claiming of offence. Secondly, the chapter uses Hall’s theory of representation to 
explore the signifying practices within British newspapers at the time of their coverage of the 
offence generated by the publication of cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in the Danish 
newspaper Jyllands-Posten in 2006. The signifying practices are examined as a method of 
understanding how our perception of the nature of offence is produced through these 
practices. Thirdly, the chapter undertakes an examination of the online comic strip Jesus and 
Mo using Barthesian semiology. The comic strip is selected so that the thesis can consider 
more closely the relevance of user-led forms of media which have encouraged a generally 
more participatory and less regulated discursive environment.  
 
Chapter Eight, Conclusion, includes a summary of the knowledge acquired from the 
investigations undertaken in each of the three data analysis chapters which it uses to consider 
the contribution to knowledge this study has made. The chapter argues that although the 
thesis findings do not suggest that a form of ‘PC’ orthodoxy pervades throughout 
contemporary discourse, uncertainty over the nature of ‘offensiveness’ has been galvanised 
by the varying and disputable levels of PC within different levels of discourse. The chapter 
will also argue that the emphasis placed within academic and journalistic discourse on the 
relationship between disputes of offence, the politics of identity and group rights may deflect 
our focus from the ways in which PC disputes also contain an individualised component. 
Finally, the chapter will suggest how further research might build upon some of the findings 
and conclusions it discusses. It recommends that to make sense of the disparate ways in 
which offence is given and received by different people, research might undertake more 
direct analysis of the relationship between an audience and ‘offensive’ forms of expression. 
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Chapter 2. A Genealogy of PC 
‘Not all neologism is politically loaded. But the introduction of a new phrase or word into the 
popular lexicon is world-changing because it alters our presuppositions: it identifies the new 
concept as both real and worthy of mention, assigns it to a frame, and so enables us to talk and 
think about it.’ (Lakoff, 2000:90) 
‘One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid the subject itself, that is to say, to 
arrive at analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical 
framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can 
account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without 
having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of 
events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history’ (Foucault, cited in 
Gordon, 1980:117) 
2.1 Introduction 
In 2000, Lakoff claimed that no other neologism appearing in the later decades of the 20
th
 
century had ‘achieved the celebrity of “political correctness” or “p.c.”(p.90). Today, popular 
use of the concept (including its derivatives like ‘politically incorrect’ or ‘non-PC’) continues 
to pervade our everyday discourse. The term ‘PC’ is often used without explanation, thereby 
suggesting that its meaning is commonly understood and broadly accepted. However, 
attempts to define and account for PC (including its obverse, political incorrectness) are often 
contentious or disputatious. Two overarching reasons may help to account for this. Firstly, as 
PC is typically viewed as having emerged from the politics of the liberal-left, the attempts to 
account for it often reflect deep underlying philosophical or ideological differences
12
. 
Secondly, the language of PC
13
 has permeated discussion of an ever wider range of 
arguments and disparate practices in the decades since use of the term entered mainstream 
discourse in the early 1990s
14
. As a way of making sense of both this broadening scope and 
the politically charged context in which the debate about PC takes place, attempts to define 
the concept have often involved the classification of particular types of thought, speech or 
                                                          
12
 In 1994, Hall described ‘the rise of political correctness’ in both the US and UK in the 1980s and 1990s as 
‘intimately connected’ to the battle over ‘moral and cultural issues’ between the liberal-left and the New Right 
governments of that era (pp. 168-169). The wider relationship between political affiliation and PC is outlined in 
greater depth in the Literature Review chapter, and more generally throughout this thesis.  
13
 I mean the ‘language of PC’ in this chapter to include the use of the phrase itself and its various derivatives 
(such as ‘political incorrectness’ or ‘non-PC’).  
14
 This expansion of the arguments and practices attached to PC will be explored in this chapter. 
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behaviour as manifestations of PC
15
. Nevertheless, the exercise of classifying particular 
tendencies or behaviour as either ‘politically correct’ or ‘politically incorrect’ remains 
problematic as a consequence of the discontinuous and disputative way in which PC is 
understood.  This thesis, therefore, suggests that it may be more useful to approach PC as a 
floating signifier which is subject to redefinition by different people in different contexts, 
rather than as a descriptor of fixed or readily observable phenomenon
16
. The notion of the 
floating signifier has been adopted by researchers who are interested in how concepts are 
discursively constructed. For example, Hall (2006:20) describes the concept of race as a 
sliding or ‘moving signifier’ and argues that there is always a ‘sliding of meaning’ around the 
concept which to be understood must be explored and contextualised through analysis of 
discourse (including religious, popular, scientific or political discourse). This chapter will 
interrogate the ‘sliding of meaning’ around PC in order to account for the ways in which it 
has become discursively attached to a disparate range of debates and phenomena. This 
exercise will also help locate the analysis of discourse in the data chapters of this project 
within their broader discursive context. 
 
This chapter investigates two broad themes. Firstly, in order to make sense of how PC has 
been defined, it explores PC as a floating cultural signifier which is tied to a number of 
different meanings. Secondly, it considers the discursive and non-discursive conditions which 
enabled PC to emerge as a reified phenomenon in the 1990s.  Analysis, therefore, will focus 
both upon how PC is understood, and how this understanding has become possible. The first 
part of the chapter explores PC as a floating signifier which exists alongside a ‘floating chain 
of signifieds’ (Barthes, 1977:39). It is also informed by Said’s concept of ‘the travelling 
theory’ which argues that an idea or theory may travel from its origins onto other locations 
where it evolves and is transformed ‘by its new uses, its new position in a new time and 
place’ (1983: 227). Using this conceptual framework, the chapter asks what PC might signify 
                                                          
15
 For example, in his history of the origins, progress, and nature of political correctness, Hughes (2010:12) 
describes how within the ‘the category of swearing only ethnic slurs qualify unambiguously… as politically 
incorrect’, whilst religious or sexual swearing are categorised more variably.  
16
 The notion of a floating signifier was initially developed by Levi-Strauss in 1950 in his book Introduction to 
the Work of Marcel Mauss and is defined by Chandler as ‘a signifier with a vague, highly variable, unspecifiable 
or non-existent signified’ (2001:229). Saussurean semiotics has highlighted the arbitrary nature of the 
relationship between signifier and signified (for example, there is no inevitability that the colour green used on 
traffic lights should signify the instruction to proceed). However, the idea of the floating signifier also questions 
the apparently predictable relationship between signifier and signified within a particular social context. This is 
because a floating signifier removes the stable link between the two, so that the signifier comes to mean 
different things to different people. 
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within different locations and at different moments in time. It, therefore, considers the 
temporal nature of the concept as it has evolved over recent decades, and also how PC may 
be simultaneously attached to different meanings within a particular location or discursive 
context. This first part of the chapter contends that, despite the fluidity of meaning 
surrounding PC, it has become reified as an overarching and hegemonic project around which 
disputes of offence and social contestation are enacted. It also describes how the sliding of 
meaning surrounding the concept has reconstituted PC as an orthodox rather than 
countercultural phenomenon.  The second part of the chapter undertakes a Foucauldian 
genealogical analysis in order to consider the conditions of possibility through which PC was 
able to emerge as a signifier for a new form of politics. It draws upon the socio-political 
context surrounding the situation comedy Till Death Us Do Part (originally broadcast in the 
UK in 1964), in order to explore our contemporary understanding of PC through a ‘history’ 
or consideration of the past. This part of the chapter asserts that the way(s) in which PC is 
understood today is the consequence of a multiplicity of historical processes and 
contingencies rather than any overarching or easily identifiable cause. 
2.2 PC as a floating signifier 
2.2.1 The discursive origins of PC 
Authors have speculated that the origins of the use of the term PC may derive from various 
forms and tones of communist doctrine (e.g. see Berman, 1992; Perry, 1992; Hughes, 
2010)
17.  However, the 1971 essay by Toni Cade, ‘The Black Woman’, is usually cited in the 
literature as the earliest written example of the modern use of the term ‘politically correct’ 
(e.g. see Cameron, 1994:19; Stourton, 2008:16, Hughes, 2010:63). In the essay Cade asserts 
that ‘a man cannot be politically correct and a chauvinist too’. In this context the term is used 
to argue in a straightforward manner against sexism, and its use resonates with how PC is 
defined today by the Oxford English Dictionary
18
 as well as much contemporary discourse 
which locates PC in debates about the harm caused by group based inequalities, such as 
racism or sexism. PC, therefore, can be viewed as a signifier for a particular political or 
                                                          
17
 Berman (1992:5) describes PC as ‘originally an approving phrase on the Leninist left to denote someone who 
steadfastly toed the party line’. Meanwhile, Perry (1992) and Hughes (2010:63) suggest that the origins of PC 
may lie within the countercultural left’s enthusiasm for Chairman Mao’s Little Red Book (1964). Hughes argues 
that the notion of ‘correctness’ was elevated to mean ‘adherence to Maoist doctrine’, and ‘was concerned not 
just with “doing the right thing” but “thinking the right thoughts”’ (p.62). 
18
 Political Correctness is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘the careful avoidance of forms of 
expression or action that are perceived to exclude or insult groups of people who are socially disadvantaged or 
discriminated against’ (2011:1110). 
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ethical position which emerged in response to material and social conditions of inequality, 
based around factors such as ethnicity or gender. However, although this position informed 
Cade’s use of the term in her 1971 essay, this was not the only way in which PC was 
understood. Cameron has described the dominant method of discussing PC in the 1970s and 
1980s as ‘ironic’ (1994:19).  She describes the term in this period as used largely by US 
leftists in a self-mocking way in order to ‘satirise the ever-present tendency of ‘politicos’ to 
become over-earnest, humourless and rigidly prescriptive, poking fun at the notion that 
anyone could be (or would want to be) wholly ‘correct’’ (Cameron,1994:19)19. The language 
of PC, therefore, permeated in-group discourse and was ‘understood by insiders as a joke at 
their own expense’ (ibid.). 
 
2.2.2 The resignification of PC 
 
The ‘discursive drift’ (Cameron, 1995:129), which saw the language of PC move from its 
original in-group context into popular discourse, has been contextualised by various authors 
as having surfaced during a series of controversies surrounding the apparent politicisation of 
the culture and curriculum of US universities in the 1980s and early 1990s (e.g. see Hentoff, 
1992; Annette, 1994; Baker-Jones, 1994; Cameron, 1994 and 1995; Hollander, 1994; Morris, 
1995; Wilson 1995 and 1996). These controversies centred upon a number of interrelated 
claims which were initially voiced in critiques concerning the US education system raised in 
various polemical books and academic articles (see e.g. Bloom, 1987; Kimball, 1990 and 
1992; D’Souza, 1991 and 1992; Paglia, 1994). Firstly, these authors claimed that educational 
standards were being compromised, particularly across Arts and Humanities courses, as 
traditional texts were side-lined in order to make way for literature selected to reflect a wider 
range of non-European and female voices. Secondly, it was argued that the use of affirmative 
action in student admissions policies was undermining educational standards and the 
principle of equality of opportunity. Thirdly, it was asserted that free speech itself was under 
attack as student activists and lecturers imposed formal and informal speech codes on 
campuses which censored language and thought deemed to be racist or sexist. The use of the 
term PC appeared periodically (although not consistently) as these assertions were initially 
made. For example, although PC is explicitly identified by Kimball and D’Souza in 1992 as 
the ideology responsible for the purported changes to US universities, their earlier work 
                                                          
19
 As this project focuses primarily on the UK, it is worth clarifying how during this period use of the term PC 
was largely confined within the US left, although the UK left used broadly equivalent terms such as ‘politically 
sound’ or ‘ideologically sound’.  
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espouses similar arguments without directly referencing PC. Instead, blame is directed 
towards targets including the ‘proponents of deconstruction, feminist studies, and other 
politically motivated challenges to the traditional tenets of humanistic study’ (Kimball, 1990: 
xi). More broadly, the language of PC in the early 1990s was emerging as a marketable theme 
across the popular media. The increase in articles and news features in the US which referred 
to PC in this period has been documented by Wilson (1995) and Lakoff (2000); and Suhr and 
Johnson (2003) describe a similar sequence of events as they occurred in the UK
20
. 
This ‘discursive drift’ (Cameron, 1995:129) produced a resignification of PC as usage of the 
term moved from its countercultural origins and into mainstream discourse. Crucially, the 
ironic meaning of the term was usurped and discursively reconstituted as a straightforward 
reflection of the form of politics the left had once parodied as ‘over-earnest… and rigidly 
prescriptive’ (Cameron, 1994:19). PC became reified through this resignification as a 
coherent movement or project in possession of its own underlying structures, ideologies, 
practices, and followers. In The History of Sexuality Foucault (1976) had contended that 
sexual identity was a modern invention, asserting that, ‘the sodomite had been a temporary 
aberration; the homosexual was now a species’ (p.43). In the early 1990s, the ‘politically 
correct’ emerged as a ‘species’ and political correctness as a new phenomenon which was 
tied to a set of signifieds reflecting ‘its new position in a new time and place’ (Said, 
1983:227). 
2.2.3 PC as a mobile cultural signifier 
PC emerged in the early 1990s as a new cultural signifier for a politics of language which 
encouraged the avoidance of words or utterances deemed to be offensive, particularly 
towards groups who have been historically disadvantaged in some way. This form of politics 
is described by Cameron as interested in the power of language wherein language is viewed 
as ‘not just a medium for ideas but a shaper of ideas; [which]… is always and inevitably 
political’ (1995:122). It also involves a degree of linguistic intervention whereby, rather than 
                                                          
20 Using analysis of various news databases, Lakoff reports that usage of the term PC ‘picks up steam around 
1990, peaks between 1991 and 1995, and appears to subside after that’ (2000:95). Suhr and Johnson (2003:33) 
note how the debate developed slightly later in the UK (with the level of interest in PC within popular 
newspapers peaking in 1994 rather than 1991) and that PC was often initially depicted as an idea or movement 
imported from the US.  
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simply avoiding certain words, ways of speaking may be challenged or replaced by politically 
correct alternatives (For example, chairman becomes chair or chairperson). 
Secondly, the importance attached to the use of ‘correct’ language and the avoidance of 
offence, has sat alongside a critique of PC which views it to be a prescriptive and censorious 
project.  Various authors have drawn attention to how media discourse which has favoured 
stories that report upon the excesses of politically correct linguistic interventions has helped 
to underwrite and sustain much of this critique (see e.g. Wilson, 1995; Lakoff, 2000; Mills, 
2003; Suhr and Johnson, 2003; Allan and Burridge, 2006)
21
. In this respect, PC has also 
emerged as a signifier for an authoritarian movement to be mocked or disparaged. In 1994, 
Dunant declared that ‘PC is a dirty word in nineties Britain. To call someone PC is less a 
description than an insult…’ (xi). Today, PC remains a label people seldom self-identify 
with; rather, it is typically imposed upon them by their ideological opponents
22
. In addition, 
as PC signified a movement to be disparaged, political incorrectness also became a signifier 
in the 1990s for the non-censorious and authentic alternative voice, thereby enabling political 
incorrectness to acquire a positive signification. 
Thirdly, PC’s ‘discursive drift’ (Cameron, 1995:129) attached the label not only to a politics 
of language but also to a broader range of political activism, initiatives and practices aimed at 
combatting various social inequalities. This might include action taken to curb discrimination 
in the workplace, or efforts by activists to ensure full legal equality on grounds such as 
sexuality or disability. It also suggests that PC may be tied to ideas about appropriate forms 
of behaviour rather than simply resting upon the appropriate use of language. In this respect, 
PC has also become a signifier for various manifestations of identity based politics and 
activism. 
These signifieds allowed PC to emerge reified as a new political phenomenon (along with the 
new ‘species’ of the politically correct). However, it is also significant that the signifieds pre-
date the presence of the language of PC within popular discourse. Firstly, the politics of 
language had already formed a significant part of the campaigns against racism or sexism 
                                                          
21
 For instance, Allan and Burridge describe how in the 1990s ‘hostility to political correctness grew, fuelled by 
endless reporting and re-reporting of stories of over-the-top speech codes, and banning of books and visual 
images…Real or invented, the most absurd and extreme positions were depicted as mainstream political 
correctness’ (2006:92-93). 
22
 The success with which PC became discursively repositioned in this way in the 1990s has been described as 
evidence in itself of a form of right-wing cultural politics which is hostile to attempts to rescue language from 
some of its detrimental or discriminatory features (e.g. Wilson, 1995; Fairclough, 2003). 
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prior to the reification of PC in the 1990s
23
. Secondly, this focus upon language had also been 
subject to resistance and critique prior to the emergence of PC as a signifier of a movement to 
be mocked. Thirdly, as it permeated mainstream discourse PC became attached to a variety of 
established political concepts and forms of activism (such as feminism or anti-racism). In this 
sense, as PC became resignified (as a new politics of language or an authoritarian movement 
to be mocked), it also became grouped with a number of other pre-existing signifiers (like 
feminism or multiculturalism).  The significance of PC as a cultural signifier was that it was 
able to emerge as an overarching label or category under which other signifiers could now be 
placed. These signifiers (such as multiculturalism or feminism) could then be emptied of their 
own specific meaning(s) and histories, and taken as examples of the broader hegemonic 
project of political correctness. 
Said’s notion of the travelling theory contends that ideas take on different implications 
depending on where, when and how they are deployed. The process of resignification (in 
particular the emergence of PC as an authoritarian movement to be disparaged) allowed PC to 
come to denote and discredit ‘the threatening menace of the left’ including ‘a wide array of 
discursive practices generally thought of as lefty’ (Lakoff, 2000:91). However, since the mid-
1990s, the remit covered by the term has expanded so that PC is also increasingly used to 
refer to ‘behaviour… rather than a political position. Moreover, the emphasis has now moved 
to civil gentility…’ (Allan and Burridge, 2006:94)24. More broadly, PC has come to be 
associated with the regulation and management of the self in ways which may not possess 
any obvious political origin. This might include notions surrounding the ‘correct’ 
management of the body, such as whether we smoke or how we exercise (e.g. Allan and 
Burridge, 2006:175-202)
25
. 
                                                          
23
 For instance, many feminist theorists had explored the nature of sexism in language during the 1970s and 
1980s (e.g.  see Kramarae and Treichler, 1985; Miller and Swift, 1976; Spender, 1980 and 1981). 
24
 For example, Allan and Burridge draw attention to an on-line discussion over social etiquette in which a 
participant asserted that, ‘it is not politically correct to let your guests wash all the dishes themselves’ 
(2006:.95). 
25
 Allan and Burridge argue that our dietary habits are deeply entwined with issues of morality and self-
regulation, which are overseen by medical, political and media discourse. One example of this could be our 
attitudes towards smoking in public places. A ban in 2014 in the UK on smoking in cars while children are 
present has been informed by medical and political discourse concerning the health and welfare of children. 
However, the move has also been condemned as ‘authoritarian’ and ‘politically correct’ (e.g Forsyth, J 2014 ‘ 
What will the family police do next?’, The Daily Mail, 9th February) 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2554960/What-family-police-force-read-children-night.html 
(Accessed: 27 March 2014) 
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What unifies many disparate practices which have come to be viewed as evidence of political 
correctness is a perception that they contribute to an increase in the oversight and regulation 
of people’s lives. Furthermore, this regulation is also often understood as possessing an 
ethical dimension so that ‘correct’ behaviour is deemed to improve the essence and character 
of the individual, or of wider society. (Browne has referred to the ethical dimension of 
political correctness as ‘the dictatorship of virtue’ (2006:3)). In this respect, popular phrases 
like ‘PC gone mad’ and ‘PC brigade’ form part of a narrative of excess surrounding the 
discussion of  what might constitute ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ behaviour. This narrative implies 
that an acceptable (yet unspecifiable) level of PC has been overstepped in some way and that 
PC is zealously and rigorously enforced by an organised and disciplined movement, or ‘PC 
brigade’. The discursive repositioning of PC in the 1990s (as a hegemonic and authoritarian 
movement) has been strengthened through the assembling together of many issues under the 
overarching category of PC since this period. As these issues may involve challenging or 
questioning various aspects of people’s attitudes or behaviour they are felt to be a part of the 
broader PC project. This further connects PC to another set of signifiers denoting both liberal 
and authoritarian aspects.  These signifiers include: ‘illiberal liberalism’ (Phillips, 1994:35), 
‘authoritarian liberalism’ (Rankin 2002:xi), ‘liberal fascism’ (Goldberg 2009) and ‘liberal 
orthodoxy’ (Hughes, 2010:4). Political correctness, therefore, has come to be understood as a 
project which may be underpinned by liberal aims but which is also authoritarian or illiberal 
in method or practice. 
 
2.2.4 The contextual nature of PC 
 
The examination of the origins and evolution of PC as a floating signifier demonstrates the 
temporal nature of the concept, and helps us contextualise how the debates and controversies 
surrounding PC are able to emerge. However, the notion of the travelling theory (Said:1983) 
is also of use when exploring the fluidity of meaning surrounding PC within a specific 
location or level of discourse. For instance, the signification of PC as an authoritarian 
movement has attached the concept to the practice of making judgements about people’s 
attitudes, thought and behaviour. These judgements might include questioning people’s use 
of language, their political viewpoints or their lifestyle choices if these are deemed to be 
politically incorrect.  Hughes (2010:204-210) has examined how political correctness is now 
perceived to inform medical and popular discourse surrounding what we eat and consume, 
including the various efforts to regulate and improve our dietary habits. However, he also 
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explores how assumptions about our dietary habits and patterns of consumption inform 
discourses surrounding body image. Words including ‘fattism’, ‘lookism’ and ‘body fascism’ 
have politicised this discussion, and point to an increasing awareness of the social influences 
and pressures which are detrimental to body image. This also suggests why a flexibility of 
meaning has arisen around PC within this discursive context. PC may simultaneously signify 
the practice of making judgements (in order to improve and regulate what and how we 
consume), or the absence of making judgements in order to avoid causing offence and 
perpetuating prejudice. 
 
This sliding of meaning may suggest that it is also possible to view PC as an empty signifier 
which means whatever its interpreters wish it to. However, in order to make sense of the 
sliding of meaning in this context, it is important to re-examine PC as a signifier of a politics 
of language and the politics of identity. PC is understood to be especially concerned with the 
avoidance of offence towards less powerful groups in society
26. (‘PC’ judgements about 
dietary habits, therefore, may be withheld in order to avoid reinforcing the politically 
incorrect doctrine of ‘body fascism’).  The practice of avoiding offence also contributes to a 
further uncertainty, or confusion of meaning, surrounding PC. Various authors have argued 
that the fear of offending less powerful groups may contribute to an unwillingness to confront 
illiberal attitudes or practices within these groups (see e.g. Okin, 1999; Pollit, 1999; Cohen, 
2007; Malik, 2009; Phillips, 2009)
27
.  One consequence of this is that political correctness is 
accused of silencing discussion concerning the rights of the some of the least powerful 
members of minority communities (such as women or LBGT people). Ironically, therefore, 
the failure to address social inequalities, such as sexism, becomes attributed to PC. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26
 This understanding resonates with the Oxford English Dictionary definition of PC as ‘the careful avoidance of 
forms of expression or action that are perceived to exclude or insult groups of people who are socially 
disadvantaged or discriminated against’. 
27
 For example, in Is Mulitculturalism bad for women?, Okin (1999) asserts that demands for multiculturalism 
and group rights can endanger the rights of women. For example, she argues that ‘during the 1980s, the French 
government quietly permitted immigrant men to bring multiple wives into the country, to the point where an 
estimated 200,000 families in Paris are polygamous’ (p.9). Malik (2009) has argued that the progressive 
recognition of group inequalities has given way to a regressive development within the politics of identity 
whereby concern for cultural sensitivity has engendered a form of liberal self-censorship. Cohen (2007) 
reiterates this view, arguing that the consequence of political correctness and self-censorship is that liberals 
within minority groups often lack the support of their liberal-left ‘comrades’ (p.12). 
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2.2.5 Summary and implications of analysis 
 
The fluidity of meaning attached to PC lends weight to the assertion that the closer the 
arguments surrounding PC are examined, the more ‘everything is a puzzle without a solution’ 
(Berman, 1992:6). However, approaching PC as a floating signifier enables this project to 
first identify the various meanings attached to the concept before exploring their significance. 
This chapter has identified three key ways in which PC has emerged as a signifier: (i) as a 
politics of language; (ii) as an authoritarian movement to be mocked; and (iii) as a politics of 
identity and activism. Crucially, it contends that the significance of PC as a floating signifier 
is that it has become an overarching label under which a number of practices, concepts and 
issues of social contestation are placed. Furthermore, as the language of PC has travelled 
from its countercultural origins into mainstream discourse, it has also acquired an orthodox 
rather than countercultural signification
28
. In 1971, Kirby described how ‘a counter-culture 
[unlike a sub-culture] arises in distinct opposition to the major culture. It examines and 
challenges many of the taken for granted features of the larger society’ (p.204). The radical 
politics which emerged from the 1960/70s counterculture, (including movements such as 
feminism, gay liberation and anti-racist groups) possessed ‘a subversive appeal’ 
(Berman,1992:9) which was retained as many movements made inroads and progress more 
broadly across society.  Although these movements may have been subject to mockery or 
disapproval, they were also often viewed as anti-establishment; or as challenging the existing 
order, including its prevailing norms and conventions. 
 
Berman’s description of how the term ‘PC’ was adopted in the early 1990s ‘by people who 
had no fidelity to radicalism at all, but who relished the nasty syllables,’(1992:5) suggests 
how ‘new’ words or neologisms can contribute to the way in which debates shift and are 
reconstituted within a discursive community. It also concurs with Lakoff that ‘the 
introduction of a new phrase or word into the popular lexicon is world-changing’ and capable 
of altering ‘our presuppositions’ (2000:90)29. As PC became useful shorthand for critique of a 
form of ‘liberal orthodoxy’ (Hughes, 2010:4), to be politically correct came to suggest 
‘someone who steadfastly toe[s] the party line’ (Berman, 1992:5). This understanding of PC 
has found support beyond traditional political conservatism and is bolstered by the language 
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 This is particularly bound with the notion that PC symbolises an authoritarian project which is enforced by 
liberal elites or a ‘liberal orthodoxy’ (Hughes, 2010:4). 
29
 The full quote from Lakoff is used at the start of this chapter. 
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surrounding the concept, including the prescriptive notion of ‘correctness’ which suggests an 
inflexible conformity to an approved body of thought or opinion. For instance, in a critique of 
the excesses of ‘PC culture’ the left leaning social critic, Ehrenreich, argues that ‘rules don’t 
work’ (1992:335) and she asks ‘why would you want to join a group just to be criticised and 
“corrected”? (p.336). 
 
2.3 A Foucauldian genealogical analysis of the emergence of PC 
2.3.1 The Genealogical Method 
Although the contention that PC should be approached as a floating or sliding signifier 
eschews the possibility of any fixed or indubitable definition of PC, this chapter has 
nevertheless asked what meanings have become attached to the concept. However, this part 
of the chapter is interested primarily in how these meanings were able to emerge. It conducts 
a Foucauldian genealogical analysis which focuses upon the conditions of possibility which 
have enabled the reification of PC to take place (rather than inquiry into the essence of the 
concept). 
In order to understand how contemporary ways of conceptualising PC were able to emerge, it 
is worth considering Foucault’s explanation of Genealogy in his 1971 essay ‘Nietzsche 
Genealogy History’ 
Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that operates 
beyond the dispersion of forgotten things…Genealogy does not resemble the evolution of a 
species and does not map the destiny of a people. On the contrary, to follow the complex 
course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion: it is to identify the 
accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false 
appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and 
have value for us; (Foucault, [1971] cited in Rabinow, 1984:81) 
Genealogy, therefore, ‘opposes itself to the search for “origins”’ (Ibid:77) and regards  
traditional or linear historical accounts which have attempted to uncover the causes of 
phenomenon as misconceived. Kendall and Wickham (2000:5) assert that genealogical 
analysis is underpinned by two considerations; firstly, the search for ‘contingencies instead of 
causes’, and secondly, scepticism ‘in regard to all political arguments’.  This theoretical 
understanding would suggest that there was nothing inevitable about the emergence of PC as 
a neologism in the early 1990s. Instead, it points analysis towards ‘the complex course of 
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descent’ (Foucault, 1971 cited in Rabinow, 1984:81) to reveal the multiplicity of events and 
occurrences which underpinned the historical beginnings and evolution of the concept. 
Hitherto, much of the literature has sought to attribute the reification of PC to clear and 
identifiable causes. These causes often reflect the political standpoint or ideological 
differences of those involved in the discussion. Therefore, right leaning authors have tended 
to assert that a form of liberal politics led to PC (Kimball, 1990; D’Souza, 1991; Hughes, 
1993); whilst left leaning authors have often explained anti-PC sentiment in terms of a right 
wing backlash against liberal politics (Epstein, 1992; Wilson, 1995; Fairclough, 2003). In this 
respect, the debate has risked remaining locked within the adversarial positions through 
which it is often conducted. A genealogical methodology may provide an alternative way of 
approaching this topic and move beyond the ideological deadlock which has the potential to 
direct the arguments and conclusions taken from analysis. 
However, despite its emphasis upon contingencies rather than causes, a genealogical 
approach does not preclude the existence of specific factors that contribute to the production 
of institutions, processes, concepts and ideas. Indeed, the uncovering of these factors is 
crucial to this method of inquiry. Kendall and Whickham (1999:45-46) have described how 
material and discursive conditions enable particular types of knowledge to operate and be 
produced. These types of knowledge will also have consequences for the conditions from 
which they arise and from which they are inseparable. This part of the chapter applies this 
understanding to an examination of the conditions through which PC was able to emerge as a 
floating cultural signifier, using the situation comedy Till Death Us Do Part to conduct a 
‘history of the present’ (Kendall and Whickham, 2000:4). 
2.3.2 Till Death Us Do Part, and the conditions of emergence of PC 
In 1966 the BBC began to broadcast one of the first TV comedies to deal directly with racism 
and bigotry, and through the programme’s main character it gave voice to the expression of 
language and opinions which would be considered politically incorrect today. Till Death Us 
Do Part  ran from 1966 to 1974 and centred upon Alf Garnett, a white working class man 
with racist and politically reactionary views who lived with his family in a council house in 
the east end of London.  Ross (1996) and Malik (2002) have explored how the programme 
was initially regarded as a radical departure from the anodyne nature of the situation 
comedies of the time, and Garnett is described by Malik as ‘stirring it up in people’s living 
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rooms, speaking the unspeakable…and thus working against the grain of expected liberal 
(television) caution’ (2002:92). 
The series immediately provoked controversy and can be viewed as having contributed to an 
emerging wave of popular discussion on substantive topics such as race, immigration and 
sexual liberation; as well as questions regarding the very nature and conditions of debate.  For 
instance, can some words or opinions be deemed so offensive to the sensibilities of others 
that they should be excluded pre-emptively from debate?  This question was asked in view of 
the fact that many viewers agreed with Alf’s view of the world and felt vindicated by its 
expression. Medhurst (1989:18) asserts that ‘a whole repertoire of anxieties and prejudices 
was being expressed for the first time and with such bravado and forcefulness that the 
response was instant and massive’. And yet the intention of the programme had been to 
expose and ridicule, rather than advocate, the sorts of viewpoints expressed by Alf Garnett. 
Writer Johnny Speight claimed to be highlighting Alf’s ignorance (which was often 
challenged and mocked in the series by Alf’s family), and he maintained that his writing was 
informed by liberal, anti-racist principles. 
The controversies surrounding Till Death Us Do Part demonstrate how contemporary 
disputes over the nature of offence and free expression, which are conceptualised as PC, 
share a history and lineage with debates which pre-date the popular use of the term.  Political 
Correctness  is defined by The Oxford Dictionary as ‘the avoidance of forms of expression or 
action that are perceived to exclude, marginalise or insult groups of people who are socially 
disadvantaged or discriminated against’(2013:725).  Many of the objections to Alf Garnett 
that arose in the 1960s and 1970s can be firmly located within this understanding of the 
concept 
30. Furthermore, Malik’s description of Garnett as ‘speaking the unspeakable’ in 
contrast to the ‘expected liberal (television) caution’(2002:92) of the 1960s resonates with 
more contemporary perceptions of political incorrectness as favouring open debate in place of 
an assumed cautiousness or conformity of politically correct orthodoxy. In view of this, how 
has the notion of PC as an idea come to be thinkable and to be seen as self-evident in a sense 
which was absent from the period when Till Death Us Do Part was originally broadcast? 
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 However, it is also worth noting that some critics of Alf ( including most famously the campaigner Mary 
Whitehouse) expressed more concern over his regular use of swear words and perceived blasphemy than his use 
of racist language and expression of racist views (see Thompson, 2013:159-160).   
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To account for this, it is worth viewing the reification of PC as the product of a number of 
historical conditions of emergence, rather than approaching PC as something which was 
discovered or identified during the controversies surrounding US universities in the 1980s 
and early 1990s.  McNay (1994:88-89) describes ‘traditional history as falsely celebrating 
great moments’ and contends that ‘genealogy is the method of analysis which traces the 
uneven and haphazard processes of dispersion, accumulation and over-lapping that are 
constitutive of the event’. A traditional semantic history would locate the UK of the 1960s as 
preceding the advent of political correctness (in line with the absence of the language of PC 
from the mainstream lexicon of that era). However, the material and discursive conditions of 
this era, in which Till Death Us Do Part was embedded, form a significant part of the 
historical contingencies through which the idea of PC was able to emerge. 
These broader material conditions included post-war immigration to the UK from former 
Commonwealth countries which resulted in a more multicultural Britain; together with the 
advent of post-imperialism and decolonisation. Malik (2002) argues that the dominant 
narrative surrounding ‘race’ at this time (which continued to be reflected across TV dramas 
and documentaries in the 1960s) had concerned the extent to which black and Asian 
immigrants were assimilated into British culture and society, without fundamentally 
addressing what might be preventing assimilation.  She asserts that media depictions 
increasingly created a ‘gap between television’s unifying project and the social, economic 
and cultural interests of an increasingly differentiated British nation’ (2002:44).  This nation 
included a popular level of opposition to immigration which was most notoriously articulated 
by Enoch Powell MP in his infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech delivered in 1968, shortly 
before the introduction of the Race Relations Bill
31
. A burgeoning awareness of the problem 
of racism, including legislative steps to combat it, therefore co-existed with a level of popular 
support for the views expressed by figures such as Powell. It was within this discordant social 
and political context that Alf Garnett appeared and became ‘a cultural phenomenon, 
attracting seismic media coverage, largely because of the series’ controversial and open focus 
upon race, sex, religion and politics’ (Malik, 2002:93). 
Till Death Do Us Part disrupted the dominant televisual narrative on race and assimilation 
(Malik: 2002), and allowed the discussion of racism to occupy a prominent space within the 
public arena. Tulloch (1990) suggests that the discourse generated by the programme 
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‘…made it a social event, providing a nexus through which ideologies could be actively 
reorganised’ (p.252).  Although some viewers took Alf’s bigotry as a straight-forward 
vindication of their own prejudices, the programme also contributed to the shifting discursive 
terrain surrounding the significant social change of the period in which the series was 
originally broadcast.  In addition to the emergence of a more diverse and multicultural 
Britain, the programme also reflected how traditional ideas surrounding gender roles, 
individual freedom and deference to authority were being increasingly challenged. This was 
discursively aligned with the rise of identity politics which was drawing attention to and 
challenging various forms of prejudice and discrimination.  The movements and campaigns 
associated with identity politics sought to uncover and critique inequalities based on the 
shared experiences of particular groups including those based upon ethnicity, gender, 
sexuality, or religious affiliation. The literature has generally identified this as the key factor 
which led towards the reification of PC as a new political project or movement (see e.g. 
Berman, 1992; Hall, 1994; Loury, 1994; Gitlin, 1997; Browne, 2006; Green 2006).  In 1992, 
Berman claimed that the emergence of identity politics ‘sparked the PC debate of today’ 
(p.13) and he argued that this usurped the traditional leftist prioritising of economic and 
material inequalities in favour of the ‘idea that in cultural affairs, the single most important 
way to classify people is by race, ethnicity and gender’ (p.13).  Berman (1992), Loury (1994) 
and Gitlin (1997) also argue that identity politics provided the pretext for the controversies 
surrounding political correctness within US universities in the 1980s and 1990s
32
. 
This analysis concurs that identity politics has been a crucial factor which has enabled PC to 
be produced and sustained as a cultural signifier for a new politics of language and identity. 
However, it also maintains that identity politics constitutes an important contingency rather 
than causal explanation of the presence of the language of PC within contemporary popular 
discourse. This is because there was no inevitability about the ‘discursive drift’ (Cameron, 
1994:20) which saw use of the concept move from US countercultural politics into everyday 
discourse. The role the media has played in this ‘discursive drift’ (ibid) has been discussed at 
length in the literature (see e.g. Cameron, 1994; Wilson, 1995; Gitlin, 1997; Lakoff, 2000; 
Fairclough, 2003; Suhr and Johnson, 2003; Allan and Burridge, 2006). Allan and Burridge 
describe the ‘PC scare’ during the 1990s as ‘largely media fed’ (p. 92) and discuss how 
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 Berman (1992), Loury (1994) and Gitlin (1997) have explored identity politics from a broadly left of centre 
political perspective, although their central claim concerning the link between identity politics and  the 
controversies in US universities is largely also echoed by right leaning authors (see e.g. Phillips, 1994; Rankin, 
2002; Green, 2006). 
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debate was ‘fuelled by endless reporting and re-reporting of stories of over-the-top speech 
codes, and banning of books and visual images’ (p. 92-93). The media was a significant 
factor which enabled the idea of PC to be recognised more broadly beyond those directly 
involved in leftist political activism. However, there was no necessity in how PC emerged as 
‘a marketable theme’ (Suhr and Johnson, 2003:50) in the 1990s or in how successfully the 
concept would be co-opted in order to conflate a number of disparate issues and concerns. 
This genealogical analysis does not preclude, however, that the discourse surrounding PC is 
often grounded in concrete disputes and anxieties surrounding notions of offence and free 
expression, or how the backdrop to reification has involved important shifts in attitudes 
towards racism and other forms of prejudice. The sequel to Till Death Us Do Part was 
broadcast in the UK from 1985 until 1992, and was called In Sickness and in Health.  
Although the language of PC had yet to be absorbed fully across British popular discourse, 
the BBC was increasingly appearing to be responsive to changing notions of what was 
deemed as offensive or socially unacceptable. Writer Johnny Speight complained that the 
BBC wanted to censor his series due to Alf’s racist and sexist views, and in a 1994 interview 
with Channel Four he claimed that ‘politically correct people’ couldn’t see that the joke was 
on Alf (‘Without Walls’, Channel Four, 25.10.94 cited in Malik, 2002:93).  Although the 
character of Alf Garnett had always been controversial, the dispersion of PC discourse in the 
1990s provided a new language with which to articulate the disputes he had already provoked 
in the 1960s and 1970s. That such disputes had preceded the everyday presence of the 
language of PC conveys how PC was discursively constructed as a new phenomenon in the 
decades following the original broadcasts of Till Death Us Do Part. However, this discursive 
process has sat alongside the eventual disappearance of Alf from the TV schedules, (along 
with other prime time television programmes which would be viewed as politically incorrect 
in a contemporary context). This suggests that the reification of PC took place during a period 
of meaningful social and political change in the way racism or sexism is perceived; and that 
the process of reification was aligned to the broader shifting discursive conditions concerning 
how we respond to racism or sexism. 
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2.3.3 Political Correctness and the shifting nature of offence 
The use of racist language in Till Death Do Us Part had been controversial from the outset, 
although the conditions of debate clearly shifted during the 1980s and 1990s. Firstly, there 
was a sense that the crude and overt racism expressed by Garnett represented an outdated 
view of a multicultural Britain which was increasingly at ease with diversity and the reality of 
a more pluralistic society (Malik, 2002:94). Secondly, the expression of Alf’s racism was 
regarded as increasingly problematic in view of the assertion that language acts as a ‘shaper 
of ideas’ (Cameron, 1995:122). Thirdly, this was linked more broadly to changing 
perceptions of offensiveness which focused upon challenging the negative depiction and 
representation of various social groups. The language of PC, therefore, became a useful way 
of articulating these debates, and of making sense of the shifting discursive landscape and 
changing social attitudes of the later decades of the 20
th
 century. 
Speight’s accusation that ‘the politically correct’ didn’t get the joke is also illustrative of how 
PC has become associated with disputes over the censorship of ‘offensive’ words or 
utterances. Speight’s assertion suggests that ‘the politically correct’ lack an awareness of 
intent or context with regard to the use of language they proscribe as off limits. This inability 
to understand why ‘offensive’ language can sometimes be used to make a meaningful point 
about a particular issue or problem, such as racism, helps suggest why PC has become a 
signifier for a movement to be mocked or disparaged. In this particular instance, PC is also 
implied to possess a degree of humourlessness and a lack of understanding of the use of satire 
and irony. However, the wider question concerning the relationship between offence, intent 
and context remains unresolved and will be revisited in the Comedy chapter of this thesis.  
According to Speight ‘the joke was on Alf’: however, regardless of his intentions this was not 
the experience for many ‘politically incorrect’ viewers who saw Alf’s bigotry as a vindication 
rather than condemnation of his various prejudices. 
2.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how PC has become attached to a range of meanings, and how the 
concept became reified through the alignment of a number of historical processes and 
contingencies, rather than any single or primary event. The first part of the chapter considered 
PC as a floating cultural signifier which has emerged as an overarching label under which a 
range of disparate practices have been re-grouped and gathered in spite of their specific 
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histories or traditions. This process of re-grouping has also surfaced alongside the discursive 
construction of PC as a newly coherent political movement, or broader cultural and socio-
political phenomenon. 
The second part of the chapter demonstrates how the process of reification has helped to 
mask how many issues which we now discuss using the language of PC (such as disputes 
over the use of language deemed as racist or sexist) are not entirely new concerns. However, 
it also argues that reification has provided us with a shared language, or way of 
conceptualising and making sense of real political and socio-cultural change regarding our 
attitudes and response to forms of prejudice like racism or sexism. 
The chapter has approached PC as a floating signifier in order to enable this project to 
identify and explore the significance of the various meanings attached to the term. Why, 
therefore, does much of the discussion of PC
33
 continue to echo Berman’s assertion that 
‘everything is a puzzle without a solution’ (1992:6)? To begin to address this, it is worth 
briefly re-considering the role PC plays as a floating cultural signifier. As a signifier for a 
politics of language and of identity, PC is tied to a set of tangible political ideas and 
practices
34
. This way of viewing PC draws our attention to arguments about particular issues 
and topics which divide political opinion. Questions about issues such as the merits of 
positive discrimination, or the use of non-sexist language, provoke disagreement and debate 
which reflect the different values and judgements people use in order to interpret and analyse 
the world around them. However, this context is nevertheless linked to disagreement over 
matters which are substantive. However, the notion of PC as a cultural signifier for an 
authoritarian, or censorious, movement moves the discussion more directly towards the 
conditions of debate and  introduces questions about the very rules and norms of behaviour 
that govern discussion in the public domain. For example, should ‘offensive’ arguments be 
pre-emptively excluded from discussion? Or, who can speak about what topics, and when, 
without violating (un)spoken PC rules and codes of etiquette? Some of the most contentious 
arguments explored in this chapter are grounded in these sorts of questions.  For instance, the 
genealogical study of Till Death Us Do Part shows us that as racism came to be viewed as 
socially and politically unacceptable, so did Alf Garnett’s expression of it, regardless of the 
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 For example, PC has become attached to concepts such as multiculturalism, or practices like anti-
discrimination legislation. 
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anti-racist intentions of Johnny Speight or the mockery of Alf’s opinions in Till Death Us Do 
Part by his own family. 
Although the meanings attached to PC are fluid, it has become a clear point of reference for 
contemporary disputes surrounding the giving and taking of offence and how the rules or 
conditions of debate should be set. Across popular discourse PC also continues to possess an 
overwhelmingly negative signification as authoritarian, censorious and detrimental to the 
principles of open and honest discussion. The following chapter will consider how the 
literature has made sense of this signification, and of how varying levels of ‘offensiveness’ or 
‘political incorrectness’ may be present (and absent) within particular discursive contexts. 
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Chapter 3. PC and the Academy 
 
‘The whole PC strategy depends on a conception of politics as the unmasking of false ideas 
and meanings and replacing them by true ones. It is erected in the image of ‘politics of truth’ – 
a substitution of the false racist or sexist or homophobic consciousness by a ‘true 
consciousness’. It refuses to take on board the profound observation (for example, by Michel 
Foucault and others) that the ‘truth’ of knowledge is always contextual, always constructed 
within discourse, always connected with the relations of power which make it true…The view 
that we need to struggle over language because discourse has effects for both how we perceive 
the world and our practice in it, which is right, is negated by the attempt to short-circuit the 
process of change by legislating some Absolute Truth into being. What’s more, what is being 
legislated is another single, homogenous truth – our truth to replace theirs…’ (Hall, 1994:181) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Since the notion of PC became part of our mainstream lexicon in the early 1990s the 
literature has sought to account for the various controversies it has provoked. In particular, it 
has addressed the largely negative signification of PC as having contributed to an 
authoritarian culture of increasing censoriousness and excessive sensitivity towards the 
giving of offence. This chapter explores three broad positions which have sought to account 
for this negative signification before the thesis begins to address how the controversies 
surrounding PC will be explored by this project. The chapter also considers how studies have 
approached the relationship between PC and the thematic fields explored within the data 
analysis component of the thesis. It does so in order to provide a context and rationale for the 
research process it proposes and develops in the forthcoming chapters.  
 
The first position outlined in this chapter largely agrees that we share an increasing 
preoccupation with the giving and taking of offence which is detrimental to the free and open 
exchange of ideas, and is attributable to the emergence of PC. The second position argues 
that PC is fundamentally informed by creditable and progressive goals, but that the narrative 
of excess associated with it, together with its prioritisation of the politics of language, has 
contributed to the backlash against political correctness. The third position views PC 
primarily as a concept co-opted by the political right in order to condemn and discredit their 
leftist opponents. As PC is typically ascribed to a politics of language rooted in the ideas of 
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the liberal-left and/or identity politics, these three broad positions tend to correspond with 
different political affiliations. However, this review of the literature also reflects upon areas 
of discussion which are not straightforwardly situated in the differences between right or left-
wing politics (including the liberal-left critique of PC). Furthermore, the three broad 
groupings, or positions, examined here are not intended to represent homogenised bodies of 
thought as the level of agreement within and between each grouping will vary dependent 
upon the author and the specific argument under discussion.  
 
However, this chapter does present an orientating examination of the main theories and 
studies which have sought to make sense of the meaning(s) attached to PC. It will also 
recognise how sociology has addressed some of the questions raised by the arguments 
outlined here primarily through studies within the field of sociolinguistics. It argues that these 
studies have generated a deeper understanding of how linguistic change has become 
increasingly attached to wider social and political change, however, it also contends that the 
literature has not reconciled some of the tensions and inconsistencies underlying our 
perception of PC. In particular, it argues that space in the literature remains for exploration of 
how PC is felt to have installed a hegemonic form of censoriousness, whilst politically 
incorrect forms of expression are simultaneously celebrated and accepted across many 
discursive spaces. It therefore concludes by outlining why the exploration of a range of 
discursive spaces within various media and popular cultural locations is at the heart of this 
research project. 
 
3.2 The case against PC 
The ‘discursive drift’ (Cameron, 1994:20) which saw PC discourse move in the early 1990s 
from its original self-parodying context in the US political left and into the US mainstream, 
included the publication of a number of polemical books and journal articles by conservative 
authors. Kimball (1990; 1992; 1995), Bahls, (1991); D’Souza (1991; 1992), Dickman (1993); 
Hughes (1993) and Bernstein (1995) focused primarily on what they saw as the politicisation 
of US universities in line with liberal or leftist doctrines.
35
. Viewed collectively, the work of 
these authors advances two key assertions regarding the impact and significance of PC. 
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 The Genealogy chapter of this thesis has examined how the use of the term PC appears periodically (although 
not consistently) within the work of many authors. For example, in 1992 Kimball and D’Souza explicitly 
identify PC as the ideology responsible for the ‘politicisation’ of US universities whilst their earlier work 
develops similar arguments without directly referencing PC. 
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Firstly, they object to the apparent side-lining in academic courses of texts by ‘Dead White 
European Males’ in favour of a more socially diverse university curriculum. In 1992, 
D’Souza argued there was ‘a movement of change, of transition, in which the Western 
classics are increasingly diminished and the non-Western works, very often polemical, 
ideological, anti-Western in tone, are being emphasized’ (p.32). Kimball also describes PC as 
having ‘invaded’ the study of literature: 
…The effect is not to make one more politically sensitive but to transform a concern with 
literature into an obsession with one’s race, one’s sex, one’s sexual preferences, one’s ethnic 
origin. What one gains is a political cause; what one loses is the freedom of disinterested 
appreciation. (Kimball, 1992:74) 
Secondly, these authors condemn the imposition of formal and informal campus speech 
codes. D’Souza (1992:30) described PC as having replaced the principles of a ‘liberal 
education’ (based upon ‘free and open debate’) with that of an ‘illiberal education’ (based 
upon ‘censorship regulations outlawing racially and sexually offensive speech’). Hughes 
(1993:30-31) accuses academics at US universities of imposing formal speech codes upon 
students which punish ‘verbal offences’ and ‘may impede…student’s progress from protected 
childhood to capable adulthood’. More generally, the arguments outlined here concerning 
campus speech codes precipitate wider contemporary debates about self-censorship and the 
exclusion of ‘incorrect’ viewpoints from public discourse.  
Initially, the academic discussion surrounding PC was largely concentrated in the US, 
although books such as The War of the Words: The Political Correctness Debate (Dunant: 
1994) also addressed the meanings attached to PC within the socio-political context of the 
UK
36
. However, as the language of PC has acquired a presence and longevity within 
everyday discourse, its impact upon the UK has come to be examined more widely. Green 
(2006) and Furedi (2011) have criticised what they regard as the excessive encroachment of 
PC upon our formal lives and personal conduct, such as the introduction of workplace quotas 
for historically disadvantaged groups, or the enactment of codes of conduct in the workplace 
or within educational institutions. However, much of the critique of PC purports to be largely 
accepting of legal efforts to outlaw discrimination against particular groups (see e.g. Loury, 
1994; Gitlin, 1997; Rankin, 2002; Browne, 2006; Bullough, 2008; Hughes, 2010; Saunders, 
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discursively constructed here, and of how the term had first emerged from its ‘in-group’ location in the US 
liberal-left. 
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2011). PC, therefore, has been understood in the literature as manifest within different levels. 
Firstly, it is understood as involving the principles of non-discrimination and formal equality, 
which are broadly accepted (particularly those governing institutions such as the workplace); 
and secondly, PC is felt to contain a broader cultural context which is regarded as more 
problematic. This cultural context has been described by Loury as involving an implicit 
‘social convention of restraint on public expression’ (1994:430) which has developed 
alongside the stigmatising of ‘incorrect’ types of thought, words or behaviour.  
 
The case against PC is built overwhelmingly around the contention that PC promotes a ‘right’ 
to be offended which is sustained by a wider fear of causing offence and a culture of 
excessive censoriousness. PC is also accused of having distorted the traditional liberal 
principles of free speech and tolerance to become a form of ‘illiberal liberalism’ (Phillips, 
1994:35), ‘authoritarian liberalism’ (Rankin 2002:xi), ‘a heresy of liberalism’ (Browne, 
2006:2), or even ‘liberal fascism’ (Goldberg 2009)37. Browne (2006), Green (2006) and 
Saunders (2011) describe PC as a product of the success of group rights and identity politics 
which they view as having elevated ‘victimhood’ into ‘a political status’ (Green, 2006:1). In 
their view, this status enables some groups to receive preferential treatment, a crucial element 
of which is the ‘right’ to not be offended. Browne (2006) also argues that PC operates 
through the misapplication of words such as sexism, racism and homophobia; and that this 
becomes a method of silencing discussion and dissenting viewpoints through instilling the 
fear of being labelled sexist, racist or homophobic. He, therefore, argues that these words are 
no longer used purely to denote the iniquities of discrimination based upon gender, ethnicity 
or sexuality. Instead, he claims they are asserted rather than demonstrated to exist for political 
advantage and to suppress viewpoints which stray from PC orthodoxy. In a similar vein, 
Green (2006) argues that the language denoting ‘victim status’ (p.45) has expanded in recent 
decades to include new words such as Islamophobia and transphobia, and therefore new 
ways of suppressing dissenting viewpoints.  
 
As PC is typically assumed to have emerged from a form of liberal-left identity politics, it is 
unsurprising that these claims about its censorious nature are echoed in the work of many 
right-leaning authors (see e.g D’Souza, 1992; Rankin, 2002; Goldberg, 2009).  However, the 
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 Phillips (1994), Rankin (2002), Browne (2006), and Goldberg (2009) are right leaning authors who are 
generally critical of the modern liberal-left. An interesting feature of the conservative critique of PC is its 
propensity to imply that ‘true’ liberal values (such as tolerance or free expression) are now the preserve of the 
right. 
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case against PC has also been made by those who broadly align themselves to the liberal-left 
(see e.g. Loury 1994; Gitlin 1997; Cohen, 2007; Malik, 2009; Hasan 2010; Lester, 2010). 
Whilst Gitlin maintains that ‘PC Panic’ (1997:177) has been exaggerated by a level of media 
frenzy that itself requires analysis, he also describes some parts of the left as ‘having 
struggled to overcome silences…developed their own methods of silencing’ (p.147).  He 
argues that PC involves a form of self-censorship whereby the fear of offence or ideological 
transgression silences potential speakers from entering debate or expressing ‘politically 
incorrect’ viewpoints.  Loury (1994) asserts that the self-reinforcing nature of this type of 
censorship is especially problematic within sections of the left where people may deny their 
behaviour, making it potentially difficult to either identify or directly challenge. Malik (2009) 
and Hasan (2010) have described self-censorship as an aspect of contemporary leftist cultural 
politics which is rooted in a fear of giving offence towards groups considered as less 
powerful or marginalized in some way. Hasan (2010) argues ‘supporters of multiculturalism 
fear that to argue against or critique oppressive beliefs would lead to ‘misrecognition’ of 
minority cultures and leave them open to the charge of being disrespectful of their very 
being’ (p.23).  From this perspective, the ‘mainstreaming’ of PC moves this aversion towards 
the giving of offence beyond the cultural politics of the left and into wider social and political 
discourse.  
 
The liberal and conservative cases against PC reach similar conclusions using different 
ideological paths. Both assert that PC inhibits open debate and is predicated on an excessive 
fear of causing offence. However, Green (2006), Browne (2006) and Saunders (2011) regard 
PC as based largely upon erroneous and outdated notions of victimhood that ‘classify certain 
groups of people as victims in need of protection from criticism’ (Browne, 2006:4). These 
authors also tend to downplay the presence of racism and other forms of prejudice and 
discrimination within modern society. Meanwhile, Malik (2009) and Hasan (2010) describe 
the desire to avoid offence as grounded in the recognition of real inequalities and power 
differentials. From this perspective, the liberal fear of offence arises from a desire not to 
offend those less powerful, or unwittingly reinforce prejudice directed at less powerful 
groups. 
 
Much of the case against PC in the 1990s initially developed as a polemic against what 
Kimball described as the ‘radical curriculum’ (1990:xiv) within US universities. This 
polemical element is retained within the contemporary critique of PC which is often 
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grounded in the political or partisan position of the writer
38
. Furthermore, although a core 
assertion of the case against PC is that it inculcates a culture of self-censorship predicated on 
the fear of causing offence, this claim may be more difficult to demonstrate than it is to assert 
in view of the self-regulatory nature of what it purports to describe i.e. PC is regarded as 
effacing the evidence of its effects. The challenge this poses to academic research is 
recognised by Loury (1994) in his study of self-censorship in public discourse.  In order to 
demonstrate how the fear of causing offence might close down open debate, Loury identifies 
specific examples of censored public discourse
39. Secondly, he uses Goffman’s dramaturgical 
model to describe how each interaction between a ‘sender’ (someone who expresses 
him/herself in a particular way) and a ‘receiver’ (who listens and reacts to that expression) is 
played as a ‘game’ or ‘performance’ (p. 422). Within this performance, the sender, or 
speaker, will want to make a desired impression on their audience, or receiver.  
 
…a skilful speaker will structure his message mindful of the inferences that listeners are 
inclined to make. He will try to use the patterns of inference established within a given 
community of discourse to his advantage. He will avoid some expressions known to elicit 
negative judgements or association and he will deploy others known to win favour with his 
audience or cast him in a positive light. (Loury, 1994:433) 
 
According to Loury, PC ensures that ‘conventions of self-censorship are sustained by the 
utilitarian acquiescence of each community member [so that] by calculating that the losses 
from deviation outweigh the gains, individuals are led to conform’ (p.455). Loury’s use of 
Goffman, therefore, helps us make sense of how open discussion may be compromised when 
the risks of offending an audience (or part of an audience) are felt to be too great.  
 
However, whilst Loury’s analysis may lend weight to the assertion that PC maintains 
conventions of self-censorship, it also sits alongside the enduring popularity of forms of 
expression across various discursive spaces which display direct and open hostility towards 
PC. Indeed, many levels of popular discourse (for example, comic discourse) pride 
themselves upon their anti-PC rhetoric and/or aversion to PC principles. This review of the 
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 For example, the books cited in this section of the chapter by Sanders (2001), Browne (2006) and Green 
(2006) are all published by the right of centre think tank Civitas.   
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 One of the cases Loury examines is the case of ‘An Incorrect Discussion of The Holocaust’ (1994). He 
examines how Philip Jenninger (once the president of the parliament in the former West German Republic), was 
forced to resign in 1988 following a speech he made in which many in his audience interpreted his ‘brutally 
frank account of prevailing attitudes among Germans in the 1930s as a disguised defence of National Socialism’ 
(p.438). 
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literature suggests there is room for further exploration of the paradox whereby people are 
deemed to self-censor to avoid appearing non-PC for fear of being stigmatized by a wider 
community; however, PC simultaneously remains an unpopular notion within that wider 
community. The concurrence of these apparently conflicting trends is, therefore, worth 
further academic examination, including what this suggests about the contested meaning(s) of 
PC, and the varying levels of PC within different discursive spaces.  
 
3.3 PC as a flawed progressive project  
 
Although PC is a concept which has been defended by Min Choi and Murphy (1992) and 
Butterbaugh (1994) as representing the progressive values of social equality and non-
discrimination, the literature contains few who are willing to self-identify as PC or rescue the 
term entirely from its negative connotations. (This reflects, at least partially, how successfully 
the term has been demonised and used as a way of stigmatising its purported proponents). 
That the literature tends to mirror a broader cultural unease with PC also highlights the need 
for further exploration of the enduring unpopularity of the term, despite its purportedly 
progressive and non-discriminatory goals. However, whilst refraining from unreserved 
identification with the label, the position examined in this section of the chapter develops a 
more equivocal understanding of the concept, including the controversies it provokes 
surrounding free expression and the politics of offence.  
 
This position largely includes those who view PC as fundamentally informed by progressive 
goals and ideals which recognise the harm caused by social inequalities, and the power of 
language to affirm broader cultural values (see e.g. Alibhai-Brown, 1994; Ayim, 1998; 
Berman, 1992; Perry and Williams, 1992; Ehrenreich, 1992; Cameron, 1994 and 1995; Hall, 
1994; Kelly and Rubal-Lopez, 1996; Said, 1992; Frunza, 2006). In her analysis of the use and 
regulation of language Cameron asserts that PC assumes ‘language is not just a medium for 
ideas but a shaper of ideas; that it is always and inevitably political; and that the ‘truth’ 
someone speaks may be relative to the power they hold’ (1995:122). Various writers have 
suggested that the emergence of PC is an example of the tradition of campaigns for linguistic 
reform which emerge when cultures contest or renegotiate the use of certain words according 
to particular aesthetic, moral, practical, or political considerations (see e.g. Cameron, 1994 
and 1995; Hall, 1994; Lakoff, 2000; Fairclough, 2003; Allan and Burridge, 2006). Cameron 
(1994) calls PC a ‘verbal hygiene’ movement which emerged from a moral and political 
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belief in, ‘rationality, progress and the perfectibility of humankind and human institutions’ 
(p.18).  In this respect, PC can be viewed as having extended our notion of what is considered 
culturally taboo to include the use of language which is deemed offensive towards particular 
groups, or is suggestive of prejudicial attitudes. However, despite the intent to replace 
‘offensiveness’ with public norms of respect and fairness, PC continues to provoke a level of 
hostility less visible when we consider other campaigns for linguistic reform. (For instance, 
Fairclough (2003:21) contrasts the backlash against PC with the relative acceptance of what 
he describes as the ‘neo-liberal project to change identities’ through the extension of market 
based terminology such as ‘customer’, ‘consumer’ or ‘individual responsibility’ into 
everyday discourse).  
 
Three broad arguments have been advanced by those who regard PC as a flawed progressive 
project in order to account for the level of hostility directed towards it. Firstly, Ehrenreich 
(1992) and Hall (1994) argue that the prioritisation of the politics of language has sometimes 
left the liberal-left open to accusations of triviality and oversensitivity regarding the policing 
of words. This position is partly grounded in the view that objections to PC arise from the 
emphasis PC places upon the ‘correct’ use of language at the expense of matters concerning 
actual discrimination, or the unequal treatment of people. Although the move to create a 
discursive environment free from discourse deemed offensive or oppressive towards 
particular groups is recognised as largely positive and well intentioned, Ehrenreich also 
argues that ‘verbal uplift is not the revolution’ (1992:336) and that the changing use of words 
does not automatically engender changing attitudes, or the wider acceptance of a politics 
based upon progressive values. However, this assertion requires further reflection. If the 
sensitivities surrounding the use of particular words are deemed to be ‘trivial’, how can we 
explain the vehemence with which the critique of such sensitivities is often voiced? Cameron 
(1995:140) describes the ‘anti-PC’ position in its crudest form to be ‘self-contradictory’ in 
view of the ‘vitriolic terms’ in which it presents the renegotiation of language as an attack on 
fundamental liberties and values. As PC has become discursively attached to disputes over 
the taking of offence, the academic and popular focus of this has been primarily upon the 
people and practices who oppose the use of racist or sexist discourse, rather than those who 
object to efforts to install linguistic or cultural change. Those who object to ‘PC’, however, 
also constitute an important component of those ‘offended’. Might further analysis, therefore, 
consider more closely the nature of the response towards efforts to introduce ‘verbal uplift’, 
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including what the varying levels of acceptance and resistance it provokes suggests about 
how we negotiate and comprehend the giving and taking of offence?  
 
Secondly, PC is described by Hall (1994:168) as possessing ‘a strong strain of moral self- 
righteousness’. (This argument appears similar to the summation of PC as the ‘dictatorship of 
virtue’ (2006:7) by Browne)40. Consequently, Hall views the backlash against PC as partially 
grounded in a reaction to its often overly zealous, sanctimonious and censorious tone. Again, 
the disdain for PC is felt to be less troubled by its non-discriminatory goals, and more 
concerned by the authoritarian manner in which these goals are sometimes pursued
41
. 
However, the tone of the critique of PC could also be open to the same sorts of accusations 
levelled against PC itself. Whilst PC is accused of closing down debate, the vituperative 
nature of some of the critique of PC has also become an effective method of stigmatising and 
silencing those who risk being labelled PC. Dunant (1994:viii) describes the discourse 
surrounding PC as often misleading, prone to ‘hysteria’ and ‘apocalyptic’ in tone; a notion 
given credence by the titles of books like  Liberal Fascism (2009) by Jonah Goldberg, or 
Thought Prison (2011) by Bruce Charlton. The debate has sometimes been clouded by the 
polemical way in which it is conducted, and the strongly held political or ideological 
viewpoints in which argument becomes embedded. However, space remains in the literature 
to re-examine PC - both as an ideology or socio-political project, and the various narratives 
which arise and continue to circulate around this ideology. 
 
Thirdly, the pervasiveness of PC disputes (especially within media discourse) has contributed 
to a narrative of excess surrounding PC which draws upon a sense that our lives are subject to 
unprecedented and inescapable levels of PC- driven judgement and surveillance: (this sense is 
also reflected in the ubiquity of popular discourse denouncing ‘PC gone mad’ or the ever 
assiduous ‘PC Brigade’). Various authors have implied, or suggested, that the discomfort 
surrounding PC may stem from an aversion to its excesses (see e.g. Berman, 1992; Dunant, 
1994; Johnson and Suhr, 2003; Allan and Burridge, 2006). However, there is no overarching 
agreement in the literature regarding where the point of excess begins or even what produces 
and sustains the narrative of excess surrounding PC. Berman (1992), Dunant (1994), Johnson 
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 Hall firmly identified with the politics of the left throughout his life and academic career. However, in this 
instance, his questioning of the ‘tone’ of PC echoes some of the arguments made by right leaning authors like 
Browne. 
41
 Hall articulates his disquiet with the ‘whole PC strategy’ in the paragraph included at the start of this chapter. 
In it he worries that PC may ‘short-circuit the process of change by legislating some Absolute Truth into being’ 
(1994:181). 
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and Suhr (2003), and Allan and Burridge (2006) concur that PC has contributed to an 
increase in oversight over aspects of human activity, whilst also agreeing that the label has 
been used to conflate too many disparate issues and impose a distorted identity upon many of 
the ideas, actions and people labelled PC. Furthermore, Fairclough (2003:21) sees this 
conflation of ‘a diverse range of actions and interventions on the part of diverse groups of 
people…within the category of ‘PC’’ as itself a form of ‘cultural politics’42. From his 
perspective, the narrative of excess could equally be viewed as kept alive by a regressive or 
conservative form of cultural politics which itself requires explanation and analysis. 
 
The position explored in this section of the chapter draws upon a range of arguments which 
appear to suggest that ‘the problem is less with the aims of PC than with its methods’ 
(Dunant, 1994:ix). In summary, the ‘problem’ with PC might be: (i) its prioritisation of the 
politics of language; (ii) the authoritarian way in which it tries to achieve its aims; and (iii) 
the narrative of excess which surrounds PC. The literature examined here also maintains that 
PC is fundamentally underpinned by progressive goals, although authors differ regarding the 
extent to which they wish to rescue PC from its negative connotations
43
.  
 
One contention this section of the chapter shares with the previous section is that the politics 
of language has taken on a new significance over recent decades. Consequently, socio-
linguistic analysis has approached PC as a political battleground over which the struggle for 
meaning over words, sentences or utterances is fought (see e.g. Cameron, 1994 and 1995; 
Lakoff, 2000; Fairclough; 2003; Allan and Burridge, 2006). Cameron argues that ‘language is 
a highly variable and radically context-dependent phenomenon which may have effects on 
perception’ (1994:25). As such, she suggests ‘there is nothing trivial about trying to 
institutionalise a public norm of respect, and one of the most important ways in which respect 
is made manifest publicly is through linguistic choices’ (p.26). However, Cameron also 
agrees that ‘words are constantly being inflected…with new meanings as they are used in 
different contexts’ (ibid.). In this respect, whilst our linguistic choices carry meaning, this 
meaning remains unfixed, and dependent upon many different factors (including how 
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 Fairclough (2003:21) names ‘teachers, academics, feminist activists etc.’ as examples of some of the ‘diverse 
groups of people’ who may be labelled ‘PC’ for their beliefs and/or actions. 
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 For example, in Dunant’s 1994 collection of essays on political correctness, The War of the Words, Hall refers 
to his own ambivalence regarding PC: ‘The last thing we need is the model of one authority substituting one set 
of identities or truths with another set of ‘more correct’ ones’(1994:181-182). Meanwhile, Cameron argues that 
‘so-called ‘politically correct’ language does not threaten our freedom to speak as we choose…It threatens only 
our freedom to imagine that our linguistic choices are inconsequential…’ (1994:33).  
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something is said or who says it within what context). What, therefore, might the different 
meanings attached to language (and representation more generally) suggest about how we 
should understand disputes of offence; and in particular, how might this help us to develop an 
analysis of the contested nature of ‘offensiveness’ as it appears within different discursive 
contexts? The significance of language also needs to be explored within the wider social 
context in which it is used and the definition of language broadened to include other ways in 
which values or meaning are transmitted between people (such as our reliance upon shared 
visual signifiers). 
 
3.4 PC as a myth 
 
Although PC is understood in different ways by the core arguments examined in the previous 
sections of this chapter, these arguments approach PC as a tangible phenomenon, and one 
which has made a real impact upon our everyday lives in recent decades. However, the 
position outlined in this part of the chapter asserts that PC is largely an idea which has been 
co-opted and utilised by the political right in order to discredit their liberal-left opponents. 
This assertion is made most forcibly by Wilson (1995) who wrote The myth of Political 
Correctness in response to the initial critique of PC espoused by writers such as D’Souza 
(1991;1992) and Kimball (1990;1992). Wilson rejected claims that PC had taken over US 
universities and argued that PC as defined by conservatives like D’Souza or Kimball barely 
existed. Instead, he regards hostility directed towards ‘political correctness’ as part of ‘the 
resentment against the many changes – institutional and intellectual – in American 
universities since the 1960s’ (1995:158). His central contention is that PC is a ‘myth’: 
 
…the myth of political correctness is a powerful conspiracy theory created by conservatives 
and the media who have manipulated resentment against leftist radicals into a backlash against 
the fictional monster of political correctness. (Wilson, 1995:xv).  
 
When describing PC this way, Wilson does not claim it to be a ‘pure invention with no basis 
in reality’ or that ‘there are some leftists who would not hesitate, if given the power to 
oppress conservatives’ (p.2). However, he does argue that few leftists have the power or 
inclination to suppress the speech of their opponents, and that greater power is held by a 
conservative establishment which attracts a fraction of the attention or criticism directed at 
PC.  Meanwhile, the ‘myth of political correctness’ is sustained through the invention, 
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repetition and distortion of incidents that support the notion of a PC orthodoxy; a process 
which Wilson describes as ‘myth making by anecdote’ (p.20). 
 
Feldstein (1997) describes the emergence of the PC debate in the 1990s as largely the 
consequence of the need for US neo-conservatism to have an enemy upon which to project its 
fears in the wake of the collapse of the Cold War and Soviet style communism in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. He also claims that the PC debate was as much about the ‘discursive 
strategies’ used to establish the ideological battle-lines in the US Culture Wars, as it was 
about the ‘diverse cultural movements related to them’ (p.2). In other words, although the 
Culture Wars were grounded in real differences over substantive issues (such as attitudes 
towards abortion or affirmative action), the discourse surrounding PC was able to create a 
new ‘internal enemy’ of ‘the politically correct’ who included ‘the radical intelligentsia who 
work in the universities today’ (p.67). 
 
Wilson (1995) and Feldstein (1997) developed their arguments primarily in response to the 
original controversies surrounding the relationship between PC and US universities in the 
1980s and 1990s. Since this period, the language of PC has acquired a longevity and wider 
presence which is now entrenched within our everyday discourse. In view of this, Suhr and 
Johnson describe political correctness as a ‘plastic word’ (2003:50) which is adaptable and 
applicable to new circumstances and debates. Many authors examined in this survey of the 
literature agree that the influence of PC has been exaggerated, and distorted by its 
conservative opponents and the complicity of some sections of the media (see e.g. Berman, 
1992; Gitlin, 1997; Fairclough, 2003; Banning, 2004; Allan and Burridge, 2006). However, 
these authors also resist describing PC as a ‘myth’. This may, in part, reflect how the very 
durability of PC discourse has forced us to also consider PC as a tangible social phenomenon, 
rather than simply a projection of conservative disdain for the politics of language and/or the 
liberal-left. However, liberal authors like Gitlin also maintain that ‘one reason why the 
campaign against PC has legs…is that identity politics and attendant censoriousness [is] real’ 
(1997:175). The view that PC is largely a ‘fictional monster’ (Wilson, 1995:iv), therefore, 
remains a minority position and much of the literature continues to focus upon the purported  
negative aspects of PC including whether, how, and to what extent, it is responsible for 
closing down debate and prohibiting the free exchange of ideas.  Nevertheless, the discussion 
in this section of the chapter of how ‘myth making’ (Wilson, 1995:20) and ‘rhetorical 
strategies’ are ‘used to establish ideological agendas’ (Feldstein, 1997:1-2) may also help us 
  42 
to isolate the projection of identities upon people (as either ‘PC’ or ‘non-PC’) from the 
tangible conflicts over free speech in which the debate about PC is embedded.  
 
3.5 The sociological view of PC and its implications for further research  
 
This chapter has examined the core arguments which have sought to account for the 
overwhelmingly negative signification of PC. This part of the chapter briefly summarises 
these arguments before it considers the different fields of enquiry this project will use in 
order to explore the unanswered questions surrounding PC. The survey of the literature has 
demonstrated how much of the analysis of PC emerged primarily as a debate about the 
curriculum and culture of US universities. Although the scope of the debate within popular 
and journalistic discourse has widened immensely since this period, much of the literature 
surrounding PC was written during (and therefore continues to reflect) this initial context. PC 
has, however, also subsequently been considered more broadly by the academic community 
as a cultural signifier for a new politics of language. Underpinning the critique of this politics 
of language is the core contention that PC closes down debate through its disavowal of 
‘incorrect’ or ‘offensive’ words or viewpoints.  This contention is expressed most forcibly by 
those who argue that accusations of bigotry, racism or sexism may be used as a method of 
suppressing dissenting viewpoints (see e.g. Browne, 2006; Green, 2006; Schwartz, 2010; 
Lukianoff, 2014). Meanwhile, those who take a more equivocal view claim to support the 
progressive or anti-discriminatory aims of PC whilst questioning some of its methods, 
including its propensity to prioritise the politics of language (see e.g. Ehrenreich, 1992; Hall, 
1994).  
 
Sociological research has considered some of the matters raised by the positions explored in 
this chapter through analysis of the ways in which society and our position within it 
influences our linguistic choices. Much of this research has taken place within the field of 
sociolinguistics and has understood language as something which shapes as well as reflects 
our ideas about the social world (see e.g. Cameron, 1995; Lakoff, 2000; Fairclough, 2003; 
Allan and Burridge, 2006). In particular, sociolinguistics has helped us make sense of the 
increasing importance attached to linguistic change as a way of encouraging political change. 
For instance, Cameron argues that drawing attention to racist or sexist language may be an 
effective way of making a wider point about racist or sexist attitudes or behaviour (1994:25-
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26). Significantly, Fairclough has also highlighted how PC has become isolated from the 
more general process of linguistic or discursive intervention: 
  
It is worth considering why critics of ‘PC’ readily say that it is ‘PC’ to suggest that adult 
females should be referred to as ‘women’ and not ‘girls’, but do not see it as ‘PC’ when ‘bank 
accounts’ are re-labelled as ‘financial products’. This re-labelling is certainly prescriptive for 
bank employees, and imposed on customers, and in that sense has to do with what is ‘correct’. 
But I imagine it is not generally seen as ‘political’ (Fairclough, 2003:21) 
 
This identification of PC with the politicisation of language suggests why PC might be 
viewed pejoratively as a proscriptive or proselytising project. However, further research 
might also ask why PC is separated from other attempts to change our attitudes and 
perceptions through linguistic reform. Furthermore, why are discursive interventions 
attributed to PC met with greater resistance than the other sorts of interventions Fairclough 
describes in the above paragraph as ‘imposed on customers’? 
 
Although much of the focus within the academic community has been upon the changing use 
of language, the questions raised by contemporary disputes of offence force us to also 
consider the importance of social and cultural change more generally; including how disputes 
of offence are produced and enacted across different cultural locations and levels of discourse 
(for example, how might ‘offensiveness’ be viewed differently within comedic or 
parliamentary discourse?). In particular, our social intolerance of ‘offensive’ and negative 
forms of social stereotyping sometimes sits awkwardly alongside a popular resistance against 
PC within some cultural spaces in which political incorrectness is often felt to embody an 
authentic or plain speaking alternative to PC orthodoxy. In order to examine this more closely 
this project moves beyond the predominantly linguistic orientated analysis which has 
dominated the discussion of PC in much of the contemporary literature to draw upon a range 
of power-centred discourse analytical approaches. It also directs its focus towards some of the 
cultural spaces in which disputes over the giving and taking of offence arise.  
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis contains a detailed examination of its research questions and 
methodologies. However, this chapter considers briefly how the literature has approached the 
three core thematic fields explored by this project in order to support and contextualise the 
research aims and methodology it proceeds to develop. The first thematic field involves 
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analysis of different instances of news discourse. Various studies have examined discourses 
of PC within the news media and considered the enduring capacity of PC to act as a 
‘discursive frame’ (Suhr and Johnson, 2003:6) for a wide range of topics (see e.g. Lakoff 
(2000); Suhr and Johnson (2003); Culpeper, Suhr and Johnson (2003); Toolen (2003)). Taken 
together, these studies highlight how the language of PC
44
 can be drawn upon as a means of 
simplifying and/or suppressing complex arguments about an increasingly disparate range of 
subjects. For example, in their exploration of discourses of political correctness in British 
newspapers (taking the period between 1994 and 1999) Culpeper, Suhr and Jonhson (2003) 
discuss how PC related terms were regularly used in national newspapers as a means of 
critiquing the Labour party. However, this critique incorporated a range of different criticisms 
of the policies and people associated with New Labour under the leadership of Tony Blair, as 
well as the politics of the ‘Old’ Labour party. Lakoff (2000) also points to the conflation and 
denunciation in newspapers, magazines and televisual broadcasts of ‘a wide array of 
discursive practices’ regarded as ‘PC’. These studies, therefore, have contributed to our 
knowledge and understanding of the discursive strategies in which the negative signification 
of PC is embedded. However, in view of the protean and discontinuous nature of PC, this 
project re-considers the discursive processes at work within different forms of news discourse 
within a contemporary context. Furthermore, although various studies have considered some 
of the ways in which PC has acquired a negative signification, further analysis might also 
consider whether, or the extent to which, the critique of PC is defensible in light of the 
different processes at work in the production and circulation of news. In other words, are 
particular arguments really proscribed or stigmatised in the reporting or discussion of topical 
events? Of further significance is the impact of new media technologies (including the 
increasing importance of social media in the last decade). This has expanded the potential 
pool of data from which any analysis of PC is drawn and also encourages research to consider 
the impact of the changing conditions of debate upon the character and nature of debate.  
 
The second thematic field this project explores is popular comedy, an artistic form renowned 
for its propensity to transgress social taboos and to offend. In view of this propensity, the 
literature has focused upon the meaning(s) produced and circulated by ‘offensive’ comedy, 
particularly humour which might be viewed as racist or bigoted in some way. Much analysis 
has explored the relationship between comic utterances and the (re)production of prejudice. 
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 By ‘language of PC’ I refer here both to the use of the term ‘PC’ and its various derivatives (like ‘politically 
incorrect’), and the various arguments or assertions which are made with regard to political correctness. 
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For example, Weaver (2011) examined racist jokes as an active part of the process of 
‘Othering’ and Billig (2009 and 2010) argues that the telling of racist jokes reinforces racial 
hatred through the creation of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ groups. In 1998, Littlewood and 
Pickering argued that political correctness (which they align to the emergence of 1980s 
alternative comedy) had largely marginalised ‘old style’ racist or sexist humour from 
mainstream comedy. They also describe such humour as having become far ‘less common’ 
without ‘the need to resort to official compulsion’ (p.297). However, more contemporary 
analysis has suggested that irony (or the assertion of irony) is increasingly invoked as a way 
of deflecting criticism of ‘politically incorrect’ humour (see e.g. Finding 2008 and 2010; Gill, 
2008; Hunt 2010 and 2013). Furthermore, humour that relies (ironically or otherwise) upon 
stereotyping on grounds such a gender, class or disability continues to retain a popular appeal 
(see e.g. Finding, 2010; Lockyer, 2010; Montgomerie, 2010; Kramer, 2011).  However, what 
does the enduring popularity of such humour suggest about PC as a mode of expression or 
what might constitute the discursive limits of free speech today? Although ‘offensive’ 
humour has emerged as a topic which is increasingly debated within popular and journalistic 
discourse
45
, there is relatively little academic analysis of the significance of the tangible trend 
towards ‘offensive’ or ‘politically incorrect’ comedy within recent years. In particular, the 
literature has not reconciled our perception of PC as having created a more censorious 
discursive environment with our continued acceptance (and celebration) of ‘politically 
incorrect’ or ‘non-PC’ forms of expression within some cultural spaces, including the field of 
popular comedy.  Finally, can we confidently claim that the enduring appeal of ‘politically 
incorrect’ humour is truly ‘ironic’? 
 
The third data analysis chapter included in this thesis will examine political cartooning. The 
literature has explored how political cartoons have often relied upon the use of ‘offensive’ 
and/or negative stereotyping in order to make a particular point or satirical comment (see e.g. 
Buell and Maus, 1988; Gilmartin and Brunn, 1998; Goodwin, 2001; Keane, 2008; Hughes, 
2010; Collins and Douglas, 2013). In particular, representation analysis has documented how 
cartoons have been used to promote racial stereotyping (for example, Thibodeau (1989) has 
examined the negative representation of African-Americans in US political cartoons, and 
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 For example, in ‘The new offenders of stand-up comedy’ the Guardian comedy critic, Brian Logan identified 
a ‘new offensiveness’ within some forms of modern comedy and argued that ‘all the bigotries and the misogyny 
you thought had been banished forever  from mainstream entertainment have made a startling comeback’. 
[Online] Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/stage/2009/jul/comedy-standup-new-offenders (Accessed: 21 
December2014). 
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Goodwin (2001) has undertaken a history of European anti-Semitic cartoons). In 2008, Taras 
asserted that ‘what is not permitted of the spoken word because of the hegemonic regime of 
political correctness can be indulged in with graphic representations’ (p.163). In their analysis 
of the representation of women in political cartoons of the 1995 world conference on 
women
46
, Gilmartin and Brunn (1998:536) also assert that the medium of the cartoon enables 
publications like newspapers to express themselves in ways which would otherwise be 
considered too ‘politically incorrect’. However, despite this body of research there has been 
little direct examination in the literature of the relationship between the emergence of the 
language of PC and political cartooning. Whilst cartooning is generally assumed to be a 
‘politically incorrect’ form of communication, studies have typically focused upon two 
overarching concerns: firstly, how cartoons are able to rely upon the use of ‘offensive’ 
imagery or text which might otherwise be deemed impermissible if expressed using another 
medium and secondly, the specific ways in which cartoons might be offensive (through, for 
example, the examination of how representations within cartoons reinforce forms of racial 
stereotyping). However, in light of contemporary controversies over ‘offensive’ imagery, can 
we claim confidently that political cartoons continue to be granted leeway to be ‘politically 
incorrect’? Contemporary controversies over political cartoons suggest rather that they are ‘ 
assuming an increasingly important role in international political communication’ in which 
‘the potential for conflict is spiralling in a context where images are circulated globally, but 
are received in very different local contexts’ (Attwood and Lockyer, 2009:4). .Furthermore, 
how might the changing conditions of debate (including the increasingly participatory nature 
of discourse generated by online activity and/or social media) impact upon our understanding 
of the offence generated by some political cartoons? Although the literature had addressed 
the range of (largely negative) meanings attached to PC, this chapter contends that it has not 
adequately reconciled some of the tensions underlying these meanings. Our increasing 
intolerance of ‘politically incorrect’ words or behaviour continues to sit awkwardly alongside 
our celebration of ‘political incorrectness’ as constituting an authentic alternative to PC. 
Despite its purportedly progressive aims, the literature also highlights how PC provokes a 
level of disdain which is far less visible when we observe other attempts to change values and 
attitudes through linguistic intervention
47
. This project, therefore, will explore these tensions 
through examination of the social practices and cultural context in which linguistic or 
discursive intervention takes place.  
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 The fourth World Conference on Women took place in Beijing, China. 
47
 This point has been made most forcibly by Fairclough (2003:21). 
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Chapter 4. ‘A puzzle without a solution’?48: Researching PC 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters outline how PC has emerged in recent decades as a signifier for an 
entire set of focuses. Some of these focuses are related to tangible phenomena (such as the 
emergence of a new politics of language and of identity) whilst others involve more 
contestable questions about these phenomena (such as, whether, how and why people self-
censor within everyday discourse). Crucially, these chapters have also highlighted how the 
literature has not reconciled various tensions which underlie how PC is perceived or 
understood. In particular, our increasing intolerance of ‘incorrect’ language or behaviour 
(such as racist or homophobic slurs) has developed alongside an emboldened critique of PC 
which has enabled political ‘incorrectness’ to acquire a positive signification. This chapter 
describes how this project investigates this paradox at the heart of the debate about PC. It 
therefore outlines the research questions which underpin the thesis, and sets out the rationale 
for the epistemological approach and methodologies embraced by this project in order to 
answer them.  
 
The chapter begins by outlining the core research questions. Secondly, it discusses why a 
range of power-centred discourse analytical approaches have been chosen as methodological 
tools given the aims and nature of the research. Thirdly, it outlines the research design for 
each of the data analysis chapters included in the thesis. This includes the rationale for how 
data is gathered and how the research questions are investigated and analysed within each 
chapter. Finally, the chapter reflects upon the overall research context in which this project is 
undertaken, including the methodological issues and challenges this has produced. 
 
4.2 Research Questions 
 
The principal aim of this thesis is to make sense of the meaning(s) and tensions which 
continue to underlie how PC is understood in popular discourse. For this reason the project 
undertakes data analysis of popular cultural and media sources which allow it to examine 
these tensions. Although PC has been theorised as a new politics of language, this project has 
                                                          
48
 This quote is taken from Paul Berman’s description of the lack of consensus within both academic and non-
academic circles surrounding the meaning of PC. (1992:5-6) 
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developed from a wider concern about the significance of change within language, 
representation and culture as a way of generating social or political progress. It, therefore, 
engages meaningfully with the critique of PC explored in the previous chapter, particularly 
the view that the pressure for linguistic or cultural change is felt to have engendered a 
censorious culture driven by a fear of causing offence. In other words, the progressive goal of 
social change has become discursively aligned through the critique of PC with disputes about 
the nature of ‘offensiveness’ and the limits of free speech. The first research question draws 
directly upon this discursive alignment: 
 
1. How are we to make sense of the various meaning(s) attached to PC, particularly 
the assertion that it is responsible for the imposition of a ‘liberal orthodoxy’ (Hughes, 
2010:4) rooted in a fear of causing offence and conformity of opinion? 
 
In order to answer this core research question there are various related issues that need to be 
considered. Further sub-questions are thus: 
 
1.1 How might a PC or ‘liberal orthodoxy’ be identified within a particular level of 
discourse? 
 
1.2 Do the conditions of debate which surround contentious topics suggest that 
particular viewpoints are stigmatised or precluded in any way? 
 
1.3 What is the relationship between the nature of debate and the discursive context in 
which it is held: crucially, how might the discursive context impact upon the way in 
which the giving or taking of offence is enacted or more broadly understood? 
 
This thesis has observed that the assertion that a PC orthodoxy prevails across contemporary 
discourse has developed alongside a popular backlash against PC in which ‘political 
incorrectness’ and/or anti-PC rhetoric has acquired a positive signification (see e.g. Dunant, 
1994; Cameron, 1995; Hughes, 2010). As PC emerged as a cultural signifier for a censorious 
movement to be mocked, political incorrectness has also emerged as its plain-speaking and 
free-thinking obverse or alternative. Despite the offence undoubtedly generated by ‘incorrect’ 
utterances, hostility towards PC therefore retains a level of popular kudos or appeal. The 
second research question directly addresses this paradox: 
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2. How do we account for the enduring popularity of political incorrectness within 
some levels of discourse; and how should disputes of offence which arise from 
politically incorrect forms of expression be viewed?   
 
The sub-questions which help to address this core question are as follows: 
 
2.1 How should we define or characterise political incorrectness? 
 
2.2 What are the social practices or discursive strategies at work which might 
legitimise and reproduce the use of politically incorrect language and rhetoric within 
some levels of discourse? 
 
2.3 Can any singular or overarching meaning account for the appeal of politically 
incorrect forms of expression despite the offence this also generates?  
 
Since the debate surrounding PC emerged in the later decades of the 20
th
 century it has taken 
place within an increasingly participatory and democratised public domain. As the language 
of PC has become part of our everyday lexicon, disputes of offence have also acquired an 
increasingly high profile within our mainstream media and wider culture
49
.  In other words, 
as a diverse range of people and practices have become categorised or labelled as ‘PC’50 so 
have the opportunities grown for people to engage in discussion of the various controversies 
the debate about PC continues to provoke (especially the controversies concerning the nature 
of ‘offensiveness’). The third research question will draw upon both the significance of our 
preoccupation with ‘offensiveness’ and the ways in which the conditions of debate have 
changed over recent decades:  
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 In 2003 Suhr and Johnson claimed that media interest in matters concerning PC had peaked in the UK in the 
mid-1990s. However, disputes of offence (particularly those concerning prejudice like racism or sexism in 
public life) form a regular part of the reporting and discussion of news and current affairs in the 21
st
 century. 
Much of the broader discussion about the significance of this, however, has been contained within journalistic or 
media discourse and commentary rather than academic analysis.  
50
 The expansion of the range of practices categorised as ‘PC’ has been examined extensively in the literature; 
including how the language of PC is used as a way of stigmatising those labelled ‘PC’ and of discursively 
simplifying a number of complex arguments about the politics of language and the nature of offence (see e.g. 
Cameron, 1995; Lakoff, 2000; Fairclough, 2000; Culpepper, Suhr and Johnson, 2003; Allan and Burridge, 
2006).  However, there has been little direct discussion of the relationship between the changing conditions of 
debate and how PC disputes are enacted or understood.  
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3. How should we make sense of our preoccupation with the giving and taking of 
offence, including the discussion this generates across various discursive spaces 
within our media? 
 
In order to answer this, two further sub-questions are also investigated: 
 
3.1 What is the relationship between the changing conditions of debate (particularly 
the expansion of discursive spaces generated by new technologies such as social 
media) and the nature of debate surrounding disputes of offence?  
 
3.2 Has the increasingly democratised and participatory character of many discursive 
spaces facilitated a culture of ‘competing rights’ surrounding the giving and taking of 
offence? 
 
These research questions are used to explore social contestation over the use of language and 
representation more generally within different levels of discourse (this encompasses ‘formal’ 
types of discourse like parliamentary discourse as well as the arguably ‘informal’ nature of 
comedic discourse). This is the focus embraced by this project as it investigates its core 
research questions. However, before doing so, the following part of this chapter discusses the 
overarching epistemological approach the thesis adopts in view of its research aims and 
objectives.  
 
4.3 Methodological Overview 
 
This thesis uses a range of discourse analytical approaches which have been adopted by 
researchers who are interested in the relationship between power, language and society and 
wish to describe, interpret and explain this relationship. Discourse analytical approaches also 
enable the data analysis component of this project to engage with the many genres of 
discourse in which disputes of offence are embedded (such as political discourse or comic 
discourse). The rationale for each choice of method is described in the forthcoming sections 
of this chapter. However, the overall research framework advanced here enables this project 
to develop a methodology which will encompass research embracing image, textual and 
cultural data from a range of media sources. As an eclectic range of data sources are drawn 
upon, the methodological tools are selected in view of the specific nature of each source and 
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the specific questions which are explored. For example, Bakhtinian dialogism is chosen as a 
conceptual framework which is especially suited to the analysis of offence and transgression 
in the field of comedy. Although this project makes use of a range of methodological tools 
and concepts, the methods and techniques of research it deploys share three core ontological 
assumptions. Firstly, power relations are viewed as discursive, and the various methods probe 
the relationship between our discursive behaviour and wider socio-political factors. Secondly, 
language is conceptualised broadly as encompassing anything which might function as a sign, 
or carry meaning
51
. For example, this project explores the various signifying practices at 
work within the language of both imagery and written texts in order to answer its core 
research questions. Finally, language is also approached as a site of struggle over meaning 
which is always contextual, temporal and embedded in wider processes of power.  
 
Crucially, the use of a variety of research approaches allows the thesis to benefit from the 
advantages associated with triangulation whereby different research techniques are used to 
investigate the questions posed by a particular study. Bryman (1992) has suggested that the 
idea of triangulation has drawn upon ‘multiple operationism’ in which different data sources 
are subject to different forms of data collection and analysis in order to check the findings 
produced by various research strategies against one another (p.63). In this respect, a multi-
method research project is strengthened through its ability draw conclusions from results 
unimpeded by the limitations imposed through reliance upon a single research strategy or 
methodology. Denzin (1970) therefore suggests that triangulation helps a researcher to 
maximise the credibility or accuracy of their research, and he has broadened the concept to 
include some techniques adopted by this thesis. Firstly, data triangulation is described by 
Denzin (1970) as research involving a variety of data sources. The research process described 
in this chapter outlines how data will be gathered in the thesis using different sampling 
strategies so that slices of data are gathered from a range of discursive contexts. Secondly, 
Denzin uses theoretical triangulation to refer to the use of more than one theoretical position 
in interpreting data. This chapter outlines how different theoretical traditions are incorporated 
into the research process in order to examine its sources: for example, Bakhtinian dialogism 
and Bourdieu’s capital theory are both deployed in order to investigate the nature and appeal 
of ‘politically incorrect’ forms of comic discourse. Finally, Denzin (1970) refers to 
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 The conceptualisation of language adopted by this project is informed by the work of Hall (1997). Hall 
describes ‘any sound, word, image, or object which functions as a sign…[and] which is capable of carrying and 
expressing meaning [as]…’a language’’ (p.19). 
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methodological triangulation as the use of more than one method for gathering data: the 
following chapter sections outline a range of methodologies used to gather the data examined 
in this thesis. 
 
The project, therefore, applies different theoretical and methodological concepts to 
investigate different types of cultural data within a wider methodological framework in which 
the relationship between power and language enables us to explore the myriad of ways in 
which PC is understood. Crucially, PC is approached throughout the research process as a 
discursive construct whose meaning is relational and subject to redefinition by different 
people and in different contexts. This does not preclude the tangible significance of the socio-
cultural, political and linguistic change which has generally been attributed to the emergence 
of PC
52. Rather, it is to foreground the ‘freeplay’ (Derrida 1966, cited by Chandler, 2001:79) 
of PC as a floating signifier
53
 which cannot be grounded to any ‘fixed’ or singular meaning. 
How, therefore, should the discursive construction of PC and the various controversies this 
provokes be explored? 
 
4.4 Political Correctness and forms of news discourse 
 
Chapter Five of this thesis uses three case studies to investigate the research questions. It 
focuses primarily upon the first research question although it also begins to consider matters 
raised by the third as it observes the ways in which the changing conditions of debate have 
contributed to our preoccupation with the giving and taking of offence. The studies make use 
of both senses of ‘discourse’ as defined by Gee (1999; 2010): firstly; data is examined in 
which the use of PC related terminology (such as ‘PC’ or ‘politically incorrect’) is directly 
gathered from the data source.  Secondly, discourse is also viewed as involving the wider 
discursive context and social processes in which the data source is embedded and is a part of. 
For example, one case study examines a parliamentary debate in which the term ‘PC’ is used 
only once. However, the data analysis also looks at the discursive practices which are used to 
construct and exchange argument throughout the debate. One of the methodological 
challenges arising from this approach is that by labelling discourse (such as the parliamentary 
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 Although the meaning of PC remains contested in the literature the previous chapter observes how it is 
broadly accepted by authors across the political spectrum as a signifier for a politics of language and identity 
(see e.g. Loury, 1994; Gitlin, 1997; Rankin, 2002; Browne, 2006; Green, 2006, Bullough, 2008; Taras, 2008; 
Hughes, 2010; Furedi, 2011).        
53
The notion of PC as a floating signifier is examined in depth in the Genealogy chapter of this thesis. 
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debate) as ‘PC discourse’ the project becomes part of the broader discursive process - 
including the discursive construction of PC - which it seeks to deconstruct and unpick. 
However, in this instance, the decision to approach the case studies in this way is a reflection 
of how PC has already emerged as a cultural signifier which is attached to many of the issues 
and themes the studies raise
54
. In choosing to begin the data analysis chapters by focusing 
upon some of the ways in which news is produced and circulated, the thesis observes the 
relatively ‘formal’ nature of parliamentary discourse and the reporting of news by the BBC 
before it engages with less formal levels of discourse in the chapters which follow. However, 
the news discourse component of this project also engages with the less regulated nature of 
social media which begins to encourage the thesis to consider more closely the complex 
relationship between what is said and its discursive context.  
 
4.4.1 Reading British newspapers 
 
The first case study begins to explore the first research question using two British newspapers 
as source material. In order to capture a snapshot of how PC is understood by each 
newspaper, data collection was limited to a two week time-frame between 10
th
 and 23
rd
 
September 2012. Two broadsheet papers were selected for their broadly opposing political 
affiliations: (i) the liberal-left leaning Guardian and (ii) the right leaning Daily Telegraph. 
This project was particularly keen to examine The Guardian because it is often identified 
within media or journalistic discourse as a ‘politically correct’ publication55.  The online 
Lexis Library was used to access the data sources and a search for articles containing the 
expressions ‘PC’, ‘political correctness’, ‘political incorrectness’, ‘politically correct’ and 
‘politically incorrect’ was conducted. Once instances of ‘PC’ which referred to the 
abbreviation of ‘personal computer’ and ‘police constable’ were removed from the data, the 
search produced eleven articles and news items in The Telegraph and eight in The Guardian 
which made use of PC related terms. Of these, analysis was narrowed to two articles in The 
Telegraph and two in The Guardian which were all taken from opinion-based, or ‘Comment’ 
sections. These sections were selected for data analysis as opinion based articles typically 
possess greater licence to freely discuss and dispute ideas and arguments than the purportedly 
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 These themes (which are directly identified in Chapter Five) include conflicting notions of equality, rights, 
free speech and the giving of offence. 
55
 Indeed, one of the articles from The Telegraph which is used as a data source in this particular case study 
refers disparagingly to ‘Guardianistas’ as part of its critique of political correctness. [Online] Available at: 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/petermullen/100180868/islamist-terrorism-is-beginning-to-demolish-political-
correctness/ (Accessed 18 November 2014).     
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‘objective’ or factual nature of news reporting56. The case study considers how PC is 
understood within each article and how we might identify a ‘PC’ or ‘liberal orthodoxy’ by 
exploring the different ways in which political correctness is discursively constructed within 
the right leaning Telegraph and left leaning Guardian.  It revisits the conceptualisation of PC 
developed by Loury
57
 (1994) - in which PC is viewed as involving both disagreements over 
substantive issues as well as questions about whether certain viewpoints are excluded from 
debate - and uses this to help ascertain whether a ‘PC’ orthodoxy can be identified within the 
various articles used as data sources. Finally, it will identify whether particular arguments are 
stigmatised during the discursive process and consider the practices at work which are used to 
(de)legitimise the expression of different arguments or viewpoints
58
 .   
 
4.4.2 Listening to parliamentary debate 
 
The second case study uses the second reading of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill in 
the House of Commons on 5
th
 February 2013 as source material with which to further explore 
the first research question using analysis of a different form of political discourse to do so. As 
parliamentary discourse involves politicians at work in a formal or official capacity it allows 
the thesis to begin to address more directly how the rules and practices governing discourse 
are informed by its discursive context and/or institutional setting.  This part of the chapter is 
also particularly interested in utilising the second sense of ‘discourse’ advanced by Gee 
(1999) as it investigates the various practices and strategies used within the Commons debate 
in order to advance or defend different positions (either opposed to or supportive of the bill).  
The parliamentary debate on the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill is available on the UK 
Parliament website
59
 both through the Hansard transcript and a video recording of the full 
debate. The case study uses both sources in order to conduct a thematic analysis of the 
arguments made during the second reading of the bill and focuses on the use of rhetoric, 
language and discursive strategies to produce the arguments advanced by the various MPs 
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 The News Discourse chapter will, however, recognise the significance of the different ways in which news 
and topical events are reported. For instance, the discursive practices surrounding the factual reporting of news 
on the BBC is examined in the third case study included in the chapter. 
57
 The conceptualisation of PC by Loury (1994) is introduced by this thesis in the Genealogy chapter. 
58
 The analysis developed in each of the data chapters will invariably address matters which are not specific to 
any single research question or sub question. In this instance, although the analysis of broadsheet newspapers 
primarily addresses the first research question the examination of discursive practices also begins to consider 
how ‘political incorrectness’ acquires a positive signification (a matter which is considered in more depth in the 
Comedy chapter).  
59
 [Online] Available at  http://www.parliament.uk/ (Accessed 20 July 2014) 
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debating the issue in Parliament.  References to ‘Political Correctness’ (or derivatives of the 
term such as ‘politically correct’ or ‘political incorrectness’) were recorded in the initial stage 
of the data gathering process. Examination of the Hansard transcript and video recording 
revealed a single reference to ‘Political Correctness’ by Maria Miller, the Member of 
Parliament responsible for introducing the bill to the House.  The search was then broadened 
to identify the key conceptual arguments made throughout the parliamentary debate - both for 
and against the legalisation of same sex marriage.  The data collection process revealed that 
both those supporting and opposing the bill relied predominantly upon of notions of equality, 
rights and discrimination to support their arguments
60
. These themes were also often 
presented as interrelated. Opponents of the bill also strongly asserted the importance of 
tradition, although this was often used to buttress arguments in support of religious rights and 
freedoms (including the opinion that the bill constituted a form of discrimination against 
religious groups).  This quantitative exercise then provided the data for the qualitative and 
wider thematic examination of how political discourse is regulated and produced within the 
institutional setting of Parliament. Although this thematic study is used primarily to answer 
the first research question, the analysis of the strategies used to oppose the bill also begin to 
explore the notion of ‘competing rights’ which is raised by sub-question 3.2.  
 
4.4.3 Following Twitter and the reporting of ‘Twitter Storms’ 
 
The final case study continues to address the first research question generally and also begins 
to explore some of the issues raised by the third research question. In particular, it considers 
the relationship between new social media technologies and how the debate concerning 
‘offensiveness’ is conducted61.  The analysis explores discourses of offensiveness using the 
‘Twitter Storm’ arising from the appointment in 2013 of England and Wales’s first Youth 
Police and Crime Commissioner, Paris Brown.  It uses tweets posted by Paris and the BBC 
coverage of the controversy they led to as data. It only uses the tweets Paris posted which 
were republished by the media, as the original source (Paris Brown’s Twitter account) has 
been deleted. The data analysis considers how discourses of offensiveness are produced 
through the reporting of current affairs. This enables it to consider our contemporary 
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 32 MPs involved in the debate used notions of equality to support their viewpoint(s). 26 referred to rights; and 
22 to discrimination. 
61
 This matter is raised directly by question 3.1. 
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preoccupation with ‘offensiveness’ including how contentious viewpoints become 
stigmatised within media discourse
62
.  
 
In order to conduct the study, a search of the BBC News Archive was undertaken using the 
name ‘Paris Brown’. Of the 20 articles found, 6 contained video clips which were also 
included as part of the source material. The BBC News Archive was selected as a sampling 
frame as the BBC aspires to be politically objective and unbiased in a way that is not claimed 
by other media sources, such as print journalism
63
. The analysis, therefore, explores the 
generation and circulation of news using two sources: (i) the Paris Brown tweets, and (ii) the 
BBC news archive. It also uses Goffman’s (1959) distinction between our ‘front stage’ and 
‘back stage’ selves (where we are viewed as possessing an observable ‘front stage’ and 
hidden ‘backstage’ self) as a conceptual tool with which to make sense of the changing 
conditions of debate generated by social media. The analysis conducted in this part of the 
research project also acts as a foundation for the study of our multifarious and democratised 
media domain which is explored in greater depth within the cartoon chapter (Chapter Seven). 
4.5 Political Correctness and Popular Comedy 
 
Chapter Six focuses primarily on the second research question using contemporary British 
comedy as source material.  It begins with a mapping exercise in which the historical 
relationship between PC and British comedy is outlined in order to situate the research 
process within an accurate broader socio-cultural context.  Although the chapter will discuss 
different genres of comedy (including sketch shows and situation comedies) it uses 
contemporary British stand-up comedy as a sampling frame from which its main data sources 
are drawn. It does so for two key reasons: firstly, the controversies surrounding politically 
incorrect discourse have often centred upon the routines of popular stand-up comedians and 
secondly, stand-up comedy may arguably be felt to be a comedic genre particularly suited to 
the expression of contentious opinions, observations or ‘saying the unsayable’64.  Because 
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 The data analysis will therefore help to answer the issues directly raised by questions 1.2 and 3 and 3.1. 
63
 The BBC describes its values as ‘independent, impartial and honest’, although of course it is not immune to 
accusations of political bias. Research conducted by the Glasgow Media Group (1995) has accused the BBC of 
favouring a conservative viewpoint, although it is more frequently accused of having a liberal-left bias, which 
some conservative commentators (e.g. Browne,2006; Green, 2006) have conflated with its alleged culture of 
‘political correctness’ which Browne argues has become ‘institutionalised’(2006:34).  
64
 Of course, various other comedy genres might also be viewed in this way and our general perception of 
comedy remains highly subjective and contextual. However, a situation comedy or sketch show may more easily 
be read as involving the portrayal of particular characters rather than constituting a true reflection of a 
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this project is interested in the various meanings attached to PC, all of the stand-up 
comedians whose material is used as data are renowned for giving offence and fostering a 
reputation as ‘politically incorrect’. Despite the offence their comedy might generate, they are 
also selected because they are highly successful performers who have maintained their 
success at a period in history in which ‘politically incorrect’ utterances have generally 
become less socially acceptable
65
. Much of the source material is selected from the comedy 
generated by three popular comics: Roy ‘Chubby’ Brown, Jimmy Carr and Frankie Boyle. 
The data analysis component is divided into two main parts of the chapter, both of which 
address the second research question generally, although each part will focus more directly 
upon particular sub-questions.  
 
4.5.1 Using capital theory to explore why Jimmy Carr is ‘edgy’ and Chubby Brown 
‘offensive’ 
 
The first major piece of data analysis uses Bourdieu’s capital theory in order to examine the 
processes at work when we form our comedic tastes, including the distinctions we make 
between ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ forms of  ‘offensive’ comedy.  It also looks at the 
enduring popularity of politically incorrect comic discourse whilst focusing especially upon 
the second sub-question which asks what discursive strategies might help legitimise 
politically incorrect utterances.  
 
Capital theory broadens the notion of economic capital developed by Marx to also include 
cultural, social and symbolic capital. For Bourdieu (1986; 2005) economic capital remains 
primary as it can be used to purchase these other forms of capital. Bourdieu describes cultural 
capital as the forms of knowledge, tastes and dispositions which endow people with wider 
advantages in society. For example, parents provide their children with cultural capital when 
they transmit knowledge and values to them which are necessary to succeed at school.  Social 
capital refers to the advantages accumulated from social connections or networking between 
individuals and groups; and symbolic capital involves the advantages gained through status or 
reputation. In Language and Symbolic Power (1991) Bourdieu also identifies linguistic 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
performer’s thoughts or opinions. Whilst a stand-up comedian might also adopt a comic persona which is 
distinct from their non-comic identity, stand-up lends itself less easily to this type of reading than the character 
based nature of a situation comedy or sketch show. 
65
 By ‘politically incorrect’ utterances I refer here particularly to language deemed to display or suggest bigotry 
towards certain groups (such as racist or sexist language).   
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capital as a form of cultural capital. He argues that an individual acquires linguistic capital if 
their use of language (such as speaking with a particular accent or dialect) is seen more 
broadly as legitimate. In Distinction (1984) Bourdieu explores how those with high levels of 
cultural capital are able to determine what constitutes taste within society. In particular, he 
considers how middle class tastes and dispositions are used by people as cultural signifiers in 
order to distinguish themselves from those who lack high levels of cultural capital. Bourdieu 
argued that one of the main ways in which privileged social groups cultivate their cultural 
capital resources is by converting them into tastes for ‘high’ culture (such as an appreciation 
of ‘high’ art like opera). These tastes, or dispositions, can also be converted into broader 
material rewards
66. However, various authors point out that the differences between ‘high’ 
and ‘low’ culture have become an increasingly less reliable means of distinguishing between 
those with different cultural capital resources (see e.g. DiMaggio, 2004; Friedman, 2011). 
Friedman argues that ‘the pursuit of distinction is not just a matter of what objects are 
consumed, but the way they are consumed and the aims pursued in doing so’ (2011:351). In 
this respect, forms of popular culture like comedy are also open to analysis of how those with 
higher cultural capital resources are able to consume comedy in ways less accessible to those 
who lack these resources.   
 
Cultural capital is utilised as a conceptual framework with which to answer the second core 
research question. The sampling process selects ten minute segments from each of the DVD 
recordings of live performances by Roy ‘Chubby’ Brown and Jimmy Carr which are chosen 
as data sources
67
. The live recordings are used for both practical and theoretical reasons. 
Firstly, the use of the DVD recordings enables the research process to ‘capture’ or record the 
telling of jokes with relative ease.  Secondly, as Chubby Brown is seldom broadcast within 
the mainstream broadcast media his live recordings grant us access to view his material. 
Finally, any analysis of ‘offensive’ humour may be particularly suited to the observation of 
live comedy where comedians are generally less constrained by what they can and cannot 
say
68
. The chapter takes each of the different forms of capital defined here by Bourdieu and 
uses them to examine several key factors: (i) the jokes told by Brown and Carr in the selected 
DVD recordings; (ii) the comic personas adopted by both comedians; and (iii) how both 
                                                          
66
 For example, Bourdieu described how knowledge of ‘high’ culture can help secure educational success which 
is then transmutable into economic capital (1984; 1993).  
67
 The DVDs used in this part of the chapter are: Clitoris Allsorts (1995, 2001); Too Fat To Be Gay (2009) and 
Making People Laugh (2010).  
68
 For example, the jokes told by Jimmy Carr when performing live to an audience of fans will be more 
‘offensive’ or explicit than those he tells as a popular host of pre-watershed TV panel shows.  
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comedians are more broadly perceived (including their critical reception and how they are 
viewed by the media and public). In other words, the chapter will explore how possession (or 
lack of possession) of the various forms of capital becomes attached to the way(s) in which 
we view jokes and comedians who rely on politically incorrect humour. Capital theory, 
therefore, is applied to the source material and used to explore the discursive processes and 
social practices which help (de)legitimise politically incorrect utterances.  
 
4.5.2 Is there a ‘new offensiveness’?69 Using Bakhtinian dialogism to make sense of the 
appeal of politically incorrect discourse 
 
The comedy chapter continues to look generally at the second research questions whilst 
focusing particularly on the third sub-question which asks whether any overarching meaning 
can explain the enduring popularity of politically incorrect discourse.  ‘Offensive’ and/or 
‘politically incorrect’ jokes taken from mainstream contemporary British comedy are used as 
data. In selecting the jokes the project recognises that these labels are somewhat imprecise 
ways of classifying an eclectic range of jokes, comedians and forms of humour. It therefore 
selects jokes which target historically disadvantaged groups, or incorporate social 
stereotyping and the use of taboo: in other words, it selects jokes conceptualised as politically 
incorrect within contemporary popular discourse. In particular, it draws upon material which 
it deems would once have been viewed as problematic within mainstream British comedy in 
the post-alternative comedy era, despite the absence of any ‘official compulsion’ (Littlewood 
and Pickering, 1998:297) to proscribe  such ‘offensive’ content. This part of the chapter also 
draws upon Littlewood and Pickering’s  useful distinction between humour which ‘kicks up’ 
at the powerful and that which ‘kicks down’ in order to help identify particular jokes or forms 
of humour as ‘politically incorrect’ (ibid.). The source material includes a segment from the 
BBC situation comedy The Office as well as jokes told in comic routines by Frankie Boyle 
and Jimmy Carr. Particular focus is placed upon jokes about disability told by able-bodied 
comedians
70
. This is because jokes about disability have emerged as a notable ingredient in 
the repertoire of many of the ‘offensive’ comedians featured in this project, and their telling 
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 The ‘new offensiveness’ is a reference to the emergence and popularity of post-alternative comedians who 
appear to delight in the use of politically incorrect language and rhetoric. The term was coined in an article by 
Guardian comedy critic, Brian Logan and is explored in greater depth in the comedy chapter. [Online] 
Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/stage/2009/jul/comedy-standup-new-offenders  
70
 All of the jokes used in this chapter are also told by white, heterosexual men. This was not a deliberate part of 
the sampling process although it is illustrative of how comedy continues to be dominated by this profile of 
comedian.  
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also arguably unsettles prior established notions of who is entitled to say what within the 
post-alternative comic world. 
 
This part of the chapter uses Bakhtinian dialogism as a conceptual framework with which to 
explore the source material. According to Bakhtin words or utterances acquire meaning from 
the dialogic relationship between two or more speakers: 
 
The word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes one’s “own” only when the speaker 
populates it with his own intentions, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting 
it to his own semantic and expressive intention. Prior to this moment of appropriation, the 
word does not exist in a neutral and impersonal language…but rather it exists in other 
people’s mouths, in other people’s contexts, serving other people’s intentions; it is from there 
that one must take the word, and make it one’s own’ (Bakhtin, 1935 cited in Emerson and 
Holquist, 1981:293-294) 
 
Everything we say and mean, therefore, is mediated and revised through our communication 
with others so that ‘any utterance is a link in the chain of communication’ (Bakhtin, 1952 
cited in Emerson and Holquist, 1986:68). Bakhtin suggests that the meaning of words is 
always negotiable and therefore, can never be entirely fixed or owned by one voice or group.  
In his 1935 essay Discourse and the Novel Bakhtin also explores the impossibility of 
neutrality in language and considers how one set of associations can replace another in the 
struggle over meaning
71
.This understanding of language as fundamentally dialogic enables 
the comedy chapter to explore the complex struggles over meaning and language in which PC 
disputes are invariably embedded. 
Of particular use are the Bakhtinian concepts of ‘double-voiced discourse’ together with the 
notion of ‘the word with a sideways glance’ (Vice, 1997: 22-23). These concepts describe 
how different voices may simultaneously occupy authorial intention in a dialogical 
relationship. They are, therefore, useful conceptual tools with which to investigate the 
interplay between conflicting PC and non-PC voices within contemporary comedy. These 
concepts are applied to each of the data sources in order to explore the enduring popularity of 
‘non-PC’ voices within contemporary comic discourse. Bakhtin also invites us to consider 
                                                          
71 For instance, the quote previously cited in Emerson and Holquist (1981:293-294) describes how the speaker 
‘appropriates’ the word to make it ‘one’s own’. Disputes of offence, including contestation over ‘offensive’ 
words or the ‘reclaiming’ of derogatory labels by less powerful groups might  also usefully be explored using 
this dialogical approach.  
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how speech is characterised by heteroglossia, or ‘multi-languaged-ness’ (Vice, 1997:113). 
Heteroglossia has been called ‘Bakhtin’s key term for describing the complex stratification of 
language into genre, register, sociolect, dialect, and the mutual inter-animation of these 
forms’ (White, 1993:136 cited in Vice, 1997:18)72. The stratified nature of language is also 
drawn upon throughout the research process in order to examine why some forms of ‘non-
PC’ discourse retain a popular presence and appeal. 
Finally, Bakhtin’s concept of the carnival is also used as a conceptual tool with which to 
answer the second research question(s). Bakhtin identified the carnival as a space granted in 
the medieval period by religious and civil authority in which the public celebration of the 
profane and transgressive was temporarily given free expression.  At carnival time people 
were free to feast and revel in grotesque comic celebration in which   
 
the body copulates, defecates, overeats, and men’s speech is flooded with genitals, bellies, 
defecations, urine, disease, noses, mouths and dismembered parts (Bakhtin, 1968:319)  
 
Comedy has been described as embracing a carnivalesque celebration of contempt and 
disrespect for the usual restraints and icons of polite life (see e.g. Medhurst, 2007; Sturges, 
2009:282). In a contemporary context, polite life arguably incorporates politically correct 
codes of speech, thought and behaviour, sometimes perceived as imposed on the majority by 
a more powerful liberal orthodoxy or authority
73
. The idea of the carnivalesque as a comedic 
and socially transgressive mode is taken up by this thesis and used to consider whether 
politically incorrect forms of comic discourse can be usefully understood as ritualised 
displays of what are ordinarily suppressed and ‘incorrect’ viewpoints.  Crucially, the comedy 
chapter considers whether or not the jokes it examines constitute a carnivalesque subversion 
of ‘PC officialdom’ and authority.    
 
 
 
                                                          
72
 Vice notes how this definition of heteroglossia makes use of concepts from contemporary sociolinguistics, 
such as “ ‘sociolect’ (discourse  determined by different social groups according to ‘age, gender, economic 
kinship’ and so on) and ‘register’ (discourse belonging to ‘the lawyer, the doctor…the politician)” (1997:18)  
73
 In his analysis of ‘Chubby’ Brown, Medhurst (2007) reflects upon this way of viewing modern life and 
defends the popularity of Brown on the grounds of his politically incorrect credentials and carnivalesque 
celebration of ‘offensiveness’ in which both comedian and his (predominantly working class) audience 
participate in a public rejection of PC ‘officialdom’ and social inhibition.  
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4.6 Political Correctness and Political Cartooning 
 
Chapter 7 uses political cartoons in order to explore the giving and taking of offence on 
grounds of religious belief or identity. The chapter continues to explore many of the issues 
provoked by the first two research questions although it also considers the third research 
question in greater depth. The rationale for its thematic focus centres upon the notion that we 
now live in a ‘post-secular’ society.74 Undoubtedly, the decision to make religion and 
cartooning the focus of this chapter was informed by the high media profile of cases 
involving contestation over visual (and non-visual) representations of religion, religious 
figures or religious groups. The data gathering process uses political cartooning as a sampling 
frame from which to select cartoons which have either generated disputes of offence or 
encourage discussion relating to offence taken on grounds of religious belief or identity. The 
data analysis process is located within the context of debate about religion in the UK in the 
21
st
 century
75
. An effort is made to include different religions (including Christianity, Islam 
and Judaism), however, in choosing cases which have generated most discussion in the 21
st
 
century a significant portion of this part of the thesis will focus upon the controversies 
surrounding the visual depiction of the prophet Muhammad. The research process utilises the 
insights of semiotics, intertextual analysis and representation theory in order to create a 
methodological path and framework through which the research questions are explored.  
 
4.6.1 Using intertextual analysis to explore discourses of offence 
 
This part of the chapter begins to examine the third core research question and explores the 
notion of ‘competing rights’ which is raised in its second sub-question. The chapter includes 
an intertextual reading of discourses of offence using the cartoons of Martin Rowson as 
source material. Rowson is a British editorial cartoonist who describes his work as ‘visual 
journalism’76. His cartoons are used as data as he has explored religion and religious themes 
in his work. The cartoons used have appeared in New Humanist magazine and The Guardian 
                                                          
74
 Habermas (2008) argues that the endurance of religious belief and reassertion of religious identity within 
Western societies in the 21
st
 century means that traditional sociological theories of secularization have been 
largely discredited. The idea of the ‘post-secular’ society is examined in greater depth prior to the core data 
analysis in the cartoon chapter.  
75
 This will include consideration of the infamous Muhammad cartoons which were published in the Danish 
newspaper Jyllands-Posten in 2005. However, the research process will focus primarily upon the response of the 
British press to the publication of the cartoons. 
76
 Rowson made these remarks during an appearance on Radio 3’s Essential Classic Programme on 30/07/2013 
[Online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0375wx8  (Access 03/12/2014) 
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newspaper.  New Humanist describes itself as standing for ‘reason, secularism and free 
enquiry’77 and, therefore, might be expected to adopt a critical view of religion.  The 
Guardian has already been used as a data source in the News Discourse chapter of this thesis. 
However, the liberal-left broadsheet is also included here for practical and theoretical 
reasons: firstly, it is the main employer of the cartoonist Rowson and secondly, as The 
Guardian is often perceived as a ‘PC’ publication78 it is worth revisiting in order to build 
upon our understanding of how PC is discursively constructed. 
 
Intertextual analysis encourages us to recognise how the meanings of a discursive image or 
text depend not only on that one text or image, but also on the meanings carried by other 
images and texts
79
 (Rose, 2007:142).  According to Kristeva (1992) texts are always in a state 
of production and cannot present clear or stable meanings as they always embody an on-
going negotiation and contestation over the meaning of words. In this sense, any meaning of 
a text can only be understood as a temporary re-arrangement of elements of pre-existent 
meaning(s) (p.52). This understanding of the discursive image as a site of contestation is used  
in this chapter to analyse three political cartoons: (i) a cartoon which appeared in New 
Humanist magazine in 2010 which depicts the prominent atheist Richard Dawkins and God 
directing ‘offensive’ hand gestures at each other;80 (ii) a cartoon from The Guardian in 2010 
showing the offence taken by Church of England clergy in view of the decision by the ruling 
synod that women bishops should be permitted
81
; and (iii) a cartoon taken from The 
Guardian in 2006 which features prominently the stars of David covering a fist which is used 
to punch a Lebanese boy
82
. Rather than focus primarily on the internal structure of each 
image, the readings also explore the intertextual relationship between each cartoon and other 
discursive events, images and texts. It will also ask what this relationship tells us about our 
contemporary preoccupation with ‘offensiveness’. The first two cartoons are chosen because 
they depict the giving and taking of offence on grounds of religious belief (or lack of belief). 
                                                          
77
 This statement is taken from the magazine website. [Online] Available at: https://newhumanist.org.uk/about   
(Accessed 02/12/2014) 
78
 For instance, one of the data sources used in the News Discourse chapter disparagingly refers to 
‘Guardianistas’ [Online] Available at: http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/petermullen/100180868/islamist-
terrorism-is-beginning-to-demolish-political-correctness/ (Accessed 18 August 2014) 
79
 For example, Figure 4 at the beginning of the cartoon chapter shows ‘New Atheists’ Richard Dawkins and 
Christopher Hitchens ‘coming out’ as atheists. The cartoon makes use of recognisable tropes (including the ‘out 
and proud’ placard held by Hitchens) in order to convey a particular viewpoint. In other words, it relies upon our 
intertextual knowledge of the symbols and methods used by the gay rights movement in order to comment upon 
New Atheism.  
80
 See figure 6 in chapter 7. 
81
 Figure 7 (ibid.) 
82
 Figure 8 (ibid.) 
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However, the third cartoon uses intertextual analysis to explore the relationship between 
critique of Israel and anti-Semitism. Unlike the first two cartoons, it is included in this part of 
the chapter because its publication in The Guardian in 2006 caused offence and provoked 
accusations of anti-Semitism. The cartoon is also selected because it allows this project to 
explore the complex relationship between racial and religious prejudice – an issue which has 
become embedded in the discussion of religious identity in the 21
st
 century.  
 
4.6.2 The reporting of a ‘cartoon crisis’: Using representation theory to explore the British 
media response to the Danish Muhammad cartoons 
 
Although the publication of the aforementioned cartoon using the stars of David generated a 
wider discussion about the nature of anti-Semitism, the cartoons used in the intertextual 
readings can be viewed primarily a form of commentary upon events as they occur in the real 
world. However, representation theory is used in this project to explore the significance of 
cartoons which have contributed more directly to the creation, rather than simply reflection of 
broader political events. The third research question is examined in light of the controversy 
generated by the publication in 2005 of images of the prophet Muhammad in the Danish 
newspaper Jyllands-Posten. There has been much academic and journalistic discussion 
regarding use and nature of the imagery depicted in these cartoons (see e.g. Hakam, 2009; 
Levey and Modood, 2009; Cohen, 2012; Norton, 2013). However, this thesis looks primarily 
at the response the cartoons provoked amongst British national newspapers. The research 
process is informed by the conceptual framework developed by Hall (1997) to explore the 
process of representation within the media. Hall’s analytical approach is used in this thesis to 
examine written text within newspaper editorials, (although his approach has also been used 
to explore imagery and spoken language). 
 
Hall’s interest in representation is located both within an understanding of the complexity of 
meaning(s) surrounding images or texts; and in an analysis of how power operates in society 
in order to shape and circulate these meanings. The methodological approach advanced by 
this project agrees with the view that culture is constructed through the ideas that people have 
about it, and the practices that flow from those ideas (Rose, 2007:1). According to Hall, 
  
Culture…is not so much a set of things – novels and paintings or TV programmes or comics – 
as a process, a set of practices. Primarily, culture is concerned with the production and 
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exchange of meanings – the ‘giving and taking of meaning’ – between members of a society 
or group… (Hall, 1997:2) 
 
Hall’s framework moves beyond the traditional view of representation which has attempted 
to capture the level of distortion involved in media images and depictions of particular 
groups, events or ideas. This view is dependent upon the assumption that it is possible to 
identify a fixed or ‘true’ meaning (independent of representations of an event or idea) against 
which the level of distortion within representations can be measured. (For example, the scale 
of the offence generated by the Danish cartoons was, in part, a reflection of how the cartoons 
were felt to depict a distorted view of Muhammad and/or Muslims more generally). 
However, Hall maintains that there is never one agreed or fixed meaning of an event as this is 
always dependent upon how it is interpreted.  Furthermore, interpretation is also dependent 
upon how the media represents something. Hall, therefore, views representation not simply as 
a process which occurs after the event, but as an important component of the event, and as 
constitutive of it. In this sense, the focus of sociological enquiry is drawn towards how 
meanings are able to enter into texts or images, and how particular forms of knowledge are 
(re)produced through them. 
 
Hall argues that we need access to a shared language in order to exchange and externalise the 
meanings we are making of the world. He also defines language broadly: 
 
Any sound, word, image or object which functions as a sign
83
, and is organised with other 
signs into a system which is capable of carrying and expressing meaning is, from this point of 
view, ‘a language’. (Hall, 1997:19) 
 
A political cartoon or newspaper editorial, therefore, can be studied as a type of language 
which will carry meaning through their use of signifying processes or practices: 
 
Meaning is produced within language, in and through various representational systems which, 
for convenience, we call ‘languages’. Meaning is produced by the practice, the ‘work’, of 
representation. It is constructed through signifying – i.e. meaning-producing – practices. (Hall, 
1997:28) 
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 Hall defines signs as ‘the general term we use for words, sounds or images which carry meaning’ (1997:18) 
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Signifying practices might, for example, involve the use of stereotyping which works through 
the ‘construction of ‘otherness’ and exclusion’ (Hall, 1997:257). According to Hall, 
stereotyping tends to occur where there are inequalities of power so that ‘power is usually 
directed against the subordinate or excluded group’ (1998:258).  Crucially, our understanding 
of representation cannot be divorced from the issue of power. Hall argues that although 
images or texts do not have a fixed meaning, the use of power and ideology can attempt to 
‘fix’ or naturalize the meaning of an image or text. In this context, power is understood not 
only in terms of economic power, but also in broader cultural or symbolic terms; including 
the power to represent someone or something in a certain way – within a certain ‘regime of 
representation’ (Hall, 1997:259).  Hall describes this process as ‘the exercise of symbolic 
power through representational practices’ (ibid.).  
 
This project examines briefly the use of signifying practices within the most controversial of 
the Danish cartoons – an image by cartoonist Kurt Westergaard which shows Muhammad 
with a bomb in his turban. However, the use of stereotyping in the Danish cartoons has been 
debated at length by the academic community (see e.g. Klausen, 2009; Tamaz, 2010; Poole, 
2009). The project, therefore, conducts a detailed analysis of the representational practices at 
work within British newspapers in order to consider the response to the publication of the 
cartoons and the offence they provoked. The analysis uses editorials from the following 
national newspapers as data: The Times, The Sun, The Daily Mail and The Guardian
84
. All of 
the editorials discuss the decision by British newspapers not to republish the cartoons and 
debate their ‘offensive’ nature. The newspapers were chosen to reflect a cross section of 
political opinion (ranging from the right of centre Daily Mail to the liberal-left Guardian). 
They also include broadsheets and tabloid publications (including the ‘red-top’ Sun 
newspaper and ‘middle-market’ Daily Mail). The representational strategies at work within 
the paper editorials are critically examined. In particular, the analysis considers how the 
representation of ‘difference’ is produced and maintained through the signifying practices 
used in each of the editorials. In summary, the data analysis is used to answer the third 
research question, particularly in light of how ‘offence’ continues to provoke discussion 
within our media. 
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 The editorial from the Guardian was published on 4
th
 February 2006. All other editorials were published on 
3
rd
 February 2006. 
  67 
4.6.3 Using Barthesian semiology to ‘demystify’ Jesus and Mo 
 
Sub-question 3.2 asks whether the increasingly democratised nature of many discursive 
spaces has facilitated a culture of ‘competing rights’ surrounding the giving and taking of 
offence. The cartoon chapter, therefore, incorporates data sources which enables it to 
demonstrate the shift towards forms of media which encourage a more participatory, or user 
generated approach to both the creation and circulation of media. This includes an 
examination of the online comic strip Jesus and Mo. As an online venture, the Jesus and Mo 
cartoons have acquired a platform without which the cartoon creator would need to rely upon 
more traditional ways of reaching an audience (such as publication in a printed newspaper or 
magazine)
85
. In view of this, the research process also considers the relationship between the 
discursive opportunities created by Facebook and Twitter (both of which have circulated the 
Jesus and Mo cartoons) and how disputes of offence emerge and are enacted.  
 
The thesis utilises Barthesian semiology in order to explore the source material it uses to 
answer the research questions. Barthes was interested in the analysis of sign systems in order 
to critique and ‘demystify’ wider society (Chandler, 2007:218). Drawing upon the 
relationship between denotative and connotative readings of cultural phenomena, he 
examined how dominant cultural or ideological values come to be regarded as ‘natural’ or 
self-evident. A denotative reading describes something on a basic or literal level although it 
nevertheless relies upon an audience being able to interpret signifiers in a particular culturally 
ascribed way. For example, The Daily Mail published a cartoon by Stan McMurty on 26
th
 
January 2012 of a Church of England bishop and his employees which relied upon the reader 
recognising certain items of clothes or dress as signifiers for particular occupations in order to 
go on to decode and make sense of the whole cartoon
86
. The signifiers include the religious 
attire of the bishop, and the uniforms worn by the chauffeur, maid, waiter and cook; as well 
as the presence of objects, such as the cleaning lady’s mop and bucket. The use of text also 
provides what Barthes called anchorage as it allows the reader to choose between various 
possible denotative meanings of the visual image. The cartoon denotes a bishop living in his 
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 It is also worth pointing out here that the Jesus and Mo website is subject to regular online attacks and efforts 
to close it down. The offence caused by the cartoons might, therefore, be a factor which any printed publication 
would consider before deciding to publish the cartoons. 
86
 The cartoon image is available using the following link: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/coffeebreak/cartoons/mac.html?index=10&monthYear=2012-01  (Accessed 07
th
 
August 2015) 
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comfortably furnished residence.  Despite having opposed benefit cuts he addresses a row of 
his employees who may be about to lose their jobs due to orders from the synod to cut 
housing costs.  
 
A connotative reading links this descriptive or ‘literal’ explanation to ‘the wider realms of 
social ideology – the general beliefs, conceptual frameworks and value systems of society 
(Hall, 1997:38-39). Analysis, therefore, can be described as moving from a ‘first order’ 
(denotative) level to a broader ‘second order’ (connotative) level (Allen, 2003:50).  In order 
to conduct connotative analysis, Barthesian semiology is interested in how the signs 
identified in the denotative reading are attached to a further set of signifieds. For example, the 
small group of domestic servants depicted in the cartoon are fairly socially representative; 
including a mixture of males and females and one non-white employee. They can be viewed 
as a synecdochal sign for the wider working population and the cartoon linked with broader 
socio-political discourse surrounding welfare reform. This includes the popular belief that 
ordinary working people are unfairly burdened by the cost of welfare and that the 
‘undeserving’ are disproportionately rewarded by the current welfare system87.  Meanwhile, 
the bishop is a synecdochal sign for those opposed to benefit cuts, and is represented as ill-
judged, hypocritical and cushioned from the harsh economic realities faced by his employees. 
Related to connotation is the concept of myth, which is described by Lakoff and Johnson as 
comparable to how extended metaphors help us share and conceptualise our surrounding 
world (1980:185-186). For Barthes, the relationship between signs and culture is deeply 
ideological. Myths perform the ideological function of naturalization (Barthes, 1977:45-46) 
by making dominant cultural values and beliefs appear as natural, timeless, or simply a 
reflection of the how the world is:  
 
[myth]…transforms history into nature (p.129)…it gives [things] a natural and eternal 
justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement 
of fact… it does away with all dialectics, with any going back beyond what is immediately 
visible, it organises a world which is without contradictions…Things appear to mean 
something by themselves… (Barthes [1957] 2009:143) 
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 Garthwaite (2011) has examined how ‘the language of shirkers and scroungers’ within media and political 
discourse increasingly perpetuates distinctions between claimants and non-claimants. Meanwhile, Briant, Philo, 
and Watson (2013) assert that there has been a significant change in how welfare benefits are reported in the UK 
media since the welfare reforms following the election in 2010 of the UK’s Coalition government. For instance, 
they describe newspaper coverage in 2010/11 as increasingly ‘less sympathetic’ to claimants with ‘an increase 
in articles that focused on disability benefit and fraud’ (p.874). 
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The signs used in The Daily Mail cartoon naturalise particular ideas about welfare provision 
which can be demystified through consideration of the socio-political context and 
circumstances in which the cartoon has appeared.  This might include exploring how myth 
has been influenced by the changing nature of political discourse following the financial 
crisis of 2008 and the consequent reform and restructuring of the welfare state. 
 
The cartoon chapter in this thesis undertakes denotative and connotative readings of three 
Jesus and Mo cartoons which are chosen for analysis because of the offence they have 
generated
88
. The cartoons are also selected because the offence they have provoked was 
expedited by the use of discursive opportunities created by new media technologies. For 
example, one of the cartoons provoked controversy after it was used on a university 
Facebook page to promote a social event and another as a consequence of having been re-
tweeted. The analysis also uses Barthesian semiology to explore whether the source material 
can usefully be described as circulating myths about the world which reinforce dominant 
cultural values.  The research findings are then used to answer the matters raised by the third 
research question(s). 
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 Chapter Seven provides a detailed description of the offence caused by these cartoons (see Section 7.4.4) 
which are shown in figures 10, 11 and 12 in the chapter. The description notes that despite the denunciation of 
the cartoons, they have not generated the violent response associated with the publication of the Danish 
cartoons. Similarly, unlike the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, the Jesus and Mo comic strip has not been 
subject either to the murder of cartoonists or a violent attack on its premises. Several factors may contribute to 
why Jesus and Mo is a less ‘obvious’ target than either the Danish cartoons or Charlie Hebdo. Firstly, the comic 
strip is a small online venture rather than a national newspaper or weekly publication. Secondly, the cartoons 
rely less upon crude or arguably ‘offensive’ depictions and caricatures than that which publications such as 
Charlie Hebdo are renowned for. Thirdly, the cartoonist responsible for Jesus and Mo uses a pseudonym to 
protect his identity for reasons of personal safety. This particular measure demonstrates how real the risk of 
giving offence as a consequence of depicting the prophet Muhammad is felt to be, regardless of the nature of the 
imagery used by a cartoonist. This thesis has reflected seriously on the ethical considerations regarding its 
inclusion of Jesus and Mo as a source of data for visual research. In doing so it has also examined the 
‘Integrated Framework’ (2010:545) developed by Pauwels with the purpose of bringing clarity to aspects of 
undertaking visual methods of research. His framework includes a discussion of some of the potential 
challenges and ethical considerations which may arise from visual research. Pauwels recommends that 
‘Complex consideration of all contextual issues relevant to the particular research is required, including…the 
acceptability of possible negative consequences,...and so on’(p.565). The International Visual Sociology 
Association (IVSA) has also developed a Code of Research Ethics and Guidelines which it describes as 
composed in order to help ‘guide visual researchers in varied disciplines, using varied visual research methods’ 
(2009:250). The Introduction to the code highlights the requirement of researchers to ‘minimise possible harms’ 
(p.251) and the general principles of the code advise that researchers ‘do not knowingly act in ways that 
jeopardize either their own or others’ professional welfare’ (p.252). There has been little direct focus in the 
literature regarding the publication of visual imagery for academic purposes which has the potential to cause 
harm as a consequence of the offence it may generate. (This thesis has also noted in its examination of  the 
available literature on the controversies surrounding the Danish cartoons that the academic community has 
opted not to republish the offending images: (see e.g. Klausen, 2009; Meer and Mouritsen, 2009; Levey and 
Modood, 2009)) In view of the ethical considerations surrounding the desire to ‘minimise possible harms’ this 
project will therefore provide a link to the cartoons in the post-viva version of the thesis.  
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4.7 Reflections on the research process  
 
The methodological framework outlined in this chapter is underpinned by the desire to 
strengthen analysis through the contributions made by each method of investigation it 
describes. In developing this framework the project recognises that the different 
methodological tools it utilises might be used to investigate a number of data sources. (For 
example, the data sources in the comedy chapter might also benefit from an intertextual 
reading, as the legitimisation of politically incorrect jokes often relies upon our intertextual 
knowledge - through, for example, the re-telling of ‘old’ jokes, or the ‘ironic’ revisiting of 
familiar routines and stereotypes based around race or gender). However, this thesis 
investigates each research question after careful consideration of the choice of method it uses 
to answer it. In doing so it does not claim that any single method is the only method 
appropriate for analysis of the source material. However, it does aim to create and develop a 
synergistic research project in which the strengths of different methodological tools are 
pooled and utilised throughout the research process.  
 
As this research project explores the meanings attached to PC - including the discursive 
alignment between PC and disputes of offence - the research questions consider matters 
including whether or not ‘offensive’ arguments are precluded from debate, or why politically 
incorrect utterances within some levels of discourse retain a degree of popular appeal. These 
questions, therefore, also force us to consider how people might feel about political 
correctness and its relationship with the nature and conditions of social discourse. However, 
in focusing on the process of representation and the discursive practices at work within 
various forms of popular cultural and media sources, this thesis has chosen not to pursue an 
approach which uses interviews or other methods of directly observing how an audience 
might interpret disputes of offence or respond to some of the source material examined here 
(such as the telling of ‘offensive’ jokes or sending of ‘offensive’ tweets). It does so for both 
theoretical and practical reasons: firstly, the project uses cultural data as it wishes to 
understand how PC is discursively constructed within our wider culture; and secondly, the 
matters raised by the research questions might indeed ‘offend’ potential respondents or 
inhibit the reliability of response(s) from interviewees or participants. (For example, most 
respondents are unlikely to suggest that the appeal of politically incorrect utterances – such as 
racist or sexist humour - might emanate in any way from their own acceptance of racist or 
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sexist attitudes). The methodology developed here, therefore, hopes to examine the difference 
(or indeed similarities) between how PC is typically understood
89
 and how the rules and 
conditions of debate actually function and are produced within different levels of discourse. 
For example, a key reason why the news discourse chapter undertakes an analysis of 
broadsheet newspapers is to examine whether particular viewpoints are in fact stigmatised or 
precluded from debate.  
 
The rationale for the choice of source material within each of the data analysis chapters has 
been outlined in the previous sections of this chapter. However, in view of the preponderance 
of contemporary disputes of offence, one of the challenges arising from the research process 
has been devising the criteria for the selection of each overarching field of enquiry to be 
explored in the thesis. The decision to move between the relatively ‘formal’ nature of some 
levels of discourse (such as parliamentary discourse) and the more ‘informal’ nature of other 
levels  (such as comic discourse) is intended to give this project room to manoeuver between 
the different rules of debate which surround different institutional settings or discursive 
contexts.  Furthermore, this thesis has arisen in part from an interest in the role humour plays 
with regard to the rules and conventions governing what may or may not be said. Each of the 
three data chapters occupies a distinct position in view of this interest. Firstly, the ‘formal’ 
nature of news reporting and political discourse examined within the news discourse chapter 
will largely consider what is said within ‘official’ or ‘serious’ discursive realms. (However, 
within this ‘official’ field of enquiry, the case study which examines the Paris Brown ‘Twitter 
Storm’ will also consider how the ‘serious’ world of news reporting responds to the 
ostensibly ‘humorous’ nature of  Paris’s politically incorrect tweets). Secondly, the cartoon 
chapter straddles more recognisably between ‘serious’ and ‘humorous’ discursive territory. 
Political cartoons typically rely upon the use of humour and satire although humour is not an 
essential ingredient of a political cartoon
90
. Furthermore, whatever the humorous intention of 
a cartoon might be, the data examined in the cartoon chapter will demonstrate how cartoons 
are also aligned to the ‘serious’ world involving the production and making of news. Thirdly, 
the comedy chapter engages most directly with the role and significance of humour. Analysis 
of British comedy will constitute a core component within this thesis in light of the changing 
nature of comic discourse and the reification of political correctness in the UK in the 1990s. 
                                                          
89
 By ‘how PC is typically understood’ I refer here to the various ways in which PC has emerged as a cultural 
signifier which are explored in the previous chapters.  
90
 For example, figure 7 in the cartoon chapter uses an image of a boy being punched which might be satirical 
but it is more difficult to describe as humorous.  
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The British alternative comedy ‘movement’ preceded the reification of PC although it 
arguably pre-empted some of the arguments surrounding the nature of free speech and 
‘offensiveness’ to which PC is discursively aligned today. Comedy is therefore, explored as a 
way of understanding how the discursive construction of PC emerged or was made possible 
in the later decades of the 20
th
 century. Furthermore, the acceptance (and arguable 
rehabilitation) of forms of ‘offensive’ humour within 21st century comedy suggests that it 
may also be worth exploring as a contemporary counterpoint to the ‘official’ or ‘serious’ 
world of political correctness.  
 
The decision to focus upon British comedy also reflects the broader decision to develop a 
research project which examines PC primarily through analysis of the socio-cultural context 
of the UK. In doing so, the project recognises that a comparative analysis of some of the 
issues it wishes to explore might strengthen any understanding of the relationship between 
‘offensiveness’  and the discursive context within which ‘offence’ takes place. (For example, 
it might be useful to compare the response of the British media to that of countries which did 
choose to republish the infamous Danish Muhammad cartoons in 2006). However, the direct 
focus on data from British cultural and media sources gives this thesis room to explore in 
greater depth how disputes of offence are circulated and produced within a specific cultural 
context. This also leaves more opportunity to consider how the controversies surrounding PC 
highlight the temporal nature of offence within a culture (for example, this project is able to 
explore how the use of language within political discourse has changed over recent decades 
in the UK, and how this might reflect upon the emergence of the language of PC and 
changing attitudes towards the giving and taking of offence). 
 
4.8 Summary and Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced the research questions which are explored in the forthcoming 
data analysis chapters. It has also outlined the rationale for the epistemological approach and 
choice of methods which guide and underpin how the research is undertaken. In outlining the 
research design - including how data will be gathered, investigated and analysed within each 
core stage of the research process – it has, therefore, identified how this project will seek to 
explain the various meanings and controversies attached to the debate surrounding PC. In 
doing so, it does not claim that each method chosen is the only possible way of exploring the 
various source materials it draws upon. However, it does intend to pool the strengths of the 
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different methods used in order to create an overarching methodological framework through 
which a varied range of cultural data will be examined. The research design outlined here, 
therefore, enables the following three chapters to investigate the issues and questions from 
which the general arguments and conclusions of this project will be drawn.  
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Chapter 5. Political Correctness and the production of news 
 
Yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care about… (John Stuart 
Mill, 1998 [1859] p.16) 
 
If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary 
opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had 
the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. (John Stuart Mill, 1998 [1859] p.28) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The aforementioned quotes taken from the 19
th
 century philosopher John Stuart Mill’s 
famous essay On Liberty were written over a century and a half ago. However, their attention 
to the dangers of intolerance and censorship, together with the emphasis they place upon the 
importance of the free exchange of ideas, appear remarkably familiar in view of today’s 
preoccupation with the controversies surrounding political correctness and the giving and 
taking of offence within public life. A contemporary reading of On Liberty suggests that the 
fear of closing down debate is a recurrent theme throughout history, although in the 21
st
 
century this fear has become attached to concerns surrounding a new politics of language, or 
what Hughes has described as a new ‘liberal orthodoxy’ (2010:4). This new ‘orthodoxy’, 
including whether and the extent to which it is responsible for the closing down of debate will 
be at the heart of the research process undertaken in this part of the thesis.  
 
All three case studies contained in this chapter focus upon the (re)production of news. They 
reflect the varying levels of PC
91
 present (and absent) within different forms of news 
discourse, and demonstrate how the language of PC now permeates the way in which news is 
circulated and produced. The first part of the chapter examines articles from broadsheet 
newspapers The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph in order to make sense of the different 
meanings attached to PC. This case study also focuses particularly upon whether anti-PC 
discourse is a response to a stifling of open dialogue within the public arena. The chapter 
argues that although opportunities for debate over difficult and contested social matters 
continue to be upheld in the 21
st
 century, trends towards self-censorship in the public domain 
                                                          
91
 By PC, I refer here to the efforts taken generally by people to avoid language deemed to be discriminatory or 
offensive towards different social groups. 
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(together with the subjective nature of offence) also contribute to greater uncertainty over 
where the discursive limits of free speech might reside. The second part of the chapter 
explores the parliamentary debate in the House of Commons on 05/02/2013 which led to the 
overwhelming vote in favour of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill. It, therefore, observes 
politicians in a professional capacity where what they say must be carefully considered, and 
arguably ‘PC’ in comparison with other discursive environments responsible for the 
(re)production of news (such as journalistic commentary or discussion on social media 
forums). The chapter locates the parliamentary debate within the context of wider social and 
legal change regarding issues of equal rights and sexual orientation. It argues that, within the 
institutional setting of Parliament, the language of PC has influenced both the formulation of 
positions on substantive topics like gay marriage, as well as the way in which debate is 
discursively performed. The third part of the chapter examines the Paris Brown ‘Twitter 
Storm’ of 2013 and begins to explore the relationship between the giving and taking of 
offence and the emergence of new media technologies. This case study asserts that the new 
discursive spaces created by sites such as Twitter has elevated our opportunities for, and 
therefore our preoccupation with, both the giving and taking of offence.  
 
5.2 ‘I’m not touchy. However I do take offence at being accused of being politically 
correct’92: Discourses of PC within British broadsheet newspapers 
 
In 1994, Loury identified two levels through which the debates surrounding PC had emerged 
and were typically understood.  Firstly, he refers to ‘partisan arguments’ (p. 429) which 
involve the adoption of different political and philosophical judgements on a range of 
substantive issues (such as the underlying causes of crime, or the dangers and significance of 
climate change). Secondly, he points to the debate ‘taking place over the very nature of 
primary discussion’ (p. 429). This directly concerns the conditions and parameters within 
which debate takes place, including whether dissenting views are felt to be silenced or 
stigmatised by a prevailing ‘PC orthodoxy’ or uniformity of opinion. The coexistence of 
these two levels of the ‘PC debate’ is observable in the analysis of newspaper articles 
selected as sources for this case study.  The data suggests that some of the hostility directed 
towards ‘PC’ is actually about disagreements over viewpoints on substantive topics, rather 
                                                          
92 This quote is taken from one the data sources used in this case study. [Online] Available at: 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/ruthdudleyedwards/100180109/i-take-offence-when-accused-of-being-
politically-correct/ (Accessed 09 December 2014) 
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than the curtailment or silencing of these viewpoints. Under the headline ‘I take offence when 
accused of being politically correct’ (The Telegraph 10/09/2012), Ruth Dudley Edwards 
responds to readers online criticisms of a previous article she has written by claiming ‘I’m 
not PC when I say that what Julian Assange is alleged to have done to a brace of Swedish 
women could reasonably be thought to constitute rape’93. In this instance, the arguments 
about what constitutes rape are presented as either ‘PC’ or ‘non-PC’. Those in the academic 
community who have reflected upon the direction of liberal-left politics following the 1968 
generation
94
 have documented how particular movements or ideas (such as feminism or 
multiculturalism) have come to be associated in everyday discourse with ‘political 
correctness’ (see e.g. Berman 1992; Spencer, 1994; Drury, 1996; Hall 1994; Kelly and 
Rubal-Lopez, 1996; Chong, 2006). However, in a contemporary context, the use and 
application of the term PC has widened to the extent that it is progressively less clear which 
arguments are now classifiable as PC, by whom and why. In this instance, the accusation of 
‘PC’ is levelled against a journalist for holding an opinion which differs from that of some of 
her readers. However, the frank exchange of views between the journalist and her 
respondents takes place within an environment in which candid and open argument remains 
possible. If PC is understood as contributing to an implicit restraint upon public expression 
then this meaning does not sit well within the context of this article.  
 
However, the concerns which arise over the rules of debate as a consequence of political 
correctness are more directly addressed in the second Telegraph article, ‘Islamist terrorism is 
beginning to demolish Political Correctness’ (13/09/2012). This piece was written during a 
period of global demonstrations and violent protest against the appearance on YouTube of a 
trailer for an anti-Islamic film, ‘The Innocence of Muslims’95.  The journalist, Peter Mullen, 
quotes from the editorial of the Daily Telegraph on 13/09/2012 which states that ‘the simple 
                                                          
93
 The previous article Edwards refers to had been published by the Daily Telegraph on 06/09/2012 and 
concerned her opinion of the politician George Galloway. Galloway had recently protested the innocence of 
Wikileaks founder, Julian Assange, against accusations of sexual offences. [Online] Available at 
telegraph.co.uk/news/ruthdudleyedwards/100179758/the-bullying-george-galloway-has-become-a-creepy-joke/ 
(Accessed 23 July 2014). 
94
 By ‘the 1968 generation’, I mean to refer broadly to the counter-cultural politics of the 1960s New Left. In A 
Tale of Two Utopias: The Political Journey of the Generation of 1968, Berman (1997:1) describes the 
countercultural politics of this generation: ‘A utopian exhilaration swept across the student universe. . ... Partly it 
was a belief, hard to remember today, that a superior new society was already coming into existence. And it was 
the belief that we ourselves--the teenage revolutionaries, freaks, hippies and students--stood at the heart of a 
new society.’  
95
 The trailer for ‘The Innocence of Muslims’ was uploaded on YouTube in July 2012. It was reported to have 
been written by Nakoula Basseley Nakoula, under the pseudonym of Sam Bacile. Nakoula had claimed that the 
trailer was to be for a two hour film, however, the film has never been located. See e.g [Online] Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19572912 (Accessed 26 July 2014) 
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fact is that Islamic fundamentalists are irreconcilable. To them the US will remain the Great 
Satan’. Praising the editorial he continues: 
 
I wonder if, in the midst of all this horror, we might begin to see signs of hope? I mean, might 
we at last be beginning to escape the mealy-mouthed world of all that for long remained 
unsayable. Perhaps there are, after all, limits to political correctness. I dare to breathe the hope 
that maybe Western societies will not die the death of a thousand euphemisms. 
 
Mullen accuses PC of contributing to an inability to speak truthfully and openly about the 
nature of Islamist violence, and he argues that since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, our media has 
succumbed to a culture of ‘euphemistic orthodoxy’: 
 
The Ministry of Truth operated by the Guardianistas and the BBC have delighted in what they 
call ‘The Arab Spring’, as if this heralded the advent of ‘democracy’ all across North Africa 
and the Middle East. As we now learn from events in Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and the Sinai – 
and most recently in Libya – this was always a delusion, a perversion of reality flying in the 
face of the facts. The fact is that a resurgent, militant anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism is 
the gravest threat to civilisation. This is bad news of course. But the good news – as evinced in 
today’s editorial column – is that finally we are being allowed to name this peril for what it is. 
This linking of PC to debates surrounding Islam and /or Islamism in the post 9/11 world 
illustrates the longevity and flexibility of PC as a ‘plastic word’ (Johnson, Suhr 2003:50) 
which is able to mould itself around the discussion of various social phenomena, including 
the unfolding of major political events. Wider investigation of British newspapers suggests 
that some of the concerns held by Mullen may be shared more broadly, and felt more 
virulently. In their quantitative and qualitative study of online broadsheet and tabloid 
newspapers, Richardson and Stanyer reported that ‘racial and religious difference, and 
immigration’ were ‘hot button’ issues (2011, p. 993). For instance, in February 2008, ‘most 
comments by online tabloid readers were on religion’ (ibid). Whilst the classification of 
topics in their study is broad, and does not denote the level of debate specifically concerning 
Islam, the authors point to the preponderance of ‘vituperative comments’ online concerning 
Multiculturalism and Islam; and referring to one case study, they describe the ‘venom in the 
thread, with readers all but united in a chorus of knee-jerk rejection of British Muslims’ (p. 
996).  
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Mullen appears to echo Huntingdon’s (1993) ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis whereby conflict 
in the post-Cold War world is taken as underpinned primarily by cultural factors. In his 
article, ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’ are presented as two diametrically opposed and monolithic 
blocks possessing radically different values. Whilst the headline of his article refers directly 
to ‘Islamist terrorism’, the article itself links the events of 9/11 directly to ‘Islam’ and 
repeatedly uses the term ‘Islamic terrorism’. The use of the word ‘Islamism’ is often 
employed to clarify the distinction between Islam as a religion and Islamism as a 
fundamentalist political ideology. Mullen’s conflation of the two terms could be viewed as 
reinforcing the polarisation of ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’ whilst refusing to distinguish between 
what Bilgrami describes as ‘the diversity of many Islams’ (2012, p. 478) (and by implication 
the diversity of many ‘Wests’). However, Mullen’s criticism of ‘media propaganda’ for 
‘telling us that 9/11 had nothing to do with Islam’ suggests how this more careful use of 
language might be understood as yet another example of what he describes as the 
‘euphemistic orthodoxy’ of political correctness.  
 
Mullen’s belief that political correctness has prohibited open critique of Islamism and/or 
Islam is held within the context of an age in which major geo-political events have prompted 
an unprecedented expansion in media discourse surrounding Islam. Media discourse has 
given voice to a variety of socio-political positions, some of which have expressed concerns 
over what is described as the ‘Islamification’ or ‘Islamicisation of Europe’ (see e.g. Carr: 
2010, p. 81). Citing journalistic authors including Mark Steyn, Bruce Bawer and Melanie 
Phillips; Carr claims that since 2001, ‘the Islamic threat to Europe has become something of a 
minor publishing phenomenon’ (p.81). In their analysis of reader online comments, 
Richardson and Stanyer refer to the high frequency of opinions regarding immigration and 
difference which adopt the following argument: ‘this [particular event] is characteristic of 
everything that is wrong with multicultural Britain…’ (2011, p. 996). They claim that ‘this 
argument was used so frequently on Daily Telegraph threads discussing Islam and 
immigration that it assumed an idiomatic status’ (p. 996). Online discussions are notorious 
for their ‘political incorrectness’ and lack of nuance although they do provide a forum for the 
frank exchange of arguments (albeit subject to the moderation policy of the online 
publication). Media discourse that is critical of Islamism, and more broadly of Islam, is 
therefore visible within both tabloid and broadsheet forums and is expressed by both 
journalists and readers. This suggests that despite a perception that individuals are fearful to 
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exercise their freedom of expression, PC does not exercise a stranglehold over all discussion 
of contentious social matters.  
 
However, as PC is charged with installing a ‘liberal orthodoxy’ which is typically ascribed to 
the culture and politics of the contemporary liberal-left, it is also worth considering how the 
left-leaning Guardian newspaper approaches matters surrounding free expression, and the 
articulation of contentious viewpoints.  The first of the articles found in the data search from 
The Guardian focuses upon the decision by the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo to 
publish a series of satirical cartoons of Mohammed in the wake of the global protests against 
‘The Innocence of Muslims’. In the article, ‘Charlie Hebdo – more anti-Islamic than anti-
clerical’ (19/09/2012) Philippe Marliere briefly describes the irreverent and anti-
establishment tradition of the magazine whilst also pointing out how its ‘sexism’ and ‘bawdy 
inclination’ during the 1970s would be judged as out of step with ‘the advent of political 
correctness’. Marliere describes the editorial stance of Charlie Hebdo, since its re-launch in 
1992 as ‘muddled’ and criticises its editor as ‘anti-Islamic’ for supporting the 2004 law 
banning headscarves in French state schools. Referring to the broader political climate in 
which the cartoons were published, he argues, ‘Of course people should be entitled to mock 
Islam and any other religion. However, in the current climate of racial and religious prejudice 
in Europe, how can these cartoons be helpful? Charlie Hebdo is waging a rear-guard battle’. 
The Genealogy chapter of this thesis has explored how PC emerged as a cultural signifier for 
a censorious or authoritarian movement to be mocked or disparaged. Underlying this 
censoriousness is felt to be an excessive fear of causing offence, and a silencing of 
unpalatable viewpoints.  In this instance, the aforementioned article upholds the right to mock 
religion, although it also cautions against unfettered freedom of expression in view of the 
wider socio-political context within which such mockery takes place. The backdrop of ‘racial 
and religious prejudice’ persuades Marliere to adopt a less robust defence of forms of 
expression which he deems as potentially ‘unhelpful’.  
 
The Guardian article may also help us make sense of some of the terminology highlighted in 
the review of the literature which has been used to describe the politics of the modern liberal-
left. This terminology includes the following oxymoronic labels: ‘illiberal liberalism’ 
(Phillips, 1994); ‘liberal orthodoxy’ (Hughes, 2010); and ‘authoritarian liberalism’ (Rankin, 
2002). Such labels are used to describe the censoriousness (including self-censorship) which 
is assumed to prevail as a consequence of political correctness.  The position adopted by 
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Marliere in the Guardian is informed by the recognition of existing inequalities between 
different groups in society. The process of giving offence towards groups considered to be 
already marginalised or discriminated against is, from this perspective, regarded as 
potentially discriminatory itself. The distinction, therefore, between discourse and behaviour 
becomes more fluid and less clear, as ‘offensive’ words or imagery are felt to be increasingly 
comparable to discriminatory action or behaviour. However, Malik has argued that the 
progressive recognition of group inequalities has facilitated a regressive trend within identity 
politics in which ‘free speech has become more restricted without the need for overt 
censorship’ (2009, p.197). He refers to attitudes towards free speech in the decades following 
the publication in 1989 of Salman Rushdie’s ‘The Satanic Verses’ as having inculcated a 
cultural ‘internalization of the fatwa’ based upon the fear of giving offence (p.197). 
Marliere’s article can be viewed as illustrating this shift towards self-censorship whereby the 
liberal - or ‘PC’ - concern with cultural sensitivity spills over into an illiberal attitude towards 
the free exchange of ideas, including the right to say what others may find unpalatable or 
offensive. Arguably, this position may also unwittingly contribute to the view that 
conservative or illiberal opinions are the ‘authentic’ voice of a designated community whilst 
denying the multiplicity of experience and opinion within communities (as well as between 
them)
96
.  
 
The final article used in this case study addresses a separate topic. ‘Golliwogs are a vile 
reminder of a racist past – even Tory MPs must see this’(The Guardian 21/09/2012) criticises 
the selling of ‘golliwog’ dolls in UK shops and is particularly concerned that the dolls can be 
won as prizes at a seaside arcade in Whitby. The journalist, Richard Seymour, has written to 
the constituency MP for this area who has responded by letter stating that it is ‘important that 
we don’t become over-sensitive to situations such as this, where no evidence has been 
brought to me other than your letter that anyone has been offended or annoyed’. Seymour 
anticipates that those opposed to his position are likely to label him a ‘hysterical PC 
troublemaker’ because of his wish that the dolls be removed from sale. 
 
This article illustrates how anti-PC rhetoric has successfully isolated ‘PC’ from what 
Fairclough describes as other ‘cultural and discursive interventions’ which have been 
‘directed at changing representations, values and identities’ (2003, pp.20-21). Seymour 
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 The homogenisation and simplification of positions taken by different social groups is considered in more 
depth in the cartoon chapter of this thesis. 
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recognises that hostility to his campaign would be likely to involve accusations of political 
correctness. However, Fairclough has questioned how, for instance, the ‘neo-liberal project to 
change ideas, values and representations’ (p.20) has escaped similar accusations of 
interference or ‘trouble-making’. For example, the extension of market-based terminology 
like ‘customer’ and ‘consumer’ into discourse surrounding public service provision is not 
commonly recognised to be ‘directed at changing representations, values and identities’ 
(ibid.). Fairclough asserts that the isolation of PC from the more general process of cultural 
intervention is ‘in itself a form of cultural politics’ through which PC comes to be an 
identification usually ‘imposed upon people by their political opponents’ which ‘has relied 
primarily on the complicity of sections of the media’ (2003, p.21). This is particularly 
important because the use of the term PC as a slur has arisen in an era where overt displays of 
racism have become increasingly socially unacceptable. Therefore, the accusation of PC 
emerges as an effective strategy for opponents of the points raised by Seymour who wish to 
avoid having to engage directly with his arguments concerning racism.  
 
The Seymour article also invites us to consider how historical items produced within the 
context of a ‘pre-PC’ era should be viewed or managed today. Kushner has linked the 
golliwog’s cultural presence in the late 20th century to ‘the heritage permeated society’ which 
had taken hold towards the end of the millennium within ‘popular culture through retro-pubs, 
television, cinema and even interior furnishing’ (1999, p.68).  For example, he notes that until 
1994 the UK shop Past Times (which specialised in retro-memorabilia) sold golliwog fridge-
magnets and plates. However, the gradual disappearance of the golliwog from most major 
retailers could also be viewed in the 21
st
 century as an example of the sort of socio-cultural 
change often attributed to the emergence of political correctness. Meanwhile, Seymour’s 
position on this issue combines both levels of the ‘PC debate’ outlined earlier in this section 
of the chapter by Loury (1994). Firstly, Seymour’s objections to the dolls are based upon a 
particular ideological viewpoint involving his opposition to racism, including the use of racist 
imagery. Secondly, his wish for the dolls to be removed from sale reinforces an 
understanding of PC as an overarching project or ‘liberal orthodoxy’ which sets the rules of 
conduct or ‘correct’ behaviour. In this instance, the racist nature of the dolls is deemed as 
‘incorrect’ therefore disqualifying them from sale. 
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5.3 Parliamentary Discourse: the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill 
  
5.3.1 Parliamentary Discourse and the role of MPs 
 
As the dominant branch of the UK legislature, the House of Commons forms a central part of 
the British political establishment. The debates that take place within it are, therefore, subject 
to various forms of oversight including the publication of Hansard
97
, journalistic commentary 
and since 1989, the televisual broadcast of its proceedings. More broadly, the behaviour of 
Members of Parliament (MPs) attracts a significant level of scrutiny often justified by the 
public and media alike on the grounds of their unique role as elected representatives and law 
makers. This scrutiny may focus upon both the positions politicians take on substantive 
issues, as well as their personal conduct in their public and private lives. Such scrutiny may 
also involve whether a politician is deemed to engage in politically incorrect discourse, or 
behaviour
98
. The role of MPs as they engage in debating and making new laws is, therefore, 
worth observing as part of any broader exploration of PC and the regulation of public life and 
public expression. 
 
5.3.2 Brief contextual background to the bill 
  
The topic of same sex marriage has become embedded across popular and journalistic 
discourse within arguments surrounding PC, group rights and social equality
99
. The Marriage 
(Same Sex Couples) Bill is a high profile example of a topic which has come to be identified 
with the more general advancement of political correctness as a broader cultural phenomenon 
or project. It is especially significant that this bill was proposed by a Conservative led 
government as this party has historically been renowned more for its social conservatism than 
its commitment to gay rights
100
. However, on the 5
th
 October 2011 David Cameron was 
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  This is the daily edited report of parliamentary debates. 
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 For example, David Cameron was subject to criticism after he told a female shadow minister to ‘calm down 
dear’ during a debate in the House of Commons in 2011. The shadow minister, Angela Eagle, later claimed that 
‘a modern man would not have expressed himself in that way’. The incident also sparked considerable media 
debate about whether the PM was sexist. [Online] Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
13211577 (Accessed 29 July 2014)  
99
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Available at: http://www.melaniephillips.com/797  (Accessed 10
th
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 Most infamously, in 1988, the then Conservative government introduced Section 28 of the Local 
Government Act, which prohibited Local Authorities from ‘promoting homosexuality’. Section 28 was 
eventually repealed in Scotland in 2000 and throughout the rest of the UK in 2003. 
  83 
confident enough at the annual Conservative party conference to pronounce, ‘I don’t support 
gay marriage despite being a Conservative. I support gay marriage because I am a 
Conservative’101. Although many MPs, most of whom were members of Cameron’s own 
party, vehemently opposed the bill, its success is a reflection of a lengthy process of social 
and legal change regarding issues of rights and sexual orientation.  In particular, it is 
noteworthy that Cameron’s decision to support this issue so publicly has been widely 
interpreted as an attempt to ‘detoxify the Tory brand’.102 What, therefore, can the 
parliamentary debate about this issue tell us about the relationship between political 
correctness, and contemporary political discourse? 
 
5.3.3 Debating same sex marriage in the House of Commons 
 
Discourse surrounding same sex marriage involves a discursive link with PC which reflects 
the wider association between gay rights and PC ‘characteristic of the rise of identity politics, 
where shared social identity (as woman, Black, gay or lesbian), not material interest…is the 
mobilising factor’ (Hall, 1994:167). However, the second reading of  the Marriage bill uses 
the term ‘political correctness’ only once and does so in an attempt to distance the bill from it 
(thereby reinforcing the generally pejorative way in which PC is usually invoked). The 
Minister for Women and Equalities, Maria Miller, who was responsible for proposing the bill 
to the House asserted that: 
 
The introduction of equal marriage will not marginalise those who believe that marriage 
should be between a man and a woman…but neither will it continue to marginalise those 
who believe that marriage can, and should, also be between a man and a man or a woman and 
a woman. We will not allow one belief to exist at the expense of the other. No misguided 
sense of political correctness will be allowed to impinge on that. It would be deeply 
divisive if, in righting a wrong for some, we created a wrong for others… No religious 
minister will have to conduct same-sex weddings. (Hansard, 05/02/2013, Column 132) 
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 This speech was widely reported across the Western media. For example, the Washington Post quoted 
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However, the desire not to ‘marginalise’ different beliefs, including those held by religious 
groups, can be viewed as adopting an inclusive approach towards group rights; and one 
which in a contemporary context is also arguably PC. In this respect, despite the 
overwhelming absence of the term from the debate, themes integral to how PC is discussed 
and understood (including questions about the nature of discrimination, or equality), inform 
the substance and direction of parliamentary discussion.  
Section 5.2 of this chapter describes how Loury (1994) argues that in order to make sense of 
the concept, PC needs to be viewed as operating on two levels: firstly, differences of opinion 
on various partisan arguments; and secondly, the very conditions through which debate takes 
place.  The Commons debate on gay marriage raises important issues with respect to both 
levels, as it provides insight into conflicting viewpoints, and how the rules surrounding 
discourse are produced within the formal or institutional setting of Parliament.  
Despite the adversarial nature of the UK Parliament, the Same Sex Marriage bill was 
introduced as a free vote and was not intended to reflect partisan differences. However, there 
are clear disparities between the major parties regarding the level of support received for the 
bill: 45% of Conservative MPs opposed it, compared with 9% of Labour MPs and 7% of 
Liberal Democrats. Whilst MPs in favour of same sex marriage overwhelmingly emphasised 
the importance of equality based upon sexual orientation, those opposed focused upon 
religious rights and the traditional status of marriage as a uniquely heterosexual institution. If 
PC is understood as an idea or broader project which is opposed to discrimination on grounds 
such as sexual orientation, gender or ethnicity then the success of the vote could reasonably 
be interpreted as a ‘PC victory’. (Of course, this excludes the remaining anomaly whereby 
heterosexual couples are prohibited from civil partnerships). However, in addition to the 
result of the vote, the discursive context within which the debate took place - and in particular 
the form taken by arguments opposing the bill - signifies further how Parliamentary politics 
has absorbed and responded to the language of PC. 
Firstly, the data shows that many MPs who opposed the bill were simultaneously eager to 
declare their opposition to homophobia:  
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Mr Matthew Offord (Con): Will the Minister take this early opportunity to confirm that the 
opponents of the Bill, including many hundreds of my constituents, are not homophobic, not 
bigots and not barking? (Hansard, 05/02/2013, Column 126) 
Mr Michael McCann (Lab): I want to ensure that my views are recorded, because I do not 
agree with the comments from people who are clearly steeped in bigotry and hatred. I 
know that many hon. Members are worried that European courts will force religious 
organisations to conduct same-sex marriages.(Hansard, 05/02/2013,Column 179) 
Mr John Glen (Con): I am very disappointed to have to rise to oppose the Bill. I never 
imagined that I would be put in a position where I have, by virtue of standing up for 
marriage, been characterised variously as a “homophobic bigot”, a “religious nutter”, a 
product of the dark ages, or, as I see in this weekend’s press, on the brink of making “a 
tragic mistake” that I will have many years to regret. This was not in our main manifesto…My 
concern this afternoon is to uphold marriage. I speak not just from personal religious interest; 
although sadly I feel it necessary to have to state it, I do not speak either from any 
sentiments of a homophobic nature. I hope that my friends who are gay would stand to 
that comment.(Hansard, 05/02/2013,Column 190) 
Mr David Burrowes (Con): I do not have a monopoly on victimhood. The homosexual 
community has been subject to abuse which, sadly, has characterised debates about 
sexuality. It is intolerable, however, that as soon as Members of Parliament put their 
heads above the parapet and speak to the media, they are called “a homophobe”, “a 
Nazi”—I have been called that—“a bigot”, and many other expletives that I would not dare 
to read out. I have been told to be ashamed of myself, and to die: I have received specific 
death threats relating to my travel plans. I have been told that I am a disgrace, and that I 
have no right to express my opinion on this subject. My children have been told that 
their dad is a bigot and a homophobe…I am not angry, but I am very sad that my 
Government have so hastily introduced legislation to redefine marriage. I am resolved to join 
other Members in proudly standing up for marriage—standing up for the equal value of 
people, whatever their sexuality, but also standing up for a commitment to the value of 
marriage as a distinctive institution for a man and a woman. (Hansard, 05/02/2013, Column 
197-198) 
The frequency of disclaimers against homophobia suggests a general acceptance that this is 
something to be condemned, and a desire not to be associated with any form of bigotry 
towards gay people as a historically disadvantaged group. That the terms of debate take place 
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within these parameters signifies a shift in political discourse whereby unabashed expressions 
of homophobia by mainstream politicians are no longer regarded as acceptable or ‘PC’. In 
1992, Rayside had asserted that in the 1970s and 1980s Britain's largest political parties had 
contributed to the maintenance of ‘a repressive climate for gays and lesbians, the 
Conservatives through their selective adoption of a morally conservative outlook…, and the 
Labourites through a timidity on matters of sexuality born of a concern for the puritanism of 
an important element of their working-class constituency’ (p.122). Whilst gay rights was an 
issue which mobilised a minority of politicians and activists within the major parties (mainly 
within the Labour party), it was also regularly ridiculed by other politicians and the 
conservative media more generally as the preserve of the ‘loony left’103. During the 1987 UK 
general election, Conservative campaign literature described books on homosexuality as part 
of ‘Labour’s idea of a comprehensive education’ and a party political broadcast highlighted 
‘a “gay seminar” as an example of local council misspending’(1992:126). In the 1983 
Bermondsey by-election, campaign leaflets for the Liberal party described their candidate, 
Simon Hughes, as the ‘straight choice’ compared with the Labour candidate, Peter Tatchell 
(one of the few openly gay political candidates at that time). However, politicians from the 
main political parties are now less willing or able to make political capital this way, and the 
discursive ground has shifted so that opposition to gay marriage is invariably prefaced by the 
sorts of clarifications and disclaimers highlighted here in the data
104
.  
Secondly, the data also demonstrates that many MPs opposed to the bill were keen not only 
to condemn homophobia but also any suggestion that they themselves might be homophobic. 
The desire not to be labelled this way may be a real reflection of changing social attitudes, 
although it also highlights an anxiety surrounding the stigma of being labelled a homophobe 
or bigot. A recurrent criticism of political correctness is that opinions deemed to be 
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‘incorrect’ come to be placed off limits and various authors (encompassing those aligned with 
both liberal and conservative politics) maintain that the use, and sometimes misuse, of 
accusations of ‘homophobia’, ‘racism’ or ‘sexism’ does indeed serve to close down debate 
(see e.g. Abel and Horvath, 2004; Gitlin, 1997; Rankin, 2002; Browne, 2006; Hasan, 
2010)
105
. As these words have emerged as powerful signifiers of bigotry or prejudice, people 
increasingly object to being labelled this way. Therefore, MP David Burrowes objects to 
being described as a ‘homophobe’ and claims to be ‘standing up for the equal value of 
people, whatever their sexuality’ (Hansard, Column 197-198) whilst he simultaneously 
opposes same-sex marriage. However, we have no way of knowing whether overt denials of 
homophobia, racism or sexism necessarily indicate an absence of bigotry. The language of 
PC, therefore, can be viewed as creating a more inscrutable discursive environment, and even 
one in which politically correct language may be deployed in order to convey arguably non-
PC viewpoints.  
The concept of ‘homophobia’ used and accepted by both sides of the Commons debate, is a 
relatively new one although Hughes (2010:180) cites the word as having been used in the 
1920s to refer instead to a fear of men. The change in meaning can be traced to the 1970s 
when it became a word popularised by an emergent gay rights movement. George Weinberg 
is widely credited as responsible for influencing the change of meaning through his 1972 
book, Society and the Healthy Homosexual (cited in Hughes, 2010:180; Willis, 2012:1594). 
Weinberg defined homophobia as a psychological disorder located in an irrational or ‘phobic’ 
response to homosexuality, although the definitional boundaries of the term have since 
expanded to include the broader institutional and social dimensions responsible for promoting 
homophobia. The word helped to ‘name the problem’ of prejudice based upon sexual 
orientation in a similar way to racism or sexism with regard to ethnicity or gender.  
However, the Commons debate also suggests that within a contemporary context, use of the 
word ‘homophobia’ has become attached to an alternative narrative whereby those labelled as 
‘homophobes’ believe they are targeted unfairly for possessing views which - according to 
Loury’s conceptualisation of PC - are ‘pre-emptively excluded from public 
debate’(1994:429).  MPs opposed to the Same Sex Marriage Bill draw attention in the debate 
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to the ways in which they have been described: ‘religious nutter’; ‘homophobic bigot’; 
‘Nazi’; ‘barking’ (Hansard, Column 197-198). They cite this as evidence of the intolerance 
displayed towards those who deviate from received wisdom, or opinion. Within this 
narrative, those opposed to same sex marriage become ‘the new marginalised’ who are 
victims of a PC orthodoxy despite the absence of any genuine hatred or bigotry on their part. 
This is an interesting reversal of the positions or identities typically ascribed to groups in the 
‘pre-PC’ world: those supporting rights based upon sexual orientation are now perceived to 
contain an oppressive and intolerant element, whilst those opposed to same sex marriage 
perceive themselves to be vilified and excluded by mainstream opinion.  
Finally, the perception that those opposed to gay marriage constitute a stigmatised group, 
forces us to consider more closely how the notion of competing rights may underpin some of 
the arguments around the debate, so that religious rights often appear to be pitted against gay 
rights. It is worth recalling that MPs have used their religious beliefs as justification for 
supporting the bill.  
Toby Perkins (Lab): As a Christian, I see Christianity as a tremendously generous 
religion. As I have said previously, I think that Jesus Christ led the way on promoting 
equalities. There are any number of stories in the Bible that make it absolutely clear that Jesus 
stuck up for groups that had been oppressed over the years. As a Christian, I feel entirely 
comfortable voting in favour of this Bill. As someone who got married at the famous 
Crooked Spire church in Chesterfield, I do not think that my marriage will be besmirched or 
undermined in any way by the fact that gay people in the future might also be able to say that 
they are married. (Hansard, 05/02/2013, Column 149) 
However, more typically, religious rights and freedoms are understood and discussed as 
threatened by same sex marriage, despite reassurances from Maria Miller that no same sex 
marriages could legally take place in religious institutions as a consequence of the bill. 
Robert Flello (Lab): The Government say that the Bill protects religious organisations, 
but there are conflicting legal opinions that robustly challenge that view. Moreover, 
there is absolutely nothing to stop a future Government legislating to allow, or indeed 
require, Churches to celebrate same-sex marriages…Marriage is the union of a man and a 
woman that is open to the creation and care of children—not in all cases, but fundamentally 
that is its intrinsic value. This Bill will fundamentally change that. (Hansard, 
05/02/2013,Column 147) 
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Ian Paisley (DUP): … comments have been made that fall into what I can only describe as 
the not-so-new phenomenon—which will now develop—of Christophobia. Anyone who 
expresses a Christian view is now going to face the allegation that they are by nature 
homophobic. (Hansard, 05/02/2013, Column 206) 
Ian Paisley’s coining of the term ‘Christophobia’ draws upon a wider trend towards the 
classification of particular attitudes or ideas as symptomatic of a deeper irrational fear or 
disorder. Since ‘homophobia’ acquired its contemporary meaning in the 1970s, concepts 
including ‘Islamophobia’ and ‘transphobia’ have also become increasingly commonplace in 
public debate. These neologisms are often applied to substantiated forms of bigotry (such as 
hostility towards transgendered people, or anti-Muslim prejudice), although increasingly 
there is a sense that they may also be used to label particular opinions as bigoted or ‘phobic’ 
in some way. The question of whether some opinions are necessarily underwritten by bigotry 
has contributed to the endurance and fractious nature of contemporary disputes regarding 
what might constitute bigoted or ‘offensive’ viewpoints. In this instance, Paisley suggests that 
the allegations of homophobia levelled against opponents of same sex marriage, is really 
evidence of a creeping Christophobia whereby anyone expressing a Christian viewpoint risks 
some form of vilification.  ‘Christophobia’ is not a term which has become part of our 
mainstream lexicon, although it is interesting that Paisley chooses to use it to make his point 
within the context of a parliamentary debate. Conservative writers (see e.g. Green, 2006; 
Browne, 2006) have argued that the notion of victimhood has acquired a political status 
which can be used to gain preferential treatment or political advantage. One way in which 
this status is sustained is through the currency attached to labels like ‘homophobia’ which 
encourages others to avoid causing offence to groups designated as oppressed or 
disadvantaged in some way. Green (2006) views the increase in ‘phobias’ in recent decades 
as a means of castigating or silencing opponents through the promotion of group interests or 
identity politics. This interpretation may ignore (or chose to downplay) how terms like 
‘homophobia’ have emerged in response to real rather than imagined grievances. However, it 
also invites us to consider whether the way we define bigotry may be increasingly flexible; or 
stretch beyond a specific hostility and antipathy towards particular groups to also include that 
which undermines or insults our core beliefs, feelings, or sense of identity.  In this instance, 
Ian Paisley side-steps charges of homophobia by claiming that his own core beliefs and 
identity as a Christian are subject to another type of phobia. That the expression of ideas, or 
the enactment of particular policies which may offend people, constitutes a type of ‘phobia’ 
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exacerbates the sense that the language of PC has contributed to a culture of ‘competitive 
victimhood’ and heightened sensitivity. (Furthermore, Paisley’s conception of 
‘Christophobia’ is also complicated in this context by the presence of MPs who cite their 
Christianity as grounds for supporting same sex marriage). 
Although the use of the concept ‘PC’ is largely absent from the Commons debate, the 
conditions of the debate evoke Loury’s (1994) conceptualisation of PC as informing the very 
nature of primary discussion. The House of Commons vote, which was overwhelmingly in 
favour of same sex marriage
106
, is itself indicative of shifting social attitudes. However, the 
language of PC also informs how the various arguments are debated and articulated so that 
politicians are generally keen to avoid overt or undisguised expressions of homophobia 
within the context of parliamentary business. What is also significant is how many opponents 
of same sex marriage are also keen to adopt the language of victimhood to describe their own 
status as that of a marginalised or stigmatised group. Arguably, the conditions of debate have 
inculcated a culture of competing rights, whereby political clout or credibility is sought 
through the appropriation of the language of victimhood.  
5.4 The Paris Brown ‘Twitter Storm’ 
 
5.4.1 The emergence of Twitter and social media 
 
This case study begins to consider the significance of social media as the thesis explores the 
relationship between PC and the changing conditions of debate. Twitter was created in 2006 
and claims to have upwards of 100 million users with over a billion tweets sent from Twitter 
accounts each week (Mussell, 2012:347). Twitter works by enabling users to broadcast public 
messages (or ‘tweets’) of up to 140 characters at a time, which may or may not be directed 
towards other specific user(s). Users can choose who they wish to receive messages from, but 
not necessarily who can receive their own messages, (although they may decide to ‘block’ 
particular users from ‘following’ them or sending them tweets). The popularity of Twitter is 
one example of how our use of the Internet is increasingly experienced through social media 
and social networking forums. Social media is often conflated with social networking 
technologies, such as Facebook, as the later typically facilitates a ‘public or semi-public 
profile within a bounded system’ (Murthy, 2012:1061) which enables users to share 
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  91 
information with other users with whom they have a connection. Both social media and social 
networking sites can be viewed as overlapping technologies which are ‘designed to facilitate 
social interaction, the sharing of digital media, and collaboration.’ (Murthy, 2012:1061). 
However, social media sites are concerned more broadly with reaching an audience beyond 
those with whom users have identified as having a personal connection. ‘Twitter culture 
encourages interaction between tweeters who do not yet know each other’ (Thorton, 
2013:42), thereby creating a deliberately less bounded discursive environment, and one 
which further fuses the traditional distinction between private and public spheres. Murthy 
(2012:1061) also describes Twitter as a form of media ‘wherein ‘ordinary’ people in ordinary 
social networks (as opposed to professional journalists) can create user-generated ‘news’ (in a 
broadly defined sense)’.  
Twitter, therefore, empowers people to generate their own news discourse. It is also a useful 
site for exploration of how people negotiate the generation and exchange of politically 
incorrect forms of expression within a comparatively un-moderated and democratised social 
forum. This is particularly pertinent in view of the advent of the ‘Twitter Storm’ - a term used 
to describe a sudden increase in activity on Twitter, usually as a result of something 
controversial or newsworthy taking place.  Twitter Storms also demonstrate how social media 
sites may simultaneously regulate as well as generate public expression (through, for 
example, the outrage expressed on Twitter in response to someone airing a controversial 
opinion). Twitter, therefore, can be approached as a forum which both enables and disables 
various forms of expression. This analysis will consider the complex relationship between 
‘offensive’ forms of self-expression, and new media technologies, through exploration of the 
Paris Brown Twitter Storm. 
 
5.4.2 Brief background to the Paris Brown case 
 
In April 2013, 17 year old Paris Brown was appointed as England and Wales’s first Youth 
Police and Crime Commissioner. However, shortly following her appointment complaints 
were received by Kent police from members of the public regarding comments she had made 
on Twitter, posted when Paris was between the ages of 14 and 16. These tweets had initially 
been brought to wider attention by The Mail on Sunday on 7
th
 April 2013 (see Figure 3) and 
were subsequently reproduced throughout the media turning the tweets briefly into a national 
news item.  The tweets were selected from Paris’s personal Twitter account where the Mail 
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claims ‘she has posted or circulated more than 4000 messages and images, many of them 
offensive’ (07/04/2013). The media furore surrounding Paris focused upon her suitability for 
the post she was appointed to in light of the tweets printed by the paper.  
 
Following the complaints to the police, Paris was interviewed under caution, and her phone 
was confiscated for three days whilst police decided whether any criminal offences had been 
committed. On 21
st
 April, Kent police announced that no further action would be taken on the 
grounds that, although some of the language used in the tweets was ‘offensive’ towards 
particular social groups, it was not ‘grossly offensive on a reasonable objective assessment 
considering intent’107 In the meantime, Paris had apologised for causing offence and stood 
down from her appointment as youth police and crime commissioner on 9
th
 April 2013.  
 
5.4.3 The reporting of a Twitter Storm  
 
The emergence of social media sites, including Twitter, provides opportunities for research to 
observe some previously undocumented forms of social discourse, including the sharing 
online of people’s everyday rituals, thoughts, practices and interactions. Of crucial 
significance here, is how Twitter exposes that which was previously kept within the private 
sphere and which has now become public and permanent. Although tweets may be deleted, 
once they have been viewed they acquire a public presence which is difficult to erase, (as 
with the tweets posted by Paris Brown years prior to her appointment as youth police and 
crime commissioner).   
 
Twitter has also helped intensify our preoccupation with ‘offensiveness’ as the democratised 
and (relatively) unregulated space of the ‘Twitter-sphere’ provides a powerful platform for 
users to engage in both the giving and taking of offence. However, rather than viewing 
Twitter simply as a generator of new forms of discourse, it may also make sense to reflect 
upon how Twitter has made some forms of discourse more visible. For instance, the 
controversy provoked by Paris Brown forces us to recognise the presence and prevalence of 
politically incorrect language within everyday conversation or social interaction.  
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Figure 2. Extract from ‘Is this foul-mouthed, self-obsessed Twitter teen really the future of 
British policing?’ by Russell Myers in The Mail on Sunday on 7th April 2013 
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The BBC reporting of the Paris Brown tweets draws particular attention to how some of the 
tweets could be regarded as racist and homophobic.  
Paris Brown, 17, posted what could have been considered racist and anti-gay tweets from the 
ages of 14 to 16.  
 (8 April 2013, ‘Kent youth PCC Paris Brown investigated over tweets’) 
The UK's first youth police and crime commissioner, Paris Brown, has resigned from her post 
following criticism of messages she posted on Twitter…Police are investigating her over 
tweets she posted between the ages of 14 and 16 which could be considered racist and anti-
gay. 
 (9 April 2013, ‘Paris Brown: Kent youth PCC resigns after Twitter row’) 
In her formal apology, which was delivered on camera to an expectant media, Paris was also 
especially keen to distance herself from allegations of racism and homophobia. 
I accept that I have made comments on social networking sites which have offended many 
people and I am really, truly sorry for any offence that has been caused. I strongly reiterate 
that I'm not a racist and I'm not a homophobic [sic]  
(9 April 2013, ‘Paris Brown: Kent youth PCC resigns after Twitter row’) 
This emphasis (both on the part of Paris and the BBC news coverage) suggests a ‘hierarchy 
of offensiveness’ whereby racism and homophobia are singled out for particular attention and 
denunciation, above the references Paris had made in her tweets to violence, drug taking, and 
underage drinking
108
. This is significant, especially as the BBC articles used here as data are 
not opinion based pieces (unlike the newspaper articles previous examined in this chapter). 
Instead, the BBC articles are presented to us as objective news reporting. The data, therefore, 
assumes a broader social acceptance that racism and homophobia constitute the most serious 
transgressions in the case of the Paris Brown tweets.   
 
The response to the tweets also reflects a wider and enduring confusion regarding how public 
expressions of politically incorrect language or viewpoints should be managed. The BBC 
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reprinted three of the offending tweets originally published by the Mail on Sunday. In the 
tweets, Paris refers to herself as being ‘racist’ and ‘sexist’ whilst drunk, and makes use of 
homophobic slurs and derogatory language towards the Travelling Community. However, it 
is the presence of these utterances on a social media site which led to a police investigation 
exploring the possibility of criminal offences having been committed. This draws into 
question the relative significance of the content of the messages, and the location in which 
they appeared. In this instance, no further action was taken and the BBC reports Paris’s 
lawyers as describing the police investigation as ‘disproportionate’ (21 April, 2013). 
However, this case suggests that the opportunities for self-expression facilitated by Twitter 
have developed alongside an additional potential for greater censure and regulation of self-
expression. It also suggests that we are still struggling with how to respond (both legally and 
socially) to disputes of offence which arise from use of new media technologies.  
 
The reporting of the tweets also contextualises what is said in view of Paris’s age when she 
posted the messages.  
Paris Brown: If I'm guilty of anything it's showing off and wildly exaggerating on Twitter and 
I am very ashamed of myself, but I can't imagine that I'm the only teenager to have done this. 
(8 April 2013, ‘Police chief backs teen crime commissioner after tweets’) 
Anne Barnes (Police Crime Commissioner): The only excuse I will make is that she wrote 
them on social networking sites between the ages of 14-16 and, you know, young people make 
mistakes. 
(8 April 2013, ‘Police chief backs teen crime commissioner after tweets’) 
Many young people have opportunities for self-expression through social media which were 
unavailable to previous generations, and as a consequence teenage life has been made more 
public or observable. However, there is also a disconnection between this exposure of our 
public selves through social media and the way some users manage and reflect upon their 
online identities. Davis (2012) has examined how young people explore their identities online 
and argues that many do not look beyond their relationship with their own friends (or any 
specific on-line rules) when considering the consequences of ‘offensive’ language and 
speech. Observing reactions to the use of racist language in online forums, Davis found that 
only a minority of her participants (2 out of 24) looked beyond the impact upon the user’s 
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friends or towards ‘broader social community-level effects’ (2012:642). Meanwhile, this way 
of separating our online selves from the broader world which we inhabit is not unique to the 
young, as people continue to grapple with the consequences of online activity deemed to be 
‘offensive’, ‘threatening’ or potentially libellous - much of which is generated by adults109.  
 
Goffman (1959) referred to social life as containing a ‘backstage’ within which individuals 
are given space to explore and engage in behaviour which might otherwise undermine the 
integrity of their observable or ‘front stage’ selves. His assertion that the ‘backstage’ includes 
‘places where the camera is not focussed at the moment’ (1959:119) is useful when 
considering the emergence of social media technologies like Twitter. The space contained 
within the ‘backstage’ can be viewed as narrowing, as more people participate in social 
media forums which allow another tier of surveillance to be placed upon their interactions 
with others. This facilitates greater potential both for the exposure of politically incorrect 
discourse (which might otherwise be hidden from our ‘front-stage’ selves) and an increase in 
popular focus upon the issues generated by such discourse (such as where the limits of free 
speech should lie). For example, prior to the emergence of social media it is improbable that 
the comments made by Paris Brown between the ages of 14 and 16 would have ever become 
a popular discussion point or a national news item.  
 
The fusion of our ‘front-stage’ and ‘back-stage’ selves through the emergence of social media 
sites like Twitter, has undoubtedly contributed to an intensification of our preoccupation with 
disputes of offence. However, this fusion of our private and public selves is further 
complicated by the very nature of social media.  Firstly, users of social media sites are made 
aware that this medium enables their comments and interactions to be placed in the public 
domain. It may, therefore, make more sense to view Twitter as providing a view of the 
backstage which people are prepared to let others see, rather than a straightforward or 
unmediated insight into the thoughts and utterances of individuals which previously remained 
hidden or privatised
110
. Secondly, despite the obviously ‘social’ aspect of social media, it 
appears that some users approach Twitter as if it really were a largely backstage activity. 
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 In 2012, the BBC claimed that ‘653 people faced criminal charges in England and Wales last year in 
connection with comments on Twitter and Facebook’. [Online] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20782257 
(Accessed 29 July 2014) More broadly, the media reporting of Twitter-storms involving high profile public 
figures also suggests that it is not only younger people who experience a disconnect between their online selves 
and public selves.  
110
 This understanding of social media may lend some credibility to Paris’s claim that she was guilty of 
‘showing off’ on Twitter, rather than expressing her genuinely held beliefs or thoughts. 
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Therefore, any exploration of anti-PC discourse within social media forums should remain 
alert to the particular discursive context(s) from which online discourse emerges.  
5.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has explored how PC discourse is produced through the reporting and 
circulation of unfolding news stories and events. It demonstrates how the language of PC 
informs the way in which topical events are discursively performed and understood more 
broadly. Using broadsheet newspapers as data, the first part of the chapter described how the 
meanings attached to PC are informed by political differences or affiliation. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, in the data sample used, the right leaning Telegraph draws upon anti-PC 
discourse and rhetoric, unlike the left leaning Guardian. The sample includes a small number 
of articles, and a larger sample (incorporating additional journalists and a broader range of 
topics) might be expected to produce a greater variety of positions within as well as between 
each newspaper. However, in the data obtained, The Guardian’s cautious approach towards 
free speech in some circumstances is suggestive of a trend whereby liberal-left politics has 
emerged as less assertive in its commitment to free expression than its ideological opponents. 
In both of the Guardian articles examined this reticence arises from a broader concern with 
social inequalities and with forms of speech or representation which appear to reinforce these 
inequalities. The cartoons appearing in Charlie Hebdo, therefore, are accused of reinforcing 
anti-Muslim prejudice whilst the sale of golliwogs is viewed as reinforcing racism. Both 
cases are also embedded in contemporary fears about the giving of offence and highlight how 
discourse deemed as ‘offensive’ towards particular groups is also increasingly felt to 
constitute discriminatory behaviour towards that group. However, whilst the Guardian 
articles reveal a liberal-left aversion towards offence giving, this case study does not claim 
that a ‘liberal orthodoxy’ has taken hold across the broadsheet media.  The data obtained 
from The Telegraph demonstrates how the expression of anti-PC rhetoric may also be 
accompanied by a perception that individuals are fearful or unable to express particular 
viewpoints. For example, in his discussion of Islamist terrorism, Mullen refers to how his 
views have ‘long remained unsayable’ and he criticises the ‘euphemisms’ of the BBC and 
‘Guardianistas’. However, in this instance, the presence of PC censure is asserted rather than 
demonstrated, as both Telegraph articles include frank discussion of contentious arguments 
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and ideas
111
. In the small sample of articles used in the case study the Telegraph does not, 
therefore, adhere to the rules or diktats of a ‘liberal orthodoxy’. Finally, if PC is viewed as an 
idea or movement which has inculcated a propensity for the excessive taking of offence, it is 
also worth considering how both of the Telegraph articles used as data take offence in 
strongly voiced terms against what they regard as ‘political correctness’. For example, 
Mullen describes the ‘politically correct’ media coverage of the 9/11 terrorist attacks as 
‘propaganda’ involving ‘euphemistic orthodoxy and the fatal disease of appeasement’. The 
taking of offence, therefore, is not confined to any single political perspective or position and 
instead forms a part of the wider discursive environment in which political commentary and 
the exchange of opinion takes place. 
The second part of the chapter recalls the parliamentary debate in the House of Commons in 
February 2013 which led to the legalisation of same sex marriage. It therefore addresses a key 
milestone in the struggle for equality based upon sexual orientation. The data analysis 
demonstrates that those MPs opposed to equal marriage rights were simultaneously careful to 
distance themselves from accusations of bigotry or homophobia. In this sense, the linguistic, 
political and cultural change which is typically attributed to PC
112
 can be described as having 
entered the rules governing discourse within the institutional setting of Parliament. 
Undoubtedly, the very discussion of the bill in the House, together with the efforts on the part 
of those opposing it to distance themselves from accusations of homophobia, illustrate that a 
real cultural shift has taken place over recent years. However, rather than having inculcated a 
‘liberal orthodoxy’ in which dissenting views are stigmatised, this chapter asserts that the 
language of PC has contributed to a less readable discursive environment. Today, mainstream 
politicians are less willing or able to engage in overtly homophobic, racist or sexist 
statements.  However, this also means that the expression of arguably non-PC viewpoints 
(such as opposition to equal marriage rights) may be articulated, ironically, through ‘PC’ 
language or rhetoric. (For example, the Labour MP, Michael McCann opposes same sex 
marriage whilst simultaneously claiming to ‘not agree with the comments from people who 
are clearly steeped in bigotry or hatred’ (Hansard, 05/02/2013, Column 179)). Significantly, 
those MPs opposed to the same sex marriage bill also adopt a language of victimhood to 
support their position. This is suggestive of a culture of competing rights in which different 
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 In her article, Edwards also discusses at length the feedback she has received from Telegraph readers 
regarding her ideas. 
112
 Of course, the changes described here are more directly a consequence of LGBT activism although gay 
liberation has become one of the many forms of activism which is subsumed or categorised under the PC label. 
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groups, identities or positions appear as pitched against one another within a broader arena of 
political or social activism. It also encourages us to begin to explore some of the matters 
raised by the third research question, including whether our preoccupation with the taking of 
offence has facilitated a culture of ‘competing rights’113. This is important because it also 
forces us to consider how we should respond to the demands or sensibilities of different 
groups, particularly where these may be in conflict with one another. For example, as the bill 
was introduced in Parliament, Maria Miller MP sought to accommodate religious rights and 
beliefs with equality for same sex couples. Secondly, it forces us to also recognise the lack of 
homogeneity within particular groups (or those sharing common identities) as well as 
between different groups. (For instance, during the House of Commons debate different MPs 
cite their Christian beliefs as grounds for both opposing and supporting same sex marriage). 
The data, therefore, points to an increasingly individualised dimension within the politics of 
identity in which the beliefs or feelings of the individual are elevated and prioritised. The 
evocation of group rights, therefore, may be used to foreground the feelings of the individual 
rather than the entire group. (For example, in the parliamentary debate Toby Perkins MP 
gives his support to the bill whilst Ian Paisley MP opposes it whilst claiming to be a victim of 
‘Christophobia’. However, both politicians use their identity as Christians as justification for 
their personal views). 
The third case study follows the Paris Brown Twitter Storm of 2013 and explores the 
relationship between our preoccupation with the giving and taking of offence and the 
emergence of new media technologies. The BBC coverage of Paris’s tweets lends weight to 
the assertion that particular viewpoints are precluded or stigmatised within some forms of 
contemporary discourse. In this instance, the precluded viewpoints include tweets deemed to 
be racist, sexist and homophobic. That her ‘offending’ tweets were initially published and 
denounced in The Mail on Sunday - the sister paper of The Daily Mail, a paper also known 
for also decrying ‘political correctness’- suggests that sensitivity towards the giving of 
offence on grounds such as racism or sexism has become entrenched broadly across society.  
Using Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical model of social interaction the case study illustrates 
that it has become increasingly difficult to disentangle our ‘backstage’ selves from our ‘front-
stage’ selves, and that what may once have been confined largely to the ‘backstage’ (such as 
one-to-one interactions or people’s everyday thoughts and rituals) has now acquired a 
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 The idea of ‘competing rights’ is raised by research question 3.2 and explored in greater depth in the cartoon 
chapter. 
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presence and permanence within a wider public domain as a consequence of the emergence 
and use of social media. One consequence of this has been our broader exposure to the 
prevalence of politically incorrect discourse within everyday social interaction
114
. This 
exposure has also contributed to an intensification of our preoccupation with disputes 
concerning the giving and taking of offence in recent years.  
The analysis of the source material largely echoes the claim by Fairclough (2003:21) that 
“Political Correctness’ or being ‘Politically Correct’ are, in the main, identifications imposed 
upon people by their political opponents’. The Telegraph accuses ‘Guardianistas and the 
BBC’ of ‘euphemistic orthodoxy’ whilst the Minister responsible for introducing the same 
sex couples marriage bill to Parliament warns against its supporters adopting a ‘misguided 
sense of political correctness’ (Hansard, 05/02/2013, Column 132). This chapter also rejects 
the idea that a PC or ‘liberal orthodoxy’ pervades our media and uses source material from 
the Telegraph newspaper to support its position. However, the source material examined here 
also demonstrates that there is a general unwillingness on the part of people to be labelled as 
bigoted or prejudiced in any way. This is particularly observable when following the 
substance of parliamentary discourse within the formal setting of Parliament. It is also 
evident in the apologies of Paris Brown, and in her decision to step down as youth police and 
crime commissioner. Furthermore, although both articles used as data from the right-leaning 
Telegraph lambast ‘political correctness’, the paper also points out the ‘obnoxious’ nature of 
the anti-Islamic trailer for ‘The Innocence of Muslims’ in its editorial of 13/09/2012.  
In summary, despite the largely negative signification of PC, the discursive environment 
which is examined by this news discourse is one in which individuals are generally reluctant 
to be viewed as endorsing racist, sexist or otherwise bigoted attitudes or behaviour. The 
chapter also observes how our understanding of what might constitute ‘homophobic’ or 
‘offensive’ attitudes remains contestable and is increasingly dependent upon personal or 
individual proclivities or beliefs. The subjective and contestable nature of offence, therefore, 
contributes both to our ongoing preoccupation with ‘offensiveness’ and our uncertainty as to 
where the parameters of acceptable discourse lie. Finally, as this chapter focuses upon the 
(re)production of news it generally observes how our ‘formal’ selves are encouraged to 
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 Instances where individuals have been subject to scrutiny or censure over their use of politically incorrect 
language have become a staple feature of news reporting in recent years. Often, these instances involve 
comments made using ‘new’ media technologies such as Twitter, Facebook, email or texting. Prior to the 
emergence of such technologies many ‘incorrect’ utterances (such as the Paris Brown tweets) are likely to have 
remained free from wider public scrutiny and within the domain of our ‘backstage’ selves. 
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adhere to certain codes of behaviour (such as non-racism or non-sexism)
115
. However, the 
third case study also begins to consider how this sits alongside our ‘informal’ selves and how 
we form and negotiate codes of behaviour in a world in which the distinction between 
‘informal’ and ‘formal’ spheres is becoming less clear. In view of this, the following chapter 
will consider the less formal field of comic discourse as it begins to examine how the 
enduring appeal of ‘political incorrectness’ within some forms of discourse should be viewed. 
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 For instance, Paris Brown steps away from public office because of the controversial and ‘politically 
incorrect’ nature of her tweets. 
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Chapter 6. Comedy and Political Correctness 
 
A joke that feeds on ignorance starves its audience. We have the choice. We can say 
something or we can say nothing. Not everything true is funny, and not everything funny is 
true. Most comics feed prejudice and fear and blinkered vision, but the best ones, the best 
ones…illuminate them, make them clearer to see, easier to deal with. We’ve got to make 
people laugh till they cry. Till they find their pain and their beauty. Comedy is medicine. Not 
coloured sweeties to rot their teeth with. (Comedians, Trevor Griffiths, 1976:23) 
The jokes on this DVD I have told to 300,000 people on tour, so I know they're not offensive. 
My audience aren't offended and people who buy this DVD won't be. The thing about my 
DVD is that there is no message, there is nothing to be learnt from it and there is no agenda. I 
am purely trying to make you laugh your ass off for two hours. That's my job. I am trying to 
release endorphins here. I am not preaching to you - I am trying to make you laugh. (Jimmy 
Carr, 2011)
116
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Comic discourse is renowned for delighting in ‘saying the unsayable’, or in unsettling and 
confronting our deeper anxieties and social taboos. It therefore, provides a potentially rich 
source of data for analysis of the controversies surrounding political correctness and the 
nature of offence. This chapter uses jokes told by popular comedians as data in order to 
explore and account for the enduring appetite for politically incorrect forms of expression. It 
will also make sense of some of the discursive strategies which help to (de)legitimise the 
expression of ‘incorrect’ utterances.  In doing so it recognises that comic discourse may be 
understood as constituting a distinct level of discourse from that which governs our formal or 
‘official’ selves117. In this sense, professional comedians are also understood as granted 
greater leeway to transgress and tweak at the codes of political correctness through humour, 
than the more ‘formal’ discourse governing, for example, the conduct of politicians in 
Parliament which has been explored in the previous chapter. However, comic discourse does 
not occupy an entirely separate realm without connection to the world which we routinely 
                                                          
116 In this quote Jimmy Carr is discussing his DVD, Being Funny, with the Daily Mirror newspaper. [Online] 
Available at: http://www.mirror.co.uk/3am/celebrity-news/jimmy-carr-interview-motormouth-reflects-92406 
(Accessed 09 July 2014) 
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 The idea that humour provides a temporary release from the regulation and oversight of our formal selves is 
explored in depth in section 6.4.2 of this chapter. 
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inhabit
118
. For instance, the comic will enter our conversations with friends and colleagues 
within the ‘formal’ domain of the workplace. The comedic, therefore, cannot be hermetically 
sealed from our broader society and culture, or from meaningful analysis of our 
understanding of the nature of offence.  
 
This chapter begins with an historical overview of the relationship between PC and British 
comedy in order to locate present-day debates within their broader socio-cultural emergence 
and context. The second part of the chapter addresses how notions of ‘acceptable’ and 
‘unacceptable’ forms of ‘offensive’ discourse have become attached to the ownership of 
cultural capital resources. The data analysis draws particularly upon the humour of Roy 
‘Chubby’ Brown and Jimmy Carr, and argues that access to higher levels of cultural capital 
can help legitimise the expression of politically incorrect viewpoints or utterances.  The third 
part of the chapter uses Bakhtinian dialogism and the notion of the carnival to consider the 
rise of ‘edgy’ comedy and the enduring appetite for ‘offensive’ or ‘politically incorrect’ jokes 
and comedians. It seeks to demonstrate how the popularity of such humour cannot be 
reducible to any singular meaning. However, it also asserts that the evocation of political 
correctness has contributed to the rehabilitation within mainstream comedy of humour which 
relies upon the targeting of those less powerful as ‘edgy’. The chapter argues that the 
rehabilitation of such humour as ‘edgy’, ‘subversive’ or ‘challenging’ has become possible as 
a consequence of the negative signification of political correctness.  
 
6.2   An historical overview of PC and British comedy 
 
6.2.1 Mapping PC and British comedy 
This section of the chapter provides a brief overview of the relationship between PC and 
British comedy in order to place contemporary debates within an accurate cultural context. It 
identifies three broad historical shifts which it classifies as pre-PC, PC and post-PC eras. 
These are loose categories which correspond with an emergence and diversity of many types 
of comedy; however, this overview focuses specifically on comedy which has contributed to 
the arguments surrounding political correctness and the nature of offence. In attaching a time 
                                                          
118  The interconnectedness between the comic and ‘non-comic’ was one of the factors underpinning the 
discursive repositioning of comedy in the 1980s.  Alternative comedy understood the racism and sexism of 
many comics as reflecting and shaping broader inequalities beyond the locus of a particular comic routine or 
performance. 
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frame to each era, it does not seek to homogenise the comedy described as specific or unique 
to any particular period. However, it does identify visible and overarching cultural shifts 
which help us locate and recognise the relationship between PC and the discursive 
repositioning of comic discourse.  
This mapping exercise takes the 1970s as its starting point. It then outlines the relocation of 
comic discourse in the 1980s, and explores how this was attached to the emergence of 
alternative comedy in this decade. The 1980s is identified as corresponding with the PC era, 
despite popular usage of the term PC having entered the mainstream lexicon in the UK in the 
early 1990s. This is because this thesis will argue that from a present-day perspective, many 
of the precepts and principles of 1980s alternative comedy can be viewed as constituting a 
broadly PC sensibility. The 1990s, and early decades of the 21
st
 century, are described by this 
chapter as post-PC. The ‘post’ prefix suggests a complex renegotiation of the relationship 
between comedy and political correctness within this period which incorporates elements of 
both continuation and rejection of prior eras.  
6.2.2 The Pre-PC era 
The popular culture of the1970s has been recalled as often fervently and unconsciously 
politically incorrect, when viewed from a contemporary standpoint (see e.g. Littlewood and 
Pickering, 1998; Lewisohn, 2003; Turner, 2008; Beckett, 2009; Viner, 2010). Viner (2010) 
describes the ‘casually sexist and racist dialogue’ of the 1970s police drama The Sweeney as 
providing ‘as strong an evocation as any television programme of a world gone forever’ 
(p.136). He also describes the ‘political incorrectness of those times’ as ‘effectively mined’ in 
the 2007 BBC drama Life on Mars in which a modern-day detective travels back to 1973 to 
work with the ‘gloriously unreconstructed DCI Gene Hunt’ (ibid.). During the 1970s racism, 
sexism, and homophobia were also common elements within TV-friendly comedy
119
, as well 
as the less regulated world of live stand-up comedy. Littlewood and Pickering have described 
the ubiquity of humour within this decade which relied upon stereotypical material, such as 
mother-in-law or ‘paki’ jokes as 
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 For a flavour of the decade it is worth viewing the Joint Industry Committee for Television Advertising 
Research (JICTAR) yearly top ten rated programmes for ITV. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.users.zetnet.co.uk/itw/features/Ratings.html] (Accessed: 15 June 2014) For example, in 1975, the 
top three most viewed programmes were: (1) The Royal Variety Performance; (2) The Benny Hill Show; and (3) 
Love Thy Neighbour.   
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…typical of the style of comedy which had hardened in the working men’s clubs of the 1950s 
and 1960s…What has characterised pub and club comedy most of all…are the almost 
exclusively white male performances and the aggressively masculinist jokes where women, 
‘queers’ and ethnic minorities are the staple butts. (Littlewood and Pickering, 1998:294) 
The influence of working men’s clubs on light entertainment and mainstream comedy in the 
1970s is described by Littlewood and Pickering as ‘pervasive’ (p.295). Significantly, 
although the swearing and aggressive delivery of the club comic may have been toned down 
for TV or ‘family’ viewing, the racism or sexism was often retained120. However, there was 
also a burgeoning unease surrounding the pervasiveness of such content. This unease was 
articulated in the 1976 play Comedians (written by Trevor Griffiths) which centres upon a 
group of aspiring comics and critiques their preference for jokes that feed on ‘ignorance’ 
(p.23) at the expense of those which reveal ‘a sort of truth… to liberate…to change the 
situation’ (p.20). Political activism in the 1970s had shone a light upon various forms of 
inequality, and legislation was consequently introduced in this decade to curb racial and 
sexual discrimination
121
. Racism and sexism within broader popular culture also eventually 
came under greater scrutiny, which (along with a sense that the content and delivery of many 
comics had become clichéd and tired) contributed to a questioning of the pervasive use of 
negative social stereotyping within popular comedy.  
6.2.3 The PC era 
The rejection of casual racism, sexism and homophobia in British comedy is associated most 
directly with the rise of alternative comedy in the 1980s. In 1979, the Comedy Store club 
opened in London and provided an important platform for an array of comics who explicitly 
rejected the types of jokes associated with ‘old school’ comics like Bernard Manning or Jim 
Davidson. In his book on the experience of being a stand-up comedian, Double describes the 
‘new breed of comics’ (1997:164):   
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 This neatly illustrates the temporal nature of offence. Today, racist jokes are far more likely to be considered 
unacceptable than the use of swearing within much TV comedy (although, of course, the nature of offence 
remains subjective).  
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 For example, the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 outlawed discrimination in employment, training and 
education on the grounds of sex or marital status. Similarly, the Race Relations Act of 1976 was passed in order 
to prevent discrimination on the grounds of race. 
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They shouted and swore, they delivered weird routines with quiet menace, they turned 
seditious politics into jokes. They threw aside stolen Pakistani jokes of their predecessors and 
instead lashed out at the mood of the times, attacking wine bars and Sony Walkmans (‘deaf 
aids for trendies’ – Alexei Sayle) with as much venom as they did the newly elected Thatcher 
government. (Double, 1997:164-165) 
Although the emergence of alternative comedy has been described by Double as sparking a 
‘comic revolution’ (p.164) that ‘completely redefined what it meant to be a stand-up comic’ 
(p.167), it is worth reiterating that the shift from ‘old school’ to alternative comedy - and 
thereby the shift from pre-PC to PC eras - was not as stark or linear as it may appear in this 
mapping exercise. Firstly, prior to the advent of alternative comedy, not all popular comedy 
relied primarily upon crude social stereotyping
122
. Secondly, although racist or sexist content 
became less acceptable during the 1980s, ‘old school’ comedy retained a level of popular 
appeal and therefore presence (albeit one which was increasingly questioned) within the 
mainstream media of this decade. Thirdly, not all comics associated with the emergence of 
alternative comedy were as explicitly political, or fervent in the expression of their anti-sexist 
or anti-racist credentials, as comics like Alexei Sayle or Ben Elton. Littlewood and Pickering 
describe performers including Rik Mayall and Ade Edmondson as not possessing the same 
‘definite political motivations’ as Sayle or Elton, or as tending to see themselves ‘simply as 
comics’ (1998:296). In this sense, the significance of alternative comedy lies more in its 
implicit rejection of the use of racist or sexist material, rather than any explicit or vocal 
declaration of a radical political or anti-racist agenda.  
However, there are some notable hallmarks of alternative comedy which illustrate the 
discursive shift from pre-PC to PC era. Most significant is the aforementioned disavowal of 
humour that generally targets those less powerful. Finding observes that, ‘where the target 
was outside the comedian’s immediate experience, it tended to be a person (or an institution) 
of power, rather than one belonging to a marginalised group’ (2008:5). Secondly, the style of 
delivery favoured by ‘old school’ comedians had tended to involve ‘quick fire gags, many of 
them second hand and taken from general circulation’ (Littlewood and Pickering, 1998:294). 
This had complemented the reliance upon well-trodden stereotypes and repetitive one-liners 
which had been the stock-in-trade of comedians like Frank Carson or Bernard Manning. The 
packaged gag was rejected by many alternative comedians, or otherwise subverted in order to 
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 For example, comedians such as Jasper Carrott and Billy Connolly had achieved popularity largely through a 
more observational or story-telling style of comedy. 
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appear in new and unexpected ways. Alternative comedy generally relied more upon 
‘observational humour, personal narratives, and a need for the audience to be intellectually 
and emotionally involved in the comedian’s train of thought in order to laugh’ (Finding, 
2008:5). Thirdly, these developments nurtured a sensibility within comedy which can be 
viewed from a contemporary perspective as broadly PC. At the core of this sensibility was a 
commitment to non-racism or non-sexism. However, alternative comedy also encouraged a 
broader engagement with the political and social questions of the 1980s, (such as the politics 
of identity, or the policies of the Thatcher governments)
123
.  
The discursive repositioning of comic discourse during the 1980s meant that many household 
names came to be regarded as either problematic or simply outdated, and were therefore 
increasingly side-lined by a media which had previously helped to build their careers
124
. 
Meanwhile, alternative comedy came to take its place within the mainstream, and comedians 
such as Ben Elton and Alexei Sayle acquired regular shows on the BBC in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s
125. Double (1997:175) neatly describes how ‘the non-sexist, non-racist comedy 
code gradually moved further into the mainstream’: 
By 1990, the holiday firm Thompsons was banning ‘blue’ comedians and racist gags from its 
resorts, and it was not unusual for television comics as anodyne as Les Dennis to declare their 
respect for Alexei Sayle and Ben Elton and openly reject bigoted comedy, saying, ‘I must 
admit it has worried me, when I’ve been watching an act with racist humour in it, to see the 
whole audience laughing’. (Double, 1997:175) 
This description is particularly illuminating in view of what has followed the mainstreaming 
of alternative comedy. It highlights a general consensus of disdain for bigoted content, and 
yet also refers to the ‘banning’ of gags. Alternative comedy has been described as having 
taken an ‘anarchic approach’ (Double, 1997:167) towards the creation of humour, and as 
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 This thesis views alternative comedy as discursively aligned with the politicisation of other elements within 
popular culture during the 1980s  which drew upon their dissatisfaction with the incumbent Thatcher led 
governments. These elements included newly politicised musicians like Billy Bragg, or dramas like Boys from 
the Blackstuff (which was broadcast on the BBC in 1982, and dealt with the impact of mass unemployment). In 
2006, Phil Wickham from the British Film Institute described the drama as ‘TV’s most complete dramatic 
response to the Thatcher era’. As the UK shifted rightwards politically during the 1980s, a cultural opposition to 
Thatcherism also emerged through various forms of artistic expression including comedy, music and drama.  
124
 For example, in 1989, Thames Television’s Head of Light Entertainment, John Davies, cancelled the once 
highly popular Benny Hill show. His reasons were, ‘…the audiences were going down, the programme was 
costing a vast amount of money, and he (Hill) was looking a little tired.’ [Online] Available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Benny_Hill_Show (Accessed 24 June 2014) 
125
 In a symbolic departure from his anti-establishment roots in alternative comedy and the Comedy Store, Ben 
Elton stood in as guest host for Terry Wogan on his flagship BBC chat show in 1989. 
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having generated ‘a punk sensibility of shock and offence’ (Hunt, 2013a:7). However, the 
offence was directed towards a set of clearly defined targets: the old guard racist or sexist 
comedians, the Thatcher led governments, or powerful institutions and groups more 
generally. But alternative comedy was also predicated on the avoidance of offence with 
regard to historically disadvantaged groups, or those lacking power. Comics, such as Ben 
Elton, were often scrupulous in their efforts not to appear sexist or racist. Arguably, this 
contributed to the creation of a new set of taboos, rules or ‘comedy code(s)’ (Double, 
1997:175) which were now attached to a new comedy establishment. How, therefore, does 
the mainstreaming of alternative comedy sit alongside the reification of PC in the 1990s as a 
hegemonic and censorious movement to be mocked; and what impact did this have upon the 
nature and direction of comic discourse?    
6.2.4 The Post-PC era 
It is less easy to identify any clear ‘movement’ within British comedy since the advent of 
1980s alternative comedy. In his analysis of post-alternative comedy, Hunt (2013a) identifies 
a number of trends which he describes as characterising the nature of British comedy since 
the 1990s
126
. However, he is keen to point out that these trends are neither self-contained or 
unified, nor lacking in tension with one another (p.10). In other words, comedy has become 
less uniform and more diverse; and the underlying precepts of popular comedy less consistent 
or readable. What, therefore, might this suggest about the relationship between comic 
discourse and PC in the post-PC era?  
At the end of the 1990s, Littlewood and Pickering argued that the legacy of alternative 
comedy’s refusal to ‘kick down’127 or to make less powerful groups the target of comic abuse 
remained broadly intact (1998:293):  
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 Hunt (2013a:10-15) identifies eight overarching trends in post-alternative British comedy which he argues 
are ‘especially significant’, including ‘Northern comedy’ and ‘Dark’ or ‘Cringe’ comedy. For a detailed 
description of these trends see pp.10-15 of his book on this topic: Cult British TV Comedy.   
127
 Littlewood and Pickering (1998) coined the distinction between jokes which ‘kick up’ or ‘kick down’ in a 
discussion of joke structures which depend upon a target of ridicule. They argue that ‘all comedians are faced 
with the choice of whether they direct their comic aggression at those who are in positions of power and 
authority, or at those who are relatively powerless and subordinated.’ (p.293) This chapter uses this helpful 
distinction in its exploration of the comedic strategies deployed by popular comics today. 
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One of the beneficial effects of this refusal has been that its influence has been considerable 
without the need to resort to official compulsion. Such humour on stage is now less common, 
and even comedians who have in the past relied heavily on such derogatory jokes, Jim 
Davidson being an example, have now toned down their acts… (Littlewood and Pickering, 
1998:297) 
 
This thesis largely agrees with this summation of comedy in the 1990s. Arguably, a 
progressive form of self-censorship had been implanted which recognised that power 
differentials within wider society had been reinforced and reflected in some of the comedy 
pervasive in the pre-PC era
128
.  
However, this chapter also argues that two significant developments contributed to a 
discursive realignment of comic discourse surrounding matters of political correctness in the 
1990s. Firstly, the politicised humour and social commentary of comics like Ben Elton, 
Alexei Sayle or Jeremy Hardy became less fashionable and less visible. Hunt quotes the 
comedian and promoter, Malcom Hardy claiming in 1994 that ‘the right-on political stuff has 
more or less gone…now it’s veering towards silly stuff, rather than clever wordy stuff’ 
(Cook, 1994:280-281, cited in Hunt:2013a:6). The shift away from political comedy could be 
viewed partially as a reaction against the tenets of the new alternative comedy 
‘establishment’. In 1989, Wilmut and Rosengard had described how alternative comedy 
involved ‘a rejection of preceding fashions in comedy’ (xiii). In this sense, the apolitical 
nature of much 1990s comedy suggests a similar process was taking place whereby the ‘new’ 
generation of comics symbolically dissociated themselves from the ‘old’. The wider socio-
political context of the 1990s may also have contributed to a climate less conducive to the 
emergence of politically inspired comedy. The downfall of Margaret Thatcher from office in 
1990 removed an important target for many alternative comedians who had been politicised 
by the social and political divisiveness of the 1980s. Furthermore, the (short-lived) optimism 
surrounding the emergence of New Labour in the 1990s dampened some of the anger and 
fervour of politically edged comedy
129
. Crucially, the retreat of political comedy is also 
                                                          
128
 Of course, this is a general summation of trends within comic discourse. Not every comedian or comic 
performance has (or ever did) consistently abide by these principles. The comedian Jerry Sadowitz, for instance, 
first appeared at the Comedy Store when alternative comedy was at its height in the 1980s. However, he reacted 
against alternative comedy and continues to deal aggressively in his act with issues like race or gender. In a 
description of his performances in the 1980s and 1990s, Double claims ‘there’s something there to offend 
everybody…he got a lot of mileage out of deliberately winding up the liberals’ (1997:210).  
129
 Some comedians did continue to successfully use political material in the 1990s (such as Mark Thomas). 
However, this thesis locates this within a broader shift away from political comedy in this decade. 
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aligned with the ‘discursive drift’ (Cameron, 1994:20) of PC from its countercultural origins 
into mainstream discourse in the early 1990s. The reification of PC as an authoritarian and 
censorious movement, with its roots firmly ascribed to the politics of the liberal-left, 
undermined the sense that the politically motivated alternative comedian really was an 
‘anarchic’ (Double, 1997:167) or anti-establishment presence. To use politically inspired 
material, or to strive for a politically engaged authenticity within a performance, risked 
accusations of self-righteous ‘political correctness’ in an era which increasingly favoured 
irony and political disinterest.  
The reification of PC in the 1990s, therefore, developed alongside the shift away from 
politicised humour, or comedy which commented critically upon social problems like racism 
or sexism. This disavowal of the political as potentially ‘politically correct’ also sat alongside 
the emergence of 1990s Lad Culture, which would also contribute to a repositioning of comic 
discourse (particularly with regard to how matters surrounding gender or sexual politics were 
discussed). Hunt (2013a:10-11) identifies ‘Laddishness and ‘political incorrectness’’ as one 
of the significant trends in his classification of post-alternative comedy, and a trend which 
still pervades various panel shows such as the ‘testosterone-drenched’ Mock the Week (BBC 
2 2005- ). The commercial success of Lad Culture in the 1990s awarded it a powerful 
presence across the popular culture of the time (including its music, film and popular 
literature). The original ‘lad magazine’ Loaded (established in 1994) declared on its strapline 
that it was ‘for men who should know better’. This knowingness informed the ‘ironic 
incorrectness’ (Hunt, 2013a:1) of much of the laddish humour popular in the post-PC 1990s 
including, most famously, the situation comedy Men Behaving Badly (BBC1 1994-1998)
130
. 
The use of irony as a device for deflecting critique of questionable content is explored in 
depth in section 6.4.2 of this chapter. However, it is worth considering briefly here how 
‘ironic incorrectness’ (ibid.) was manifest in some of the humour of the 1990s. Men Behaving 
Badly centred upon the laddish lifestyle of two friends in their thirties, and often drew upon 
the sexist language and behaviour of its main protagonist, Gary Strang. However, the series 
was careful never to reward Gary for his behaviour, and his attitude towards women was 
regularly mocked and ridiculed. In a similar vein, characters which emerged from other 
                                                          
130
 The BBC comedy website describes Men Behaving Badly as ‘the defining sitcom of the 1990s. Seemingly a 
reaction against the onset of the caring, sharing ‘new man’, it appeared to revel in a politically incorrect world of 
booze, burps and boobs’. [Online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/comedy/menbehavingbadly/ (Accessed: 
19 June 2014) 
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comedies during the 1990s, such as Alan Partridge (created and performed by Steve Coogan) 
engaged in xenophobic, sexist and homophobic discourse; however, the comedy was written 
and performed so that the target was always Alan himself. Politically incorrect views, 
therefore, were simultaneously expressed and ridiculed, whilst the underlying principles of 
the PC era remained in place.  
This discursive repositioning in the 1990s shifted comic discourse away from some of the 
rules and diktats of ‘political correctness’, whilst generally remaining careful to avoid the 
pitfalls of appearing to endorse derogatory forms of stereotyping
131
. However, in the 21
st
 
century, the popularity of some forms of comedy has provoked suggestions of a ‘backwards 
slide’ (Finding, 2008:7) or retraction of alternative comedy’s refusal to ‘kick down’. Gill 
describes a ‘new cruelty’ (2008:47) within the popular culture of the 21st century which she 
views as manifest in the pervasiveness of celebrity culture, reality TV and Make Over shows 
which revel in harsh critique of the physical and personal attributes of their participants. 
Finding (2008; 2010) also identifies a ‘new cruelty’ within some of the popular comedy of 
the 21
st
 century. For example, she describes the character based sketch-show Little Britain 
(BBC 2003-2005) as relying ‘primarily on the stereotypical Other, and their grotesqueness, 
for the humour of the show’ (2008:8). She also describes most of these stereotypes as 
‘produced through disgust at class, sexuality, race or gender’ (p.3).  
It seems that when alternative comedy became mainstream, a return to the old traditional 
comedy became the knowing, naughty, ironic alternative. If, as seemed to be assumed, the 
battles over racism and sexism had been won, then there could be nothing new or interesting 
about them or challenging them. The discourse of ‘political correctness’ and the tabloids’ 
insistence that ‘you can’t say anything nowadays’ meant that making racist or sexist 
comments became the new (old) alternative. (Finding, 2008:8) 
How should we view this assertion, in light of the claim made a decade earlier by Littlewood 
and Pickering (1998:293) that alternative comedy had implanted a lasting legacy in its refusal 
to pander to comic abuse or regressive values? Some of the fears expressed by Finding 
appear to be confirmed in light of the popular appetite for forms of modern comedy which 
rely upon crude stereotyping or stock-in-trade one-liners not dissimilar from those told by the 
club comics of the pre-PC era. Does this suggest a straightforward return to the comic 
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 Of course, the ‘ironic incorrectness’ of the 1990s remains open to different readings. The wider question of 
whether ‘ironic incorrectness’ (un)intentionally reinforces social stereotyping is explored in greater depth in 
section 6.4 of this chapter.  
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discourse of that era; and how should we make sense of the enduring appeal of politically 
incorrect humour in the world of post-alternative comedy? 
6.3 A cultural analysis of ‘offensive’ humour 
 
6.3.1 Comedy and the new ‘liberal orthodoxy’ 
 
The marginalisation of ‘trad’ comics from mainstream entertainment formed part of a general 
cultural shift within society which encouraged a greater sensitivity towards language or 
behaviour which could be deemed to be politically incorrect. Arguably, this sensitivity also 
contributed to a sense that a new form of ‘liberal orthodoxy’ (Hughes, 2010:4) now prevailed 
over social discourse whereby unpalatable, or ‘politically incorrect’, viewpoints were 
stigmatised or silenced. This is worth exploring with regard to comic discourse, particularly 
in view of its reputation for ‘saying the unsayable’ and its complex relationship (via the birth 
of alternative comedy and post-alternative comedy) with the emergence and reification of PC. 
 
The historical overview of PC and British comedy (outlined in the previous part of this 
chapter) concludes with Finding’s suggestion that ‘old traditional comedy’ has emerged in 
recent years to become the ‘new (old) alternative’ (2008:8). Indeed, many of the jokes 
contained in the DVDs viewed for this section of the chapter are striking in view of how 
similar some of the politically incorrect themes and utterances are within the live shows of 
both ‘trad’ and post-alternative stand-up comics performing today.  How, therefore, does this 
sit alongside the aforementioned marginalisation of ‘old school’ comics, together with the 
common assertion that a ‘liberal orthodoxy’ now pervades over contemporary discourse? 
The remainder of this chapter will grapple with these questions. However, before doing so it 
is worth reflecting in more depth upon what is meant by offensive and politically incorrect 
humour, as these are terms which have helped frame the discussion surrounding the questions 
asked by this chapter. 
 
6.3.2 Defining offensive humour and politically incorrect humour 
 
The notion of what constitutes offensive humour is subjective; as is whether, and the extent to 
which, offensive humour can be separable from politically incorrect humour. Littlewood and 
Pickering (1998) suggest a distinction can be made between ‘offensive’, ‘sick’ or ‘gallows 
humour’ and humour which is understood in a contemporary context to be politically 
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incorrect. They describe ‘sick’ jokes as ‘flaunting their bad taste’ and their ‘callous 
insensitivity to human tragedy and suffering’ (p.290). According to Littlewood and Pickering 
such jokes, therefore, depend upon an awareness of their inappropriateness; however, 
politically incorrect jokes depend upon pandering to harmful and well-trodden stereotypes 
(p.290).   
 
Whilst this chapter agrees that offensive and politically incorrect humour cannot be viewed as 
interchangeable ways of categorising or conceptualising types of comedy, it also asserts that 
any fixed or clear distinction between the two is increasingly difficult to sustain. Firstly, jokes 
may simultaneously incorporate insensitivity to human suffering with various forms of 
stereotyping or targeting of particular groups. For example, in October 2009, Jimmy Carr told 
the following joke to an audience at the Manchester Apollo: ‘Say what you like about these 
servicemen amputees from Iraq and Afghanistan, but we are going to have a fucking good 
Paralympic team in 2012’. This joke provoked accusations that it was offensive towards 
wounded soldiers, in bad taste and disabilist; suggesting that it can be viewed as both 
offensive and politically incorrect using the method of classification described by Littlewood 
and Pickering
132
.  Furthermore, many contemporary jokes which involve social stereotyping 
are also dependent upon an awareness of their inappropriateness or ‘incorrectness’. This 
somewhat unsettles Littlewood and Pickering’s earlier description of the role jokes play in 
reinforcing stereotypes, and is a use of humour which can be observed in another segment of 
a live performance from Jimmy Carr: 
 
I was asked this evening not to be patronising or sexist. I thought, fair enough, birds can’t take 
it (audience laughs, cheers and claps)…don’t worry that’s post-modern misogyny, the joke 
was in fact steeped in irony (addressing a woman in the audience) don’t you worry your 
pretty little head about it love. (audience laughs) (Live at the Apollo, BBC 2012) 
 
In this example, the joke rests upon an awareness of the ‘incorrectness’ of sexism, and can be 
viewed as consistent with the way in which a ‘sick’ joke rests upon an awareness of the 
inappropriateness of laughing at suffering or human tragedy.  Of course, not all jokes which 
                                                          
132
  The joke was widely reported in the media as having been condemned by injured soldiers, disability rights 
groups, military leaders and politicians. See, for example, [Online] Available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1222791/Jimmy-Carr-The-comedian-criticised-making-disgraceful-
joke-war-hero-amputees.html ].  (Accessed 17/05/2014) The media storm provoked by the joke firmly locates it 
within the broader discussion and discursive formation of the ‘new offensiveness’ explored in Section 6.4 of the 
chapter.  
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involve sexual or racial stereotypes will incorporate an acknowledgement of the 
‘inappropriateness’ of sexism or racism on the part of either the comedian or audience. 
Furthermore, jokes that do suggest a level of knowingness in their use of stereotypes cannot 
be dismissed as automatically non-racist or non-sexist as a consequence.  
 
The contextual nature of comedy (together with the discontinuous way in which PC continues 
to be understood) complicates any attempt to conclusively define or describe what politically 
incorrect humour is. Of further significance is what Green (2006:4) describes as the 
‘expansion of victimhood’ whereby more and more groups are perceived to be the targets of 
stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination. In view of this, a greater number of jokes are 
potentially classifiable as politically incorrect. (For example, following Green’s 
conceptualisation of ‘victim’ groups, it makes sense that class-based jokes which target 
‘chavs’ are considered to be politically incorrect in the same way that racist or homophobic 
jokes are).  
 
However, despite the ambiguities of meaning surrounding offensive and politically incorrect 
humour, this chapter uses jokes as data for analysis which target historically disadvantaged 
groups, or incorporate social stereotyping and the use of taboo: in other words, it selects jokes 
conceptualised as politically incorrect within contemporary comic discourse. In particular, it 
selects jokes and material which it deems would once have remained impermissible within 
mainstream British comedy, despite the absence of any ‘official compulsion’ (Littlewood and 
Pickering, 1998:297) to proscribe content in the post-alternative comedy era.  
 
6.3.3 Data analysis 
 
Despite the ‘comic revolution’ described by Double (1997:164) as having been triggered by 
the birth of alternative comedy, politically incorrect humour retained a popular appeal for 
some audiences. The relegation of many ‘old school’ comics by the mainstream broadcast 
media partly reflected changing public tastes, as well as wider concerns about how comedy 
had represented less powerful groups. Nevertheless, ‘pre-PC’ comics were still able to find 
audiences willing to watch their videos or live performances
133
.  
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 For example, Bernard Manning became famous on British television in the 1970s, appearing on shows like 
The Comedians. The racist content of his material contributed to his fall from grace from TV comedy in the 
following decades. However, Manning never toned down his racist jokes and continued to perform in theatres 
and clubs until his death in 2007. In a poll conducted by Channel Four in 2010, he was voted number 51 by the 
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One such figure is the highly successful Roy ‘Chubby’ Brown who began his career in 
comedy in the 1970s. After several unsuccessful auditions and appearances on television 
talent shows he rebranded himself as a ‘blue’ comedian and his popularity soared. He has 
released many lucrative recordings of his live shows
134, ‘while his tours are guaranteed sell-
outs and he holds box-office records at many theatres’ (Medhurst, 2005:188). Despite his 
popularity, Medhurst observes ‘there are many who have only heard of him, if at all, by 
reputation’ (p.187). He also suggests that Brown is not shown on mainstream broadcast 
media because of this reputation: ‘his stand-up comedy cannot be shown…because of its two 
chief characteristics, the relentless use of swearwords and the unvarnished expression of 
strong and contentious views’ (ibid). These contentious views are expressed in jokes about 
‘sex…topical events, ethnic and sexual minorities, and assorted reference points drawn from 
the everyday life of white, working class England – or more specifically, white, working 
class, non-Southern England…’ (pp. 188-189). Here are three Chubby Brown jokes selected 
from a ten minute segment of one of his live performances in 1995: 
 
My first wife died. I didn’t notice for a week. The fucks were the same but the dishes piled up. 
(audience laughs) 
 
Do you know what I read in the paper today? This is true. You can now get AIDS off a 
mosquito. (pause) Well anyone sick enough to shag a mosquito up the arse deserves to 
fucking die. (audience laughs) 
 
Cyril Smith (then a famously overweight Liberal Democrat politician) has that skin disease 
that eats you away (pause) doctors have given him 22 years to live.(audience laughs)  
            (Clitoris Allsorts, 1995) 
 
Many Chubby Brown jokes echo similar ‘politically incorrect’ sentiments which have 
contributed to his status as an offensive figure, or reactionary throwback to a pre-PC era. The 
suggestion that his heavy reliance upon strong swear words - together with his expression of 
‘ideologically irredeemable’ (Medhurst, 2005:191) viewpoints - has denied Brown greater 
media exposure contains some weight. However, this alone does not account for his near 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
public in, The 100 Greatest Stand-Ups. [Online] Available at:  
http://www.comedy.co.uk/guide/tv/100_greatest_stand_ups/episodes/1/2/  (Accessed 22 June 2014) 
134
 His live recordings typically have crude titles, including the two used as sources for data in this chapter: 
Clitoris Allsorts (1995), and Too Fat to Be Gay (2007).  
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pariah status across much of the popular media
135
. Firstly, swearwords are increasingly 
tolerated by media broadcasting as an integral part of comic discourse (particularly within 
post-watershed transmissions); and comic performers (including those labelled controversial 
or ‘edgy’) are usually willing to temper their use of language to comply with the (un)spoken 
boundaries such broadcasts set in place. Secondly, the sorts of ‘ideologically irredeemable’ 
(ibid.) sentiments expressed in the Chubby Brown jokes above are also articulated by TV 
friendly performers.  
 
For example, Jimmy Carr has acquired a ubiquitous media presence in the 21
st
 century. His 
achievements include being host of the popular quiz show 8 out of 10 cats (Channel Four 
2005 - present), and co-presenter of the satirical current affairs show 10 O’Clock Live 
(Channel Four 2011 – present). He is also a highly successful stand-up comedian and a 
regular guest on various BBC and Channel Four comedy panel shows.  The following jokes 
are from a short segment of a live performance of his in Glasgow (which was also recorded 
for DVD, and broadcast on Channel Four in 2011): 
 
I had a fat girl come up to me recently after a gig. Well, I say a fat girl, she was either fat or 
eighteen months pregnant (audience laughs) she was big. Bubbly you might say. Not with an 
effervescent personality that filled the room, no shaped like a bubble. (audience laughs) She 
was a comfort eater, I don’t mean she was eating for emotional comfort, she was eating till she 
was comfortable to sit on. (audience laughs) She wasn’t a size zero, she was a shape zero 
(audience laughs) She came up to me after - well, she pretty much surrounded me (audience 
laughs) and she said you’re not meant to use the term ‘fat’. I said you’re not meant to eat cake 
for breakfast (audience laughs) 
 
We all know that no means no, but what does it mean when they shout ‘help’? It means the 
gag’s come loose. (audience laughs) 
 
I don’t know how to describe it to people who didn’t see the Paralympics. It’s sort of like 
(pause) The Paralympics, it’s like a children’s book where all the broken toys have a picnic. 
(audience laughs) 
                                                                         (Jimmy Carr Making People Laugh, 2010) 
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 Although Brown’s shows are not shown on television, a documentary about him was broadcast on Channel 
Four in 2007, called Roy Chubby Brown: Britain’s Rudest Comedian. He has also made several cameo 
appearances as the foul mouthed mayor of a fictional town in the comedy The League of Gentlemen (BBC TWO 
1999-2002). Brown’s real name, Royston Vasey, was also used in the comedy as the name for the town.  
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In common with other live performances from Jimmy Carr Making People Laugh draws 
heavily upon sex, misogyny, homophobia, disability, paedophilia, national or regional 
stereotyping and obesity in order to create its humour. (Significantly, although Carr’s jokes 
are less explicit during his appearances on prime-time panel shows, Channel Four were 
confident to broadcast Making People Laugh in its entirety in the post-watershed time slot). 
Brown and Carr are both extremely popular comics whose reliance upon ‘offensive’ content 
forms a core component of their appeal
136
. Why, therefore, despite his obvious popularity, is 
Brown disdained by much of the media, whilst Carr has emerged to become one of the UK’s 
most TV friendly comedians? Crucially, why are the jokes told by Brown viewed  as 
regressive or pandering to bigotry, where similar jokes told by Carr are regarded as ‘taboo-
breaking’ or ‘edgy’? 
 
Part of the answer to this question involves the use (or assertion) of the comic device of 
irony. Section 6.4.2 of this chapter will explore in depth how irony (or the assumption of 
irony) has helped to re-accommodate some forms of ‘politically incorrect’ humour. It also 
considers how Jimmy Carr builds irony very carefully into some - but significantly not all - of 
his joke-telling. His ironic persona, therefore, rests at-least partly upon the assumptions we 
make about him and the intentions which underlie his ‘offensive’ brand of humour. Offence, 
therefore, becomes attached not only to what or how something is said; but also who is saying 
it.  
 
The assumption of irony is seldom granted to Brown, whose reliance upon sexism, racism or 
homophobia is typically viewed as a straightforward reflection of his own irredeemable 
prejudices. However, Medhurst describes this view of Brown as ‘shockingly reductive’ 
(2005:195): 
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 The official websites for Jimmy Carr and Chubby Brown are keen to promote their offensive credentials. The 
front page of Brown’s website declares him to be ‘the most outrageous comedian in the world’, and warns that 
‘offensive material may be used throughout this site. If easily offended please stay away’. [Online] Available at 
http://www.chubbybrown.biz/  (Accessed 27/06/2014). The Jimmy Carr website promotes his 2014 Funny 
Business tour by declaring it will be ‘rude and offensive’ and that ‘If you are easily offended, don’t be a dick 
about it’.  [Online] Available at http://www.jimmycarr.com/live/ (Accessed 27/06/2014)  Hunt (2013b:201-202) 
points out that such warnings ‘seem designed to flatter the ‘inside’ audience even as they punish the prudish and 
‘politically correct’. Who, after all, wants to be regarded as ‘easily offended’?’. 
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He relishes telling jokes which position him as a sexual adventurer, dispensing advice on how 
to stage successful conquests…yet these are always rendered ludicrous by his palpable failure 
to measure up to norms of male attractiveness, and they are in any case counterbalanced by 
jokes which catalogue both his failures to seduce and the feistiness of the women who turn 
him down. In these narratives, his own body is crucial, with the costume accentuating his 
fatness and a running theme centred on the gap between the delusions of desirability that he 
seems to suffer from and the actual spectacle evident on stage. (Brown typically appears on 
stage wearing a helmet and a brightly coloured patchwork suit with too-short trouser legs) 
(Medhurst, 2005:189) 
 
In his 2006 autobiography, Brown also claims that, ‘the same joke from a slim, good-looking 
comedian wouldn’t have been half as funny as from a fat, balding lump’ (p.262). This 
suggests a level of knowingness on the part of Brown, whose derogatory comments about 
women are juxtaposed with his own shortcomings, and the comic persona he creates to tell 
stories of how women respond to these shortcomings. Medhurst also identifies how 
 
…one of Brown’s favourite tropes is the provocation of outrage. He and his audience are 
engaged in a game of dare – will he dare to say these outrageous things and will they dare to 
laugh at them? He rampages through taboo areas, unleashing jokes about paedophilia, making 
fun of disabilities, treating famines in Africa and earthquakes in India as source material for 
jibes… and after especially on-the-edge remarks he takes satisfaction in confirming his status 
as the man who will go further than any other – ‘Only me that can get away with that one’. 
(Medhurst, 2005:190) 
 
This is not dissimilar to the ‘game of dare’ Carr engages with within his live shows137. He 
finishes the encore of his Glasgow gig with what he describes as his ‘favourite pub joke’:  
 
What’s the difference between football and rape? Girls don’t like football.  (audience laughter 
and groans) 
              (Jimmy Carr, Making People Laugh, 2010) 
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 Section 6.4.2 of this chapter describes a comic performance in which Jimmy Carr directly invites his 
audience to find out what his most ‘offensive’ joke might be. In the routine from his Telling Jokes (2009) DVD 
he tells his audience  ‘we could start gentle and work our way up and see at what stage as an audience you go – 
oh for fuck’s sake!’.  
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Carr had begun the encore by telling his audience (who respond by cheering) that he’d ‘like 
to torpedo this gig with some very unpleasant jokes that will offend and upset you all’. After 
telling the aforementioned joke he describes the audience reaction to it as ‘a text-book 
response…it’s a laugh followed by an ‘oohh’’138. However, if this joke were told by Brown it 
is difficult to imagine it would be understood as defensible within the context of a broader or 
intentionally provocative comic persona
139. In other words, Brown claiming ‘only me that 
can get away with that one’ is not understood as comparable to Jimmy Carr claiming he 
wants to ‘torpedo this gig with…jokes that will offend and upset you’.  Despite Medhurst’s 
assertion that Brown engages in a knowing ‘provocation of outrage’ he remains a largely 
ostracised figure (or arguable casualty of our ‘liberal orthodoxy’) whose expressions of 
homophobia or misogyny are taken at face value, whilst other ‘politically incorrect’ comics 
are celebrated as ‘dark’ or ‘edgy’. Allowing for the subjective nature of what might constitute 
comedy which is credible, amusing or offensive; why might comedians who engage with 
broadly similar themes or material be perceived so differently?  
 
In order to account for this it is worth engaging with Bourdieu’s theory of capital which can 
help us explore how individuals and groups use their resources to navigate their position in 
the world around them. This may also help us understand how possession of cultural capital 
resources is attached to the distinctions we make between ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ 
forms of ‘incorrectness’. In The Forms of Capital (1986) Bourdieu expands upon the Marxian 
notion of capital to move beyond a narrow economic conception of the term which regards 
capital primarily as control over material or economic resources. Although Bourdieu regards 
economic capital as the governing form of capital he argues that it is transmutable into other, 
non-material, forms. Economic resources enable the accumulation of cultural capital; or the 
forms of knowledge, tastes, skills and personal dispositions which bestow people with 
advantages within society. What, therefore, are the forms of capital at work within popular 
contemporary comedy? 
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 Carr has previously claimed that ‘my favourite noise in comedy is the laugh followed by the sharp intake of 
breath’. [Online] Available at http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2009/nov/05/jimmy-carr-paralympics-joke 
(Accessed 30 June 2014) 
139
 This is not to claim that Carr (along with other post-alternative comics like Frankie Boyle) has been immune 
from criticism of his ‘offensive’ material but that he nevertheless continues to retain his position as a critically 
acclaimed and media-friendly comedian in spite of this. Undoubtedly, ‘Daily Mail–style outrage’ (Hunt, 
2013:181) has sat alongside liberal-left disquiet with many comedians who rely upon ‘non-PC’ or seemingly 
derogatory material for laughs.  
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Brown lacks the cultural capital necessary for the acquisition of ‘edginess’. Firstly, his 
emergence from the northern working men’s clubs of the 1970s locates him firmly within the 
history, tastes and traditions of the unreconstructed, and pre-PC comedy past. Secondly, 
despite Medhurst’s assertion that Brown’s sexist jokes are typically knowing and self-
deprecating (rather than unabashedly misogynistic) Brown is not generally attributed with the 
self-awareness, or sophistication of ‘edgy’ comics who also engage in misogynistic - or 
otherwise ‘politically incorrect’ - material.  In his analysis of patterns of consumption of 
British comedy, Friedman describes how comedy fans possessing High Cultural Capital 
(HCC) were generally keen to describe the comedy they liked in terms of sophistication: 
‘Favourite comedians were ‘intelligent’, ‘complex’, ‘intellectual’ and most of all ‘clever’ 
(2011:359). These respondents also distanced themselves from what they regarded as the 
unsophisticated ‘bullying’ of ‘trad’ comics like Brown (p.362).  
 
Bourdieu maintains that language must be understood not only as a means of communication 
but as a form of cultural capital whereby an individual acquires particular resources, or 
advantages, by virtue of their use of culturally privileged or legitimised speech patterns, 
sociolects, or dialects. His concept of linguistic capital may help us make sense of the 
distinctions made (by consumers and critics of comedy alike) between ‘offensive’ comedy 
that is ‘dark’, ‘challenging’ or ‘edgy’ and that which is unremittingly regressive. Unlike 
Brown, Jimmy Carr is a middle class Oxbridge graduate from the Home Counties: (he will 
begin a misogynistic one-liner with a reference to ‘my girlfriend’ rather than to ‘the wife’). In 
a segment from the Glasgow gig used as data for this section of the chapter, Carr invites his 
audience to ask him any questions. The questions asked are crude and sexually explicit, as are 
Carr’s responses. However, they also include the following exchange: 
 
 
Member of audience: What would you rather do, suck off your Dad or lick out your Mum? 
(audience laughs loudly, cheers and claps) 
Jimmy Carr: Yes, I think if I’m not mistaken that’s one of Wittgenstein’s theorems. (audience 
laughs) 
                                                                       (Jimmy Carr, Making People Laugh, 2010) 
 
That Carr’s humour is often described by comedy fans and critics as ‘acerbic’, ‘dark’ and 
‘taboo-busting’ is partly a reflection of the power of his linguistic capital to confer upon him 
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and his comedy assumptions of irony, intelligence and erudition
140
. Brown, however, lacks 
the linguistic capital to convince us that he too is a ‘risk-taker’ who is carefully playing with 
what can and cannot be said within the parameters of comic discourse.  
 
The role of the pre-alternative ‘blue’ comedian, or club comic, was typically a working class 
one; however, this is less true of the modern ‘edgy’ post-alternative comic. That said, neither 
are today’s comics necessarily wholly dependent upon possession of a middle class status to 
be accepted as ‘edgy’ rather than regressive. Of paramount importance are the cultural capital 
resources of a comic’s audience. The audience for Chubby Brown typically possess lower 
levels of cultural capital than the audiences of ‘edgy’ comics like Jimmy Carr or Frankie 
Boyle. (Hunt (2013b:225) has described ‘alternative and post-alternative comedy’ as 
‘strongly middle class in their appeal’). Brown’s act is peppered with references to the tastes, 
values and experiences of his predominantly white, working-class audience: (he refers to 
holidays in the Spanish Costas, or points out what he has just read in The Sun newspaper). 
  
His comedy offers its white working-class English audiences a welcome, a place of refuge, a 
sense of belonging, a space that is simultaneously warmly familiar to those whose faces fit and 
ferociously unforgiving to those whose faces do not (Medhurst, 2007: 194)  
 
Medhurst argues that Brown’s success is particularly grounded in his articulation of the fears 
and experiences of a working class culture increasingly less certain of its status and future.  
He also argues that Brown’s reliance upon ethnic slurs and homophobia can be explained 
(though not excused) through an understanding of Giddens’ concept of ontological security. 
For Giddens, ontological security refers to ‘the confidence that most human beings have in 
the continuity and constancy of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding 
social and material environments’ (2007: 195). This concept has been used to help illuminate 
how understandings of ‘foreignness’ enable citizens to acquire ‘security about their own 
identity, their rightful position in the world and who (or what) poses a danger to them’ 
                                                          
140
 An interview with Jimmy Carr in The Independent neatly touches upon how he perceives his comedy. Carr 
claims ‘I’m quite an edgy comic. I like dark things. So it’s lovely that I’ve found that many people who share 
my sense of humour’. Referring to a series of jokes he has made about wife-beating, the interviewer asks how he 
thinks these jokes would be perceived if Bernard Manning or Jim Davidson told them. Carr replies, ‘I don’t 
want to get into the conversation where I defend myself against comics that a) I don’t rate, and b) I don’t want to 
be compared to. I think the vast majority of my audience recognise a liberal, slightly over-educated man telling 
jokes and playing with what you can and can’t say’. [Online] Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
entertainment/comedy/features/taboobuster-the-dark-side-of-jimmy-carr-1022921.html  (Accessed 03 July 
2014) 
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(Grayson, 2013:390). Medhurst argues that Brown dispenses ontological security to an 
audience whose identities have become less secure due to the pace and fluidity of post-
industrial change. He maintains that Brown’s core audience are ‘that segment of the white 
English working class whose identities were rooted in traditional heavy industries’ (2007: 
195), and who now experience an increasing rootlessness characterised by greater economic 
uncertainty and weakened social, familial and political ties.  
 
However, the contention that Brown offers a ‘sense of belonging…ferociously unforgiving to 
those whose faces do not fit’ (p.194) makes it more difficult to sustain the view that the 
‘provocation of outrage’ (p.190) he engages in with his audience represents an entirely ironic 
persona. For example, his 2009 DVD Too Fat To Be Gay includes a routine about asylum 
seekers in which Brown engages in crude racial stereotyping before inviting his audience to 
clap and sing along to a song about asylum seekers. This is an extract from the song which 
his audience enthusiastically clap along to: 
    
Came across on dustbin lids, 
by the way this is my fifteen kids. 
No security, no need to hide, 
floated in over the tide. 
You advertised on our TV, 
you said everything in Britain was fucking free. 
Sorry for taking the piss, 
you fought two World Wars for this… 
I am asylum seeker, 
we love all of your benefits. 
I am asylum seeker, 
you give us a house, car, money, NHS, and a glimpse of Jordan’s tits. 
 
               (Roy ‘Chubby’ Brown, Too Fat To Be Gay, 2009) 
 
The audience participation in the routine is suggestive of an ‘anthemic’141 response whereby 
approval is expressed for the views expressed by the comic onstage. The routine also 
                                                          
141
 Mintz (1985) used the term ‘anthemic’ in his analysis of audience reactions to a Redd Foxx routine about 
oral sex. Mintz notes that whilst ‘… the older people in the audience gasped, flinched, physically backed away 
while laughing at the punch-lines, and frequently looked at each other nervously’ (p.76) the younger members 
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highlights a notable difference between ‘old school’ Chubby Brown and the ‘new 
offenders’142 of stand-up comedy. The following section of this chapter notices that white 
post-alternative comedians generally remain more guarded in their treatment of race than 
other ‘taboo’ topics, as they do not wish to risk provoking the sort of ‘anthemic’ response 
given here to Brown
143. ‘Edginess’, therefore, requires the ability to know which ‘politically 
incorrect’ viewpoints remain truly unacceptable, and which can be discursively rehabilitated 
and celebrated as outré or transgressive. This ability to know (on the part of both comedian 
and audience) depends upon possession of sufficient levels of cultural capital in order to 
successfully navigate and interpret the rules of the game governing comic discourse
144
.  
 
The acquisition of social and symbolic capital can also allow a comedian to manoeuvre 
confidently between their different personas or identities (including those which involve the 
expression of politically incorrect voices). Social capital (which is accumulated through the 
forming of networks and social connections) allows a comic to utilise their friendships and 
alliances across the media and comedy industries. This might involve networking with 
industry colleagues to secure regular appearances on popular shows, or receiving support 
from colleagues over the use of contentious material.
145
 In general, post-alternative 
comedians appear reluctant to criticise another comic’s material. This may reflect a general 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the audience responded in an ‘anthemic’ manner. ‘They leaned toward Foxx, often applauded, and raised 
their hands or fists as though cheering a political speaker with whom they were in agreement…’ (ibid.). 
142
 The ‘new offenders’ is a reference to the title of a controversial article by the Guardian comedy critic, Brian 
Logan which identifies a ‘new offensiveness’ in modern comedy. The arguments raised by the article are 
explored in the following section of this chapter. [Online] Available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/stage/2009/jul/comedy-standup-new-offenders (Accessed: 21 July 2014). 
143
 For example, a 2009 Guardian interview with Jimmy Carr describes a member of his audience in Margate 
asking him a ‘dubious question about immigration’. The article points out that Carr ‘avoids making a joke and 
says he thinks immigration is a good thing’. [ Online] Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2009/nov/05/jimmy-carr-paralympics-joke  (Accessed 04 July 2014) 
144
 Of course, there are occasions where ‘edgy’ post-alternative comics may also misjudge these rules. Although 
Frankie Boyle was defended by Channel Four over his now infamous Harvey Price joke (examined in detail in 
part 6.4.2 of this chapter) he did face a considerable public backlash over the joke. In 2011, the media regulator, 
Ofcom, upheld complaints against the joke which it ruled had appeared to ‘target and mock mental and physical 
disabilities’. The joke has also been removed from the DVD version of the Tramadol Nights series where it 
originally appeared. 
145
 For example, in 2011 Ricky Gervais provoked criticism for repeatedly using the word ‘mong’ on his Twitter 
feed. When challenged, he spoke out against the ‘humourless PC brigade’ and argued that the term is now used 
to refer to someone who is ‘ignorant’, rather than as a slur against people with Down’s syndrome. [Online] 
Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/15365744 (Accessed 05 July 2014) In an interview with Metro 
newspaper, Jimmy Carr defended Gervais stating that, ‘he’s always been edgy so I don’t understand what the 
fuss is about. It’s always someone’s turn. I am never offended by anything. As long as it’s a joke it’s fine’.  
[Online] Available at http://metro.co.uk/2011/11/25/jimmy-carr-ricky-gervais-saying-mong-is-just-him-being-
edgy-as-usual-233546/ (Accessed 05 July 2014)    
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wariness of censoriousness, although it is also suggestive of the clubbable nature of the 
comedy world
146
. 
 
Bourdieu referred to symbolic capital as ‘the acquisition of a reputation for competence and 
an image of respectability and honourability’ (1984:291). He saw symbolic capital as 
dispensed to individuals through their ownership of symbolic markers; such as the acquisition 
of a respected qualification, or prestigious job title. An ‘old school’ comic like Chubby 
Brown attracts low levels of symbolic capital. Meanwhile, Jimmy Carr has acquired 
numerous comedy awards which have bolstered his reputation as both an entertaining and a 
critically respected comic
147. More generally, Carr’s high media profile as a popular stand-up 
and TV host lends his comedy a degree of social approval and credibility. (In other words, his 
ironic persona is buttressed by his possession of symbolic capital: if he truly meant some of 
the politically incorrect things he says it is assumed he would not be so critically acclaimed, 
or appear so frequently on TV). Furthermore, Carr’s self-identification as a ‘liberal’ (with 
respect to his non-comedic identity) also constitutes a valuable form of symbolic capital
148
. 
This thesis will address in depth the assertion that irony has emerged as ‘the get out of jail 
free card’ (Finding, 2010:113) for content which might otherwise be subject to ethical 
scrutiny. However, this section of the chapter also suggests that the assertion of a liberal-
left
149
 identity may act in a similar way to dismiss the notion that a comedian could possibly 
mean the politically incorrect things that they say (unlike, for example, the Conservative 
voting Jim Davidson). The assertion of a liberal identity, therefore, becomes a symbolic 
                                                          
146
 However, it is also worth recognising that some comics do break rank, and have criticised particular content 
or trends within comedy. For instance, comedian Richard Herring wrote a blog in which he criticised Gervais 
for his repeated use of the word ‘mong’, and argued that disabilist language should be viewed as akin to racist 
language. [Online]  Available at http://metro.co.uk/2011/11/28/richard-herring-ricky-gervais-mong-comments-
just-werent-funny-235189/ (Accessed 05 July 2014).  Some veteran comedians from the alternative comedy era 
have also expressed their discomfort with particular trends within comedy. For instance in a 2009 interview in 
the Guardian, Jo Brand refers to the ‘new wave of misogyny going on in comedy’. [Online] Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2009/apr/09/question-time-jo-brand (Accessed 14 July 2014) 
147
 In 2002 Jimmy Carr was nominated for the comedy Perrier award. He was also named best stand-up at the 
Time Out Awards in 2003 and at the Laftas in 2004. After winning the Royal Television Society Award for best 
on-screen newcomer in 2003 he soon became one of the main faces of Channel 4 and BBC comedy. 
148
 A 2009 Guardian interview describes how ‘despite his non-PC stage persona, he calls himself an “uber-
liberal”’. [Online] Available at http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2009/nov/05/jimmy-carr-paralympics-joke 
(Accessed 15 July 2014)  
149
 By ‘liberal-left’ I mean to refer very broadly to having an identification with left leaning political principles 
(such as support for greater economic or social equality). In practice, this thesis recognises that this may 
incorporate a fairly vague or loose set of identifications. For example, someone who confesses a ‘left-wing’ or 
‘liberal’ identity might possess a strong commitment to racial equality, yet hold less concern for debates 
surrounding gender or sexuality.  
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marker which carries with it the assumption that enlightened attitudes lie behind the 
‘ironically’ homophobic or sexist jokes.  
 
This suggests that the modern edgy comic has greater capital at their disposal with which to 
shift between their nominally ‘PC’ and ‘non-PC’ identities than the ‘obviously 
unenlightened’ and ‘pre-PC’ Jim Davidson or Chubby Brown. This is also further 
complicated whereby post-alternative comics (such as Frankie Boyle) engage in humour 
which incorporates both broader political or satirical concerns (involving jokes that target 
powerful figures or institutions which invariably ‘kick up’); together with jokes that rest upon 
soft targets which ‘kick down’. The audience of a Frankie Boyle gig is generally credited 
with the cultural capital to navigate and distinguish between his ‘ironic’ jokes and those 
which dare to ‘speak plainly’ and non-ironically, about political corruption or injustice. 
However: 
 
Audiences can’t always be expected to know (or even be interested in) the intentions behind a 
contentious joke, and in the ‘ironic’ climate comedy now resides in, it’s easy enough for 
comedians to make mistaken claims regarding their intentions. (Hunt, 2013b:229) 
 
Crucially, the Chubby Brown audience are assumed to be ‘anthemic’ or approving when they 
clap or cheer a racist or homophobic joke; whilst the audience of an ‘edgy’ comic who 
ridicules ‘chavs’ or the disabled are  assumed to be discerning enough to appreciate that these 
are ‘just jokes’ and that the comedian has ‘no agenda’150. In practice, however, it is difficult 
to draw conclusive or generalised judgements about the relationship between jokes and the 
values or beliefs of a comic’s core audience. However, class and possession of cultural 
capital underpin our assumptions about ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ politically incorrect 
utterances. Hunt argues that it seems as if ‘middle-class offence is ‘challenging’’ whilst 
‘working-class offensive comedy is equated with ignorance’ (2013b:226). In a similar vein, it 
appears that the cultural capital accrued by the modern edgy comic permits him/her to engage 
in illiberal utterances which might otherwise be subject to popular censure or greater critical 
scrutiny.  
 
 
                                                          
150
 The view that comedy is ‘just jokes’ with ‘no agenda’ is a reference to the quote from Jimmy Carr included 
at the start of this chapter. 
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6.4   Making sense of ‘edgy’ comedy and the ‘new offensiveness’  
 
6.4.1 Identifying the ‘new offensiveness’ in British comedy 
 
This section of the chapter seeks to account for the popularity of some of the humour 
explored by this part of the thesis. In particular, it examines what has been described as a 
‘new offensiveness’ (Logan: 2009) within some forms of contemporary comedy. This term 
was coined in an article by the Guardian comedy critic, Brian Logan, and generated some 
controversy including a reproach from one of the ‘offending’ comedians named in the 
article
151
. Regardless of the disputatious nature of the arguments made, the Logan article 
nevertheless highlighted a tangible trend (observed in the previous sections of this chapter) 
towards what is variously described as ‘offensive’, ‘edgy’ or ‘politically incorrect’ comedy; 
labels which are applied in popular and journalistic discourse to a number of successful 
comics including Ricky Gervais, Frankie Boyle and Jimmy Carr
152
. These are somewhat 
ambiguous and imprecise labels which have been used as a way of classifying an eclectic 
range of comedians and types of comedy. However, what these types of comedy typically 
share is; firstly, a proclivity for the provocation of offence as a consequence of discussion of 
the ‘taboo’, and secondly, a repositioning of comedic discourse surrounding matters of race, 
gender, sexuality and disability. More generally, Hunt (2010a:181-182) has identified the 
relationship between offensiveness and British comedy as having become eminently 
newsworthy in recent years following the ‘new sensitivity’ created by ‘Sachsgate’153 in 2008.  
                                                          
151
 In ‘The New offenders of Stand-up Comedy’ Logan argues that ‘a world where all the bigotries and the 
misogyny you thought had been banished forever from mainstream entertainment have made a startling 
comeback’. [Online] Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/stage/2009/jul/comedy-standup-new-offenders 
(Accessed: 21 April 2014). Comedian Richard Herring replied to the article in a piece also published by the 
Guardian. In ‘There isn’t a “New Offensiveness”’ Herring argued Logan had used a quote from his live show 
out of context. The quote that ‘racists have a point’ was, he argued, in fact a prelude to a critique of racism. 
[Online]. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/stage/2009/jul/31/richard-herring-standup-comedian-brian-
logan. (Accessed: 16 May 2014) 
152
 Edgy comedy is often particularly associated with stand-up comedy, possibly because fewer restrictions are 
placed upon the content of live stand-up performances. However, both Frankie Boyle and Jimmy Carr have also 
achieved considerable success on panel shows broadcast on the BBC and Channel 4, and Ricky Gervais 
achieved mainstream popularity through his co-authorship, co-production and appearance in the BBC sitcom 
The Office. 
153
 In 2008, during an episode of Radio 2’s Russell Brand, Russell Brand and Jonathan Ross were broadcast 
leaving a number of answer-phone messages for the actor Andrew Sachs. The messages made explicit 
references to Brand having had sex with Sachs’s granddaughter. The episode generated huge controversy 
(including 42000 complaints to the BBC).  In the wake of ‘Sachsgate’ Brand and Radio 2 controller, Lesley 
Douglas, resigned and Ross was suspended by the BBC for three months. Hunt argues that ‘Sachsgate’ 
contributed to a heightened public and media sensitivity towards ‘offensive’ jokes and ‘edgy’ comedians 
(2010:183-184).  
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Much of the discussion surrounding the ascendancy of edgy comedy in the post-Sachsgate 
era has taken place within journalistic or media discourse (which increasingly also includes 
social media forums such as Twitter or the blogosphere). However, the academic community 
has examined the backlash against PC more broadly in the post-alternative comedy era, 
primarily through analysis of the use of irony or the assumption of ‘knowingness’ as a ‘get 
out of jail free card’ (Finding, 2010:133) or means of deflecting critique of arguably 
questionable content (e.g. see Gill, 2008; Lockyer and Pickering, 2009; Finding, 2010; Perez, 
2013).  This chapter concurs with the view that irony acts as a tool to create a ‘safe place’ 
(Finding, 2010:133) between the comedian and what is being said. However, it will also 
suggest that comics have become increasingly oblique in their use of irony, or confident to 
eschew reliance upon it altogether as a core defence of politically incorrect content.   
 
6.4.2 Is ‘the joking rebel’154subversive or conservative?: Data analysis of ‘edgy’ humour 
 
The nature of irony (including the claims and counter-claims made over its use) is a crucial 
component of any data analysis of the discursive repositioning of comic discourse 
surrounding questions of offence, and/or social stereotyping.  The relationship between irony, 
offence and social stereotyping shares a long history
155
. However, this part of the chapter will 
consider the ways in which modern forms of comedy have become less careful to separate 
humour which ‘kicks up’ from that which ‘kicks down’ and how this has contributed to a 
wider uncertainty around notions of what does and does not constitute offensive content.    
The use of irony as a comedic device cannot be divorced from the context in which a joke is 
told. This context will incorporate a multiplicity of factors including the authorial intention of 
the joke-teller, the heteroglossia of comedic forms used to tell the joke (such as story-telling, 
mimicry or the use of sketches), and the various ways in which an audience experiences and 
interprets the joke. The contextual nature of meaning also complicates any analysis of the 
nature of offensiveness within comedy, including the assertion that irony has become a way 
of deflecting critique of questionable content. Bakhtin’s model of language addresses how the 
meaning of words or utterances arises from the dialogical relationship between two or more 
speakers so that all we say and mean is mediated and revised through our communication 
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 The ‘joking rebel’ is a term used by Billig (2010:209) and is explored in this part of the chapter. 
155
 For example, irony was used as a comedic tool in the 1960s sitcom Till Death Us Do Part to draw attention 
to the racism of the main character, Alf Garnett. The Genealogy chapter of this thesis examines how some of the 
arguments raised in contemporary disputes of offence predate the presence of the language of PC within 
everyday discourse.  
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with others. Meaning is therefore always negotiable and can never be fixed or owned by one 
voice or group. Does the impossibility of neutrality in language, therefore, undermine any 
attempt to make sense of the use of irony and the popularity of edgy forms of comedy? 
This part of the chapter argues that Bakthinian dialogism can help us explore the struggles 
over meaning that take place within comedic discourse; including the ways in which one set 
of associations may conflict with or replace another in the struggle over how a joke or 
comedic performance is understood. It maintains that analysis of these struggles is essential if 
we are to engage meaningfully with the assertion that irony has provided a new voice for 
forms of humour once vilified as problematic; or that this voice has rehabilitated and 
repackaged such humour as ‘edgy’ or ‘transgressive’. 
 
The Bakhtinian concept of ‘double-voiced discourse’ (Bakhtin, 1935:40 cited in Vice, 
1997:22-23) suggests that different voices may simultaneously occupy a joke or comedic 
routine through the use of irony. In this respect, the comedian is granted licence to engage 
mischievously with politically incorrect utterances through interplay between conflicting PC 
and non-PC voices. For example, the following extract is taken from the BBC situation 
comedy The Office. In it, the character (Gareth) acknowledges the importance of sensitivity 
with regard to the use of offensive words only to fail to notice his own insensitivity. 
 
That’s it, see. A lot of people can’t keep up with what words are acceptable these days and 
what words aren’t. It’s like my Dad, for example, he’s not as cosmopolitan or as educated as 
me, and it can be embarrassing, you know? He doesn’t understand all the new trendy words, 
like, he’ll say “poofs” instead of  “gays”, “birds” instead of “women”, “darkies” instead of 
“coloureds”.                                                                   (The Office, Series 2, BBC, 2002) 
 
Whilst the use of double-voiced discourse in this context relies upon politically incorrect 
language, the irony arises from Gareth’s own ignorance about his use of offensive language 
despite his attempts to be PC.  In this respect, the humour does not ‘kick down’ or suggest a 
rejection of principles like anti-racism or anti-sexism.  Indeed, irony continues to be used as a 
device within comedy in order to draw attention to racism or sexism, often through the 
ridicule of racist or sexist voices within a particular joke or routine.   
 
The myriad of ways in which double-voiced discourse is deployed (together with the 
different readings this exposes comedy to), can cloud or obfuscate the distinction between 
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humour which critiques and draws attention to bigotry, and that which condones it. Logan 
(2009) described the new offensiveness as directing today’s comedians away from the 
principle implanted by alternative comedy which held that particular groups should not be 
denigrated, or that comedians should avoid negative social stereotyping. He gave various 
examples in ‘The New Offenders of Stand-Up Comedy’ to his to illustrate his point, although 
not all of these suggest that the discursive shift he describes represents a return to the pre-
alternative comedy era of humour which ‘kicks down’156.  Humour which is evoked within 
popular discourse as ‘edgy’ or ‘politically incorrect’ may not, therefore, necessarily indicate a 
rejection of principles like anti-racism or anti-sexism, and irony continues to be a tool 
through which racism or sexism can be exposed or ridiculed rather than excused and 
rehabilitated.  
 
Does this, therefore, undermine the assertion that the ‘old’ offensiveness has re-grouped or 
re-emerged in the 21
st
 century as ‘edgy’ or ‘ironic’? The jokes used as data in this section of 
the chapter suggest that edgy comedy has, in actuality, emerged as a signifier for a polyphony 
of comic voices.  Some of these voices may share a preoccupation with purportedly ‘taboo’ 
topics, or a willingness to engage with contentious arguments surrounding matters like race 
or sexuality. However, their propensity to ‘direct their comic aggression at those who are in 
positions of power and authority, or at those who are relatively powerless and subordinated’ 
(Littlewood and Pickering, 1998:293) varies considerably.   
 
For example, the following segment is taken from a live performance by Jimmy Carr in 
which Carr begins by explicitly drawing attention to the offensive nature of his jokes. He 
appears to delight in ‘the word with the sideways glance’ (Bakhtin, 1984a:249) in which his 
politically incorrect voice interacts with another voice that displays a candid awareness of 
this incorrectness:   
 
The most common question after a show is what’s the most offensive joke…. now I don’t 
think I can tell you the most offensive joke because I think offence is taken not given…. 
Different people take offence at different things. So I can’t tell you what the most offensive 
joke is….but we could see (audience laughs) We could start gentle and work our way up and 
see at what stage as an audience you go – oh for fuck’s sake! (audience laughs) Do you want 
                                                          
156
 Most notably, Logan’s article quotes a line out of context from Richard Herring’s Hitler Moustache show 
(2009-2010). The quote that ‘racists have a point’ is actually used in the show as a starting point for a lengthy 
critique of racism. 
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to give it a go? (audience claps and cheers).......people say that dolphins are really 
intelligent…I think yeah but only compared to the retarded kids we’ve gone swimming with 
(audience laughs, and Carr continues)…..The next joke is just a simple piece of wordplay, 
it’s a turn on a very common phrase. The joke isn’t about what the joke is about if you follow 
me – you know it’s going to be offensive if it comes with a warning before-hand….They say 
there’s safety in numbers – yeah? tell that to six million Jews…(audience laughs and 
claps)…Really London? Really? A round of applause? (Carr uses the tone of his voice to 
suggest incongruity at the audience response)….        (Jimmy Carr: Telling Jokes, 2009) 
 
This example is less obviously interested in using irony as a way of critiquing or exposing 
social stereotypes, and is more demonstrative of what comedian Stewart Lee has described as 
the rise of the ‘professionally offensive comedian’ (O’Hagan, 2009:3 cited in Hunt, 
2010b:201).  The extract also sits neatly with Finding’s description of irony as the reliable 
‘get out of jail free card’ (2010:133). Many of the jokes used by Carr throughout this live 
performance suggest how content once thought of as regressive or problematic (or merely 
old-fashioned) retains the potential to be reawakened and discursively repositioned as ‘edgy’ 
through use of ‘the word with the sideways glance’(Bakthin,1984a:249)157.  However, in the 
aforementioned extract Carr frames his incorrectness very carefully.  Despite his use of 
politically incorrect language, Carr pointedly makes clear that he (and by implication his 
audience) are fully aware of the offensive nature of what is being said. For instance, he 
responds to his audience with emphatic incredulity when they clap a joke about the 
Holocaust.  
 
The contemporary edgy comic is protected by their ‘sideways glance’ which reassures us that 
fundamentally s/he ‘knows better’ than the ‘old’ offensiveness of the past.  However, should 
edgy humour necessarily be understood in this way? In December 2010, Channel Four 
broadcast an episode of Tramadol Nights, a show containing a mixture of sketches and stand-
up comedy, created by and starring Frankie Boyle.  The show included the following joke: 
 
Apparently Jordan and Peter Andre (Katie Price’s ex-husband) are still fighting each other 
over custody of Harvey. Well eventually one of them will have to lose and have to keep him 
(audience laughs) I have a theory that Jordan married a cage fighter (Alex Reid, Katie Price’s 
second husband) because she needed someone strong enough to stop Harvey from fucking her 
(audience laughs).                                                 (Tramadol Nights, Channel Four 2010) 
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 Telling Jokes includes jokes on topics such as disability, rape, paedophilia and wife-beating.  
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The joke attracted considerable controversy and media attention (its high profile partly 
sustained by the offence experienced and expressed by Harvey’s parents)158. It is also an 
example of edgy comedy as both a taboo-breaker and vehicle for repositioning comic 
discourse surrounding matters such as disability. This repositioning also includes some 
unsettling of conventions around the use of insider and outsider humour
159
.  Although 
outsider humour has withstood the post-alternative comedy era, comic discourse has 
generally incorporated a willingness to tread carefully so as to avoid denigration of ‘the 
Other’. This joke, however, appears to disregard this willingness160.  
 
The joke is also harder to immediately recognise as the word of the author ‘with the sideways 
glance’. This is because any use of irony as a means of distancing comedian or audience from 
what is being said must be assumed to take place outside of the joke itself. In other words, 
because ‘we all know’ targeting a disabled child is reprehensible, the joke acquires its ironic 
edge. Irony, therefore, becomes less of a comic device built around the actual telling of a joke 
and more of an assumed state of mind. Crucially, this understanding of the use of irony rests 
entirely upon this assumption without which the joke becomes indistinguishable from the ‘old 
offensiveness’ of jokes which unambiguously kicked downwards. The obvious question this 
provokes is can we really be certain everyone shares the preferred ‘ironic’ reading of the 
joke? 
 
Unlike the extract taken from Telling Jokes, the Harvey Price joke is confident enough to by-
pass any ironic framing as a part of the joke-telling process. This thesis, therefore, describes 
                                                          
158
 Harvey Price has a condition known as septo-optic dysplasia, which makes him blind. He is also autistic, 
gains weight easily and finds walking difficult. After Channel 4 repeated the episode of Tramadol Nights Katie 
Price stated that, ‘Channel 4 are embracing and exploiting discrimination. They are saying it is ok to ridicule 
people – even children – for disability in a way they would not dare over race or sexual orientation’. [ see  
http://www.standard.co.uk/showbiz/katie-price-slams-repeat-of-frankie-boyle-show-with-joke-about-son-
6546250.html ] 
(Accessed  01/06/2014) 
159
 In Humour Studies, insider humour is used to refer to jokes told by members of a particular group which 
draw upon the shared experiences of that group, and may incorporate some use of social stereotyping as a 
consequence. Meanwhile, outsider humour includes jokes told by those external to the group being targeted. 
(Billig, 2010a:194) 
160
 Boyle has been reported as defending the joke on the grounds that it intended to highlight Katie Price’s use 
of her son for publicity. However, he also added (in a reference to Harvey’s blindness) ‘there’s no way Harvey 
was watching the joke’.   [Online] Available at 
http://www.chortle.co.uk/news/2011/03/22/13005/frankie_boyle_stands_firm_over_harvey_gag (Accessed 03 
June 2014) 
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the joke as an example of anti-political correctness in that it celebrates politically incorrect 
utterances simply by virtue of their expression. Confusingly, a comedian may switch between 
anti-political correctness and more carefully constructed ironic joke-telling so that the 
struggle over meaning within a comedic routine or repertoire becomes more abstruse and 
contestable. For instance, Hunt argues that “Bigot’ would be an inappropriate word for 
Boyle’ as ‘like a lot of comedians he challenges some dominant political positions and 
reinforces others’ (2010b:219-220).  However, using the distinction between humour which 
‘kicks up’ and that which ‘kicks down’, the following jokes from Carr and Boyle opt to kick 
down, demonstrating how the old offensiveness morphs into the new: 
 
Why are they called Sunshine Variety Coaches when all the kids on them look the fucking 
same?                                                               (Laughter Therapy Tour, Jimmy Carr, 2011) 
 
My Grandad’s one of those people who can make you laugh just by reading a telephone 
directory. He’s a spastic.                                       (Tramadol Nights, Channel Four, 2010) 
 
Edgy comics are increasingly willing to detach irony from the joke-telling process or to rely 
upon other ways of justifying controversial content (such as the defence of material on the  
grounds of free speech or ‘the right to offend’).161  Furthermore, there appears to be a 
rejection of the interconnectedness between the comic and non-comic world which this 
chapter observes as having contributed to the desire to move away from racist or sexist 
humour in the 1980s. Alternative comedy had emerged from a position which viewed the 
language of comedy as an important shaper and reflector of wider beliefs and attitudes. 
However, today’s post-alternative comic may appear to reject this interconnectedness, or 
view humour as occupying a distinct space from our ‘non-comic’ or ‘formal’ selves162. These 
features of the ‘post-PC’ comedy world - together with the appetite for anti-PC rhetoric 
within popular discourses - have contributed to a new uncertainty over how racist or sexist 
humour should be viewed.  
                                                          
161
 For example, Jimmy Carr describes his comedy as ‘just jokes’. He also argues that any subject should be ‘up 
for grabs’ in comedy and that ‘some people just like being offended’.  [Online] Available at  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/celebritynews/8916298/Jimmy-Carr-defends-joke-about-handicapped-
children.html   ]   (Accessed 06 June 2014) 
162
 This view of comedy has been endorsed by Jimmy Carr in various interviews. His defence of Ricky 
Gervais’s repeated use of the word ‘mong’ argues ‘I am never offended by anything. As long as it’s a joke it’s 
fine’. [Online] Available at http://metro.co.uk/2011/11/25/jimmy-carr-ricky-gervais-saying-mong-is-just-him-
being-edgy-as-usual-233546/ (Accessed 15 July 2014).   The quote from Carr used at the start of this chapter 
also claims that his comedy has ‘no message…I am not preaching to you – I am trying to make you laugh’.  
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We are uncertain about how to register the offence without seeming to lack a sense of humour, 
or without inviting the accusation of being moralistic, intolerant or – in what is now an 
uninspected term of condemnation – politically correct. No one wants to be judged in this 
way. (Lockyer and Pickering, 2009:5) 
 
One explanation for the popularity of comics such as Jimmy Carr or Frankie Boyle is 
attributed, ironically, to the success of political correctness. Undoubtedly, the racist or 
homophobic jokes of the 1970s were told in a different socio-political context than the 
politically incorrect jokes of today. Shifting social attitudes, together with the gains accrued 
by formal or legislative change has contributed to the view that some of the most important 
battles against social inequalities have now been won. (Therefore, if we know that sexism is 
wrong then sexist jokes become ‘just jokes’ and lose their power to be problematic). This 
view has developed alongside a popular backlash against PC in which our lives are felt to be 
increasingly governed by an overarching and hegemonic PC culture. This culture is viewed as 
driven by an excessive fear of causing offence and underwritten by a new politics or policing 
of language. This is also an understanding of PC which enables the new offensiveness within 
comedy to position itself as a playful alternative to ‘PC officialdom’ and a potentially 
subversive voice that dares to ‘say the unsayable’.   
 
Humour ...challenges our closely held values and beliefs, subverts existing moral proprieties 
and bares its backside to prim decency and serious demeanours…If one of the major purposes 
of satire is to dish the dirt, complaining about this is to miss the point, to surrender your sense 
of humour for a sanctimonious position on the moral high ground, to appear to be ‘clean’ and 
‘correct’. To say that certain topics or targets are not appropriate for satirical ridicule or attack 
is to invite such ridicule and attack…(Lockyer and Pickering, 2001:648) 
 
Bakhtin’s notion of the carnival provides a useful metonym for the exploration of today’s 
edgy comedy as a subversive and transgressive form of expression. In Rabelais and his 
World (1984a) Bakhtin identifies the carnival as a space temporarily granted in the medieval 
period by religious and civil authority in which public laughter and irreverent celebration of 
the profane was given free license.  Central to the comic state described by Bakhtin was a 
separation between official culture, which was underpinned by the power of the church and 
civil society, and the unofficial culture of the carnival which was based around the collective 
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underbelly of the people. Bakhtin describes official ‘medieval ideology’ as determined by a 
‘tone of icy petrified seriousness’ which he states was assumed to be ‘the only tone to express 
the true, the good, and all that was essential and meaningful’ (1984a:73). Meanwhile, the 
carnival provided ‘a completely different, nonofficial, extraecclesastical and extrapolitical 
aspect of the world, of man and of human relations’ (1984a:6). Above all, it offered an 
alternative to (or temporary release from) the seriousness and constrictions imposed by the 
official culture of the day.  
 
Rather than reflecting a return to the ‘old offensiveness’ of the past, can the jokes used here 
as data be viewed as providing a carnivalesque release from the seriousness and authority 
imposed by our ‘official culture’?  If PC is regarded as determining this official culture 
(including how we regulate our social selves through our everyday discourse and behaviour) 
then politically incorrect utterances act as a counterweight to this; forming part of a ‘second 
world and a second life outside officialdom’(1984a:6) which is ‘organised on the basis of 
laughter’(p.8). Central to the Bakhtinian view of the second world is the democratised and 
participatory nature of the carnival in which social hierarchies are suspended, including ‘all 
the forms of terror, reverence, piety and etiquette connected with it - that is, everything 
resulting from socio-hierarchical inequality or any other form of inequality among 
people’(Bakhtin, 1984b:123). The Bakhtinian view of our ‘second life outside officialdom’ 
also complements the perception of PC as a phenomenon largely imposed upon people by a 
ruling authoritarian minority who remain detached from the majority; a view reinforced by 
the use and ubiquity of popular phrases such as ‘liberal elite’, ‘metropolitan elite’ or ‘PC 
brigade’. The carnival, therefore, permits people to temporarily dispense with the rules 
imposed upon them by governing officialdom (or in discourses of PC, the ‘liberal elite’) and 
offers an alternative construction of social relations driven by the collective will of the 
people.  
 
In 1911 Bergson suggested that ‘it seems that laughter needs an echo. Our laughter is always 
the laughter of a group’(p.5).  Comedy is often enjoyed through the shared experience of a 
live performance which reinforces a view of laughter as a collective or unifying experience. 
(All of the Jimmy Carr jokes used in this chapter are taken from live shows and the series 
Tramadol Nights was recorded in front of a studio audience who are included in the stand-up 
segments of the series). In the carnival, laughter is typically shared in the location of the 
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marketplace: a site of free and uncensored communication where there is no separation 
between participants and spectators. 
 
The carnivalesque crowd in the marketplace or in the streets is not merely a crowd. It is the 
people as a whole, but organised in their own way, the way of the people. It is outside of and 
contrary to all existing forms of the coercive socioeconomic and political organisation, which 
is suspended for the time of the festivity (Bakhtin, 1984:255) 
  
The shared laughter of a comedy performance, therefore, echoes the experience of the crowd 
in the marketplace, and allows the comedian and audience to occupy a space that playfully 
flouts the rules and speech codes of our PC world. However, such an understanding rests 
upon an acceptance of politically incorrect humour as necessarily anti-authoritarian or 
subversive, and of edgy jokes as fundamentally inclusionary rather than exclusionary.  
 
Whilst Bakhtin argues that ‘laughter only unites’ (1986:135) he nevertheless distinguished 
between the ‘joyful, open festive laugh’ and the ‘closed, purely negative satirical 
laugh’(ibid). Laughter for Bakthin was joyful if it mocked authority and officialdom but 
negative when it served these interests. The data sources used in this chapter which target 
disability do not choose to mock authority. Furthermore, the evocation of political correctness 
enables humour which ‘kicks down’ to acquire an edgy or subversive veneer despite this. 
Such humour tends to reflect or reinforce, rather than challenge prevailing power structures 
whilst simultaneously positioning itself as rebellious or anti-authoritarian. Billig is 
particularly critical of what he describes as the ‘preference for rebellion over discipline’ 
(210:200) within theoretical models of humour. In other words, he rejects an understanding 
of humour as inherently positive, anarchic or liberating. Instead, he argues that laughter and 
ridicule perform a disciplinary function through which social life is regulated and our values 
more often than not reinforced rather than challenged (for example, ridicule is a particularly 
effective means of proscribing forms of behaviour as socially unacceptable). His description 
of ‘the joking rebel’ (p.209) is particularly illuminating in light of the contemporary fashion 
for edgy comics:  
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The position of the joking rebel is a valued one. It is much celebrated in the entertainment 
products of the media. These products do not encourage their audiences to become rebels in an 
absolute sense, for their rebelliousness conforms to the standards of the times (Billig, 
2010:209) 
 
The edgy comedian is invariably celebrated in popular culture as the untameable outlaw or 
‘taboo-breaker’ (Hunt, 2010a:182): (s)he is the spokesperson for all of those opposed to the 
ideological straitjacket imposed by a PC establishment. However, Billig’s contention that the 
joking rebel in fact ‘conforms to the standards of the time’ (2010:209) forces us to think more 
closely about where the parameters of acceptable comic discourse actually lie. This section of 
the chapter has chosen to draw heavily upon jokes about disability as this has emerged as one 
of key ‘taboo-breaking’ topics associated with edgy comedy and the new offensiveness. 
Although the new offensiveness has emerged around a more general discursive repositioning 
of comic discourse (also encompassing matters like race, gender or sexuality) it is notable 
that ‘edgy’ comics appear more comfortable with some ‘taboo-breaking’ topics and 
transgressions than others; and that this is particularly true with regard to jokes which remove 
irony from the joke-telling process itself (such the Harvey Price joke).  For example, such 
jokes may incorporate the targeting of ‘chavs’, as well as homophobia and sexism (including 
a fashion in recent years for misogynistic rape jokes). However, edgy comedians tread more 
carefully around the topic of race, where they are more likely to carefully construct and 
signpost their ironic persona in order to keep a clear distance between the comedian and their 
politically incorrect utterances
163
. Mintz (1985:76) described how a joke may illicit different 
responses from an audience, including the ‘anthemic’ response which is approving of the 
sentiments expressed by the comic on stage. Hunt (2010a) also notes that whilst many 
controversial white male comedians are willing to project sexist or homophobic personas to 
an audience, they ‘will not risk an ‘anthemic’ response to racially sensitive material’ (p.183).  
 
This is important because it suggests that the rebelliousness of the edgy comedian takes place 
within certain parameters of which s/he is aware and which in this sense adhere to ‘the 
                                                          
163 In his study of stand-up comedy and the nature of offence, Sturges argues that, ‘Stand-up comedians, despite 
their own sense that they defy restriction and popular perception of their material as often offensive, do monitor 
their material for potential offence. They assess the extent of offence and modify their performances in 
response. In some cases they apply personal formulae to this process’ (2010:279) After having observed stand-
up performances and conducted informal interviews with comedians as part of his study, he also states that, 
‘possibly the most consistent message that the comedians offered was that they regarded race as a topic that 
must be touched on with sensitivity and offence avoided’ (p.286). 
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standards of the time’ (Billig, 2010:209). (It is also worth reiterating that despite the ‘outlaw’ 
status of the ‘edgy’ comedian; all of the comics named and used in this section of the chapter 
are TV-friendly performers who sit firmly within the comedy mainstream). Comedians may 
be less willing to risk an ‘anthemic’ response to racially sensitive material because they view 
racism as more serious than other transgressions. However, this undermines the assertion that 
‘we all know’ edgy jokes are ‘just jokes’ or ‘ironic’; and cannot  adequately account for why 
disabilist jokes do not risk pandering to bigotry in the same way as racist jokes.  
 
6.4.3 Summary and conclusions 
 
What, therefore, is the significance of the enduring appeal of politically incorrect forms of 
discourse? In order to answer this question this chapter has categorised humour which targets 
historically disadvantaged groups and/or deploys negative social stereotyping as evidence of 
politically incorrect discourse. The thesis argues that the rules of the game governing comic 
discourse have become increasingly grounded in who is saying something, as well as what, or 
how something is said. In this respect, the ‘incorrect’ utterances of pre-PC comics such as 
Jim Davidson or Chubby Brown remain overwhelmingly detached from and rejected by our 
mainstream media. However, this chapter also rejects the idea that ‘old school’ comedians 
have been usurped by a liberal or PC consensus within British comedy in the 21
st
 century.  
Instead, it argues that the expression of politically incorrect language and viewpoints 
becomes legitimised through possession of cultural capital resources; and that, ironically, 
these resources may include the symbolic capital attached to a comedian or audience who are 
assumed (rather than demonstrated) to share a broadly liberal sensibility. Bourdieu (1990:54) 
describes how our tastes and perceptions are habitually formed through our regular 
experiences, or habitus.  Our habitus will, therefore, condition our tastes and perceptions of 
comedy, thereby granting the post-alternative comic permission to engage in ‘edginess’.  
However, we have no easy way of ascertaining whether, and to what extent, an audience 
accepts or rejects the illiberal utterances and viewpoints expressed by a comedian, 
irrespective of whether we perceive the comedian as ‘old school’ and regressive or ‘edgy' and 
challenging.  
 
Of course, the ‘acceptable offensiveness’ of the modern edgy comic is also legitimised 
through how something is said and rests largely upon the use and assumption of irony.  This 
chapter has explored how the assertion of irony grants legitimacy to various forms of 
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politically incorrect humour. In view of this, how should we understand the popularity of 
such humour; particularly in view of its enduring appeal in the post-alternative comedy 
world? This thesis argues that edgy comedy has emerged as a signifier for a polyphony of 
comic voices. These voices include: (i) those which critique or draw attention to various 
social issues, taboos or inequalities (such as the mocking of Gareth’s use of politically 
incorrect language in the extract taken by this chapter from The Office); (ii) those that build 
irony into a joke or performance to deflect critique of politically incorrect utterances (such as 
the segment used from Telling Jokes); and (iii) those which engage in an unambiguous 
celebration of politically incorrect utterances (such as the material selected from Tramadol 
Nights).  A performance may also switch between comic voices, making any overarching 
reading of a particular routine more difficult to obtain. A further factor which sits somewhat 
awkwardly next to the assertion of irony as a ‘get out of jail free card’164 (Finding, 2008) for 
otherwise questionable content, is the reputation of the modern edgy comic as a straight 
talking ‘truth teller’ who bravely defies political correctness. If politically incorrect content 
can be defended on the grounds of both ‘irony’ and straight-talking ‘honesty’ then 
interpreting the ‘true’ meaning of such content becomes yet more indiscernible.  
 
The popularity of the jokes examined by this chapter is not, therefore, reducible to one 
particular meaning or a single set of associations.  Consequently, this thesis cautions against 
viewing humour described in popular or journalistic discourse as ‘politically incorrect’, 
‘edgy’ or ‘offensive’ as necessarily comparable with the derogatory humour typically 
associated with some of the content from the pre-PC comedy era. Indeed, some humour 
identified as ‘politically incorrect’ may actually be more usefully viewed as sharing the 
commitment to anti-racism, or anti-discrimination, now associated with the radicalism of 
alternative comedy
165
. However, the data also suggests that the invocation of political 
correctness enables jokes which would once have been viewed as regressive or conservative 
to be discursively reimagined as transgressive or ‘edgy’. It cautions against viewing comedy 
which unambiguously ‘kicks down’ or chooses its targets carefully so that the ‘rebelliousness 
conforms to the standards of the time’ (Billig, 2010:209) as challenging or carnivalesque.  
 
                                                          
164
 This quote is taken from a Guardian article by Finding, ‘Laughter as a weapon’. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/nov/08/comedy-television (Accessed 11th December 2014) 
165
 For example, Richard Herring’s ‘politically incorrect’ Hitler Moustache (2010) show actually satirised 
racism and prejudice.  
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As our understanding of what might constitute ‘offensive’ humour has become more 
contestable as a consequence of the emergence of ‘edgy’ comedy, it has also become more 
difficult to unequivocally condemn comedy which ‘kicks down’ or relies upon negative 
stereotyping. However, despite this, ‘offensive’ content continues to be met with resistance as 
well as approval. (Resistance might include the response provoked by contentious jokes on 
social media sites; such as the Twitter Storm following Ricky Gervais’s repeated use of the 
word ‘mong’). The ironic climate in which much contemporary comedy resides continues to 
reflect both the subjective nature of offence, and the multiplicity of ways in which ‘politically 
incorrect’ utterances are understood. Our response to ‘offensive’ forms of humour 
(particularly the rise and regularity of the Twitter Storm) is also suggestive of an increasingly 
democratised and participatory discursive space within which the right to offend or to take 
offence has become increasingly elevated.  The following chapter explores our preoccupation 
with disputes of offence through examination of some of these discursive spaces.   
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Chapter 7. Political Cartoons and ‘offensiveness’ 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Martin Rowson. New Humanist. 2007
166
 
https://newhumanist.org.uk/1623 (permission to use granted) 
 
It’s my job, as a satirical cartoonist, to give offence. But I need immediately to qualify that 
statement. I see my job as giving targeted offence, because satire, to borrow H L Mencken’s 
definition of journalism, is about comforting the afflicted and afflicting the comfortable…if I 
draw rude pictures of people less powerful than myself, what I do ceases to be satire, and 
creeps into one of the wider spheres of aggressive, bullying humour and into areas I consider 
offensive. (Martin Rowson, 2009:22) 
  
7.1 Introduction  
The thematic focus of this chapter is the giving and taking of offence on grounds of religious 
belief or identity. In choosing this focus the chapter recognises how offensive language or 
behaviour directed at others on the basis of religious or cultural identity is increasingly 
regarded as comparable to prejudice like racism or homophobia. Indeed, in his exploration of 
anti-immigrant discourse and the tensions caused by the presence of the foreign subject 
within the UK, Grayson describes how ‘the new racism has shifted the terrain…away from 
                                                          
166
 Although this chapter focuses primarily on the giving and taking of offence on religious grounds, the 
response provoked by this cartoon of ‘New Atheist’ writers, Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens, 
illustrates our preoccupation with offence more widely.  Some readers of New Humanist magazine interpreted 
the depiction of Richard Dawkins in the cartoon to be homophobic and the depiction of writer, Christopher 
Hitchens, was also felt by some to be offensive to overweight people.  An online discussion of the offence 
caused by the cartoon is available on the New Humanist website. [Online] Available at: 
http://blog.newhumanist.org.uk/2007/11/new-humanist-cartoon-controversy.html  (Accessed 24
th
 September, 
2014) 
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strict notions of biological inferiority to cultural unsuitability’ (2013:385). In this respect, the 
shifting discursive terrain reflects the increasingly social and political unacceptability of 
biological explanations of the inferiority of different groups. Nevertheless, the various 
sanctions against such explanations - often attributed colloquially today to the emergence of 
‘PC’ - sit within a broader socio-cultural environment in which representational practices 
continue to engage in the ‘Othering’ or stereotyping of different social groups: 
 
The mainstream media, though differentiated by medium, outlet, genre and subject all too 
often produce shocking examples of xenophobic reporting and racist portrayal, while often 
publicly committing to the ideals and practices of an inclusive multi-ethnic, multicultural 
society. (Cottle, 2000:3) 
 
What, therefore, might controversies concerning religious identity contribute to the 
complexities and competing narratives surrounding how different groups are portrayed, or 
how we respond to forms of expression deemed by some to be ‘offensive’ on religious 
grounds or culpable in the production of negative stereotypes of those who share a religious  
affiliation? This chapter uses political cartoons
167
 as data with which to explore our 
preoccupation with ‘offensiveness’, including the competing ideas and positions regarding 
the nature of offence. The thesis will argue that disputes of offence contain an increasingly 
individualised dimension which may be overshadowed by our concern with identity politics 
and group membership.  
 
The chapter begins with an overview of the history and nature of political cartooning and 
explores the idea that we live in a ‘post-secular’ society (Habermas:2008) in order to situate 
the thematic focus of the chapter within an accurate wider socio-cultural context. It then 
undertakes an intertextual analysis of political cartoons using the work of cartoonist, Martin 
Rowson. This section of the chapter uses cartoons which comment upon the relationship 
between religion and broader social or political issues to explore how competing voices and 
identities assert their right to be offended, or to offend. It also examines how imagery 
becomes attached to a ‘floating chain of signifieds’ (Barthes, 1977:39) using cartooning 
commenting on Israel’s actions in the Middle East which has attracted accusations of anti-
Semitism
168
. Finally, this part of the chapter will argue that the methods typically deployed 
                                                          
167
 Section 7.4.3 of the chapter will also use British newspaper editorials which comment on cartooning as data. 
168
 As anti-Semitism refers to hostility towards Jews (who may or may not be religious), it is generally 
recognised as a form of racism rather than purely religious based prejudice. However, hostility to Jews emerged 
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by cartoonists (such as stereotyping through the use of unflattering caricature) has drawn 
cartoons further into the creation (as well reporting) of political discourse.  
 
Following this, the chapter will investigate more closely how cartoons create discourse. 
Firstly, it undertakes a representational analysis of the response in the UK national press to 
the publication of the Muhammad cartoons in the Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten. 
Secondly, it applies Barthesian semiology to the use of imagery in the online Jesus and Mo 
comic strip. The chapter will argue that representational practices have contributed to the 
appearance of polarised and homogenised positions regarding what might constitute 
‘offensiveness’. However, the chapter maintains that these practices deflect our focus from 
the multiplicity of ways in which offence continues to be understood and the diversity of 
voices which compete to be heard within contemporary disputes of offence. 
 
7.2 Political Cartooning and the significance of Religious Identity 
 
7.2.1 The history and nature of cartoon satire 
 
Cartoons appearing in publications such as newspapers, pamphlets and posters have long 
been vehicles for lampooning and satirising religious and political figures, ideas and 
institutions. Political cartooning has been described as ‘an outgrowth of caricature’ (Keane, 
2008:848) - an artistic form associated with the exaggeration or simplification of a character, 
usually in order to produce a satirical or comic imitation. The idea of the cartoon as a satirical 
device, and as a form of social commentary, has an extensive history. For instance, the 
invention of the printing press facilitated the use of cartoon satire by Protestant reformers 
during the Reformation, as images of the Papacy started to appear which made use of 
insulting and defamatory visual puns (see e.g. Hughes, 2010:272-273; Keane, 2008:849)
169
. 
Political cartoons have also been categorised as ‘cartoons of opinion’ (Keane, 2008:849; 
Kemnitz, 1973:82) as they have played an important role in criticising and checking the 
exercise of political and/or religious power. Kemnitz (1973:82) describes this type of cartoon 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
from and remains embedded in religious difference. The Oxford English Dictionary (2012) defines anti-
Semitism as ‘hostility or prejudice against Jews’ (p.27) and a Jew as ‘a member of the people whose traditional 
religion is Judaism and who trace their origins to the ancient Hebrew people of Israel’ (p.390). 
169
 Hughes (2010) describes these visual caricatures as having constituted part of the propaganda war during the 
Reformation. He highlights one example of a cartoon (c.1520) which depicts Pope Leo X as a lion and 
‘Antichrist’ figure. Keane (2008:849) also argues that visual caricatures containing an underlying political 
message have ‘a long and varied history since Martin Luther employed [them] against his opponents’. 
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as a ‘primarily visual means of communicating opinions and attitudes or of “summing up” 
situations; humour may be present but it is not a necessary part of a cartoon of opinion’. 
 
More problematically, cartoons of opinion have also been used to promote racial or religious 
prejudice. Thibodeau (1989:483) asserts that ‘prior to the civil rights movement, a cartoonist 
could probably portray blacks in an openly stereotypic or derogatory fashion with relative 
impunity’. Meanwhile, Goodwin (2001:854) has described the history of anti-Semitic 
cartoons within Europe as responsible for depicting Jews ‘as demons - ugly, lecherous, 
grasping and evil – unlike other humans’. The British caricaturist, George Cruikshank (1792-
1878) is accused by Appel (1971) of having pioneered the graphic caricatures used within 
satirical publications such as Punch or Puck magazine, in which the Irish were ‘pictured with 
the faces of subhuman ‘Celtic gorillas’’ (p.372). Furthermore, this type of caricature was 
often underpinned by an anti-Catholic as well as anti-Irish sentiment. At different points, 
therefore, cartoon satire has both challenged religious and political authority, and reinforced 
negative stereotypes about less powerful racial, ethnic or religious groups. As a visual tool of 
communication, therefore, political cartoons may be used to ‘afflict the comfortable’170  or 
those less powerful.  
 
In 2008, Keane asserted that ‘there is no contemporary official tolerance for racially offensive 
cartoons’ (p.856). This position can be attributed to broader changing societal values which 
have largely rendered the sorts of imagery highlighted by Thibodeau (1989) or Goodwin 
(2001) as no longer acceptable within mainstream media discourse. Nevertheless, political 
cartoons continue to be described in the literature as a politically incorrect form of visual 
communication (see e.g. Emlinger, 2000; Gilmartin and Brunn, 1998:536; Taras, 2008:163; 
Hughes, 2010:274). For example, Gilmartin and Brunn (1998:536) assert that the format of a 
political cartoon invariably enables the expression of viewpoints within mainstream 
publications, such as national newspapers, which would be deemed ‘too extreme, mean 
spirited or “politically incorrect” to verbalise in an editorial essay column’. The left-leaning 
British cartoonist Steve Bell is described by Hughes (2010:274) as disregarding ‘the new 
politically correct notion of lookism: the fact that Brown has a glass eye is often glaringly 
apparent, as was the blindness of David Blunkett’171. Therefore, whilst Keane may be correct 
to point to a general intolerance for racist content, political cartoons nevertheless continue to 
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 This is a reference to the quote from Martin Rowson included at the beginning of this chapter. 
171
 See Figure 4.  
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be appraised for their use of representations which appear in a present-day context to be 
wilfully politically incorrect. 
 
Figure 4. Steve Bell The Guardian 2004 
http://www.theguardian.com/cartoons/stevebell/0,7371,1373351,00.html 
(permission to use granted) 
 
This understanding of political cartoons as ‘non-PC’ is made possible partly through the 
mechanisms employed by cartoonists in order to produce a satirical or critical point. In their 
analysis of newspaper editorial cartoons, Buell and Maus (1988) discuss how ‘exaggeration 
and distortion are the cartoonist’s stock in trade’ (p.847). Although cartoons are capable of 
communicating complex messages about people or events, the medium nevertheless 
generally relies upon crude stereotyping and unflattering representations in order to make a 
comical or political point (see e.g. Buell and Maus, 1988:856; Mazid, 2008:436)
172
. The use 
of humour also often includes a degree of incongruity, so that the serious and unserious are 
deliberately juxtaposed for comedic effect. This ‘stock in trade’ reliance upon distortion, 
stereotypes and the humorous treatment of serious topics leaves cartooning potentially 
exposed to accusations of offensiveness or insensitivity in the treatment of its subject matter, 
including cartoons which are perceived by some to be offensive on religious grounds. 
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 For example, in Buell and Maus’s study of 246 newspaper editorial cartoons during the 1988 US Presidential 
nomination process, they describe the insults conveyed through graphic imagery as containing a level of ‘crudity 
and offensiveness’ (1988:847) that was far less evident within written newspaper editorials or opinion pieces. 
For instance, cartoon caricatures of Democrat candidate, Michael Dukakis, consistently portrayed him as 
‘boring, humourless and short’ whilst written articles focused more directly upon policy issues (p.851).  
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7.2.2 Religious identity, offence and the ‘Post-Secular’ Society 
 
In 2008, Habermas drew attention to how fewer sociologists continued to support the (once 
widely accepted) hypothesis that there was a ‘close linkage between the modernization of 
society and the secularization of the population’ (p.17). It has also been suggested that, 
‘secularization may be valid as a specific process that has been underway in particular social 
settings, but as a meta-narrative of Western history, it fails utterly’ (Aldridge, 2007:65). 
When considering the experience of the affluent societies of Europe which underwent a 
decline in religious observance in the post-war period, Habermas argues that the endurance of 
religious belief within these societies, together with ‘the visible conflicts that flare up in 
connection with religious issues give us reason to doubt whether the relevance of religion has 
waned’ (2008:17). Increasingly, therefore, sociologists have made use of the concept of 
‘post-secularism’ in order to make sense of the ‘return’ of religion within contemporary 
Western societies (see e.g. Harrington, 2007; Bahram, 2013; Bruce, 2013; McLennan, 2010; 
Nickleson and Sharpe, 2014; Nynas, Lassander, and Utrianinen, 2014). 
 
In the UK today, disputes concerning religious identity and religious based claims of offence 
have acquired an increasingly high public profile. It is worth recognising that despite the 
preponderance of sociological theories of secularisation,
173
  the post-war decades also 
witnessed noteworthy controversies arising from these grounds. In 1977, the magazine Gay 
News was found guilty of blasphemy after a private prosecution was brought against it by the 
campaigner Mary Whitehouse
174
. Two years later, the Monty Python film Life of Brian was 
also accused of blasphemy, and was banned by various local authorities on the grounds that it 
was offensive towards Christianity.  However, although these cases opened up impassioned 
discussion over the relationship between religious censorship and free expression, the Gay 
News trial has also been described as bringing to an end prosecutions for blasphemy as a 
means of protecting Christianity from insults (see e.g. Thomas, 2007:347; Allard and 
Hannabus, 1994:19-20). In 1994, Allard and Hannabus suggested that whilst controversies 
over religious based offence would continue to arise in the UK, Christianity no longer exerted 
the authority it once held over matters concerning free speech and artistic expression. In 
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 For example, in 1966, Bryan Wilson had argued that the public sphere was becoming less dependent upon 
religious values, practices or institutions, although religion  still maintained an influence over many people’s 
lives in a privatised capacity. 
174
 Thomas’s study of the history of censorship in modern Britain describes how the trial was held after Mary 
Whitehouse had objected to a poem and illustration published in the magazine about a centurion’s love for 
Christ at the Crucifixion (2008:346-347). 
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particular, they claimed the 1980s had ‘accelerated an entrepreneurial attitude’ towards moral 
values dependent upon ‘individual choice rather than any religious doctrine’ (p.14). 
Furthermore, they asserted that, ‘if faith is regarded as a major referential framework at all, it 
is set within the context of pluralism and a multi-faith theology’ (p.14). 
 
The literature has recognised how media discourse surrounding religion adopted a sharper 
tone following the events associated with the terrorist attacks of September 11
th
 2001
175
 (see 
e.g. Sheridan, 2006; Brenkman, 2007; Habermas, 2008; Ibrahim, 2010; Klug, 2012). Much of 
this has concerned the narrative of conflict between Islam and the West, and has often drawn 
upon the Clash of Civilisations thesis espoused by Huntington (1996) which proposed that in 
the 21
st
 century cultural and religious identities would emerge as the primary source of global 
conflict. Although much discussion has been generated around Islam, various religions have 
become embroiled in controversies regarding the giving and taking of offence. Prominent 
examples include the protests against the BBC decision in 2005 to broadcast Jerry Springer: 
The Opera, a surreal musical which parodied reality TV and Christianity; and the cancellation 
of the play Behzti in 2004 after rioters objected to its depiction of sexual abuse and murder in 
a Sikh temple. These sorts of debates lend weight to Habermas’s suggestion that secularised 
societies can be more usefully described today as ‘post-secular’ as within them ‘religion 
maintains a public influence and relevance, while the secularistic certainty that religion will 
disappear worldwide in the course of modernization is losing ground’ (2008:21). Habermas 
also claims that the successful maintenance of a post-secular society requires a 
‘complementary learning process’ (p.28) involving tolerance and mutual recognition from 
both religious and secular mentalities towards beliefs which they themselves reject. However, 
this also raises the question of how such tolerance and mutual recognition are to be 
maintained in view of a growing plurality and co-existence of religious and cultural 
worldviews. In his discussion of the contemporary intolerance for racist cartoons, Keane 
speculates about whether future generations will share a similar disdain for ‘religiously 
offensive’ (2008:856) content.  However, are cartoons which offend some religious believers 
necessarily comparable to the sorts of racist depictions previously highlighted by this section 
of the chapter? (For example, how might we determine whether a political cartoon which 
portrays a religious figure like the Pope disparagingly, constitutes a form of anti-Catholic 
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 Of course, prior to 9/11, a major event which forced many societies to reconsider how they should deal with 
religious based offence was the fatwa issued against Salman Rushdie in 1989, following the publication of his 
book, The Satanic Verses. Many of the arguments which have proliferated on the nature of religious belief and 
free expression in the 21
st
 century can also be located in the discourse which emanated from this event.  
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prejudice?)  It is therefore worth closely considering how we respond to and make sense of 
images deemed by some to reinforce bigotry towards religious groups or believers.  
 
7.2.3 Religion and Political Cartooning in the 21
st
 century 
 
Much (though not all) of what religious believers have found offensive in recent years has 
appeared in the form of humour, often involving parody or satire of religion. Although 
humour is not an essential ingredient of a political cartoon, most rely upon it in some way in 
order to express a particular viewpoint. In the 21
st
 century, the most notorious example of 
cartoon satire has involved the appearance of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in 
the Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten
176
. The events arising from their publication in 2005 
led to over 200 deaths resulting from global demonstrations against the imagery used, in 
addition to assassination attempts upon the lives of the cartoonists responsible for the 
cartoons.  
 
Controversies arising from political cartoons have become disputatious in part through 
evolving arguments surrounding the relationship between racism and notions of religious 
and/or cultural stereotyping. Levey and Modood (2009) have compared Islamophobia with 
the development of anti-Semitism, arguing that the persecution of Jews was originally 
‘grounded in their religious beliefs and distinct customs’ (ibid:442). 
 
‘Traditional Judeo-phobia became anti-Semitism only in the 19th century as Jews sought to 
fully integrate in western Europe…In understanding racism, what is key here, is not that 
‘blood’ was invoked to exclude or condemn all Jews, but the targeting of all members of the 
Jewish group simply in virtue of their membership’ (Levey and Modood, ibid:442) 
 
Increasingly, cultural and religious groups are viewed as racialized categories. For instance, 
Levey and Modood argue it is possible ‘that Muslims can be the victims of racism qua 
Muslims as well as qua Asians or Arabs or Bosnians’ (p.443). From this perspective, the 
stereotypical depiction of Muslims in cartoons qualifies as evidence of a form of cultural 
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 Two further incidents in 2015 now also form part of the wider notoriety surrounding depictions of 
Muhammad in satirical cartoons. In January 2015 eleven people were shot dead in the offices of the French 
satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo which had previously printed cartoons of the prophet. (The magazine’s office 
had also been the target of a fire-bomb in 2011). Further deaths resulted from a gunman who opened fire in 
Copenhagen in February 2015 at an event discussing free speech. The intended target of the gunman was 
believed to be the cartoonist Lars Vilks who had depicted the prophet Muhammad with the body of a dog in 
2007. 
  148 
racism which targets and demonises all members of the Muslim group (p.443). It is within 
this broader socio-political context that this chapter will consider the relationship between 
‘offensiveness’, cartoons and religious identity. 
 
7.3 Reporting Discourse 
 
7.3.1 The role of the Political Cartoonist 
 
‘Cartoons of opinion’ (Keane, 2008:849) enable a cartoonist to satirise and comment upon 
topical events as they arise. Humourists and cartoonists have long occupied a position 
whereby their use of satire allows them to express strong arguments in ways less readily 
available to political professionals. As Keane argues, some political professionals (such as 
journalists or politicians) are ‘a little in awe of the freedom cartoonists enjoy to commit 
outrages that would read like lunacy in print’ (2008:847).  Meanwhile, Taras claims that, 
‘what is not permitted of the spoken word because of the hegemonic regime of political 
correctness can be indulged in with graphic representations’ (2008:163). Drawing upon the 
work of Martin Rowson (whose cartoons regularly appear in The Guardian newspaper and 
New Humanist magazine) this section of the chapter considers how the meaning of a 
discursive image depends upon its intertextual relationship with other images or texts. In 
doing so it explores the relationship between cartoons and discourses of offence, and 
considers how disputes of offence have facilitated a culture of competing rights.  
 
7.3.2 An intertextual reading of discourses of offence 
 
Kristeva claimed that ‘every text is from the outset under the jurisdiction of other discourses 
which impose a universe on it’ ([1977] cited in Culler, 2002:116). In other words, the 
meaning of an image is produced not only through the relationship between the author and 
their reader(s) but also through the intertextual relationship between an image and other 
images or texts. Rather than confining its focus to the internal structure of a cartoon, this part 
of the chapter therefore, also considers how structure has come into being - or the process of 
‘structuration’ (Kristeva [1970] cited in Coward and Ellis, 1977:52).  
 
Some instances of intertexuality within cartoons involve the direct use or appropriation of 
familiar cultural works – such as films, paintings or literature. For example, figure 5 alludes 
to one of the best known images in Western art: Michelangelo’s depiction of God reaching 
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out to touch Adam. In figure 5, Adam is replaced by the high-profile atheist and evolutionary 
biologist, Richard Dawkins who reads a copy of the scientific book – On the Origin of 
Species (1859) by Charles Darwin. 
 
 
Figure 5. Martin Rowson. New Humanist. 2010 https://newhumanist.org.uk/1623/holy-
communion(permission to use granted) 
 
The cartoon depicts Dawkins and God as mutually antagonistic figures through their use of 
hand gestures. Their ‘offensive’ hand gestures also carry a connotative meaning as their 
mutual hostility represents wider conflicts, or philosophical differences, within the public 
arena surrounding matters of religious belief.  One feature of our ‘post-secular’ (Habermas, 
2008) society has been a visible reassertion of both religious and atheist identities within 
public discourse. This has given voice to conflicting arguments regarding the role that 
religion should play in the public sphere. Firstly, the ‘new atheists’177 argue that religion has 
a harmful effect on political and social life and that its role in these spheres should be 
reduced. Secondly, this critique of religion has been characterised by some as exhibiting a 
form of ‘aggressive’, ‘intolerant’ or ‘militant atheism’178. Furthermore, this view of modern 
atheism has developed alongside a sense that religious rights are increasingly under threat 
from a modern secularised society. (The News Discourse chapter of this thesis touches upon 
this sense when it explores how some opponents of same sex marriage argue that the law 
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 The ‘New Atheism’ has been described as an ‘anti-religious, anti-theist movement’ (Emilsen, 2012:521) 
which has been popularised in the early part of the 21
st
 century by writers such as Richard Dawkins and 
Christopher Hitchens.  
178
 For example, Fiala (2009:139) describes ‘militant atheism’ as ‘often dogmatic in its assertion of cognitive 
superiority’.  
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enabling same sex couples to marry is an attack upon the rights and values of religious 
groups. Most notably, Ian Paisely MP refers to the law as an example of ‘Christophobia’ 
within contemporary society). These debates form part of our wider participation in, and 
preoccupation with the giving and taking of offence (in which some believers are ‘offended’ 
by ‘militant atheism’ and so on). Significantly, they also point to a culture of competing 
rights, in which different groups or identities hold different notions of what might constitute 
‘offensiveness’.  
 
 
Figure6.MartinRowson.TheGuardian,2010 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cartoon/2010/jul/12/martin-rowson-row-gender-
sexuality-church-of-england(permission to use granted)  
 
For instance, figure 6 appeared in The Guardian newspaper following the decision by The 
Church of England’s ruling synod that women bishops should be permitted. The cartoon 
displays the offence and distress caused to some members of the clergy at the prospect of gay 
bishops and women bishops. In this example, intertextuality arises less from the direct ‘re-
authoring’ of another’s work in the cartoon, although we can recognise and interpret familiar 
codes which transcend the structure of the individual image. For example, the clergy are 
identifiable through their religious attire, including the former Archbishop of Canterbury 
(Rowan Williams) who looks on (and away) from the offence caused to members of his 
clergy. The distress depicted in the cartoon also illustrates the emotive nature of offence, and 
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how offence is viscerally attached to our feelings, or deeply held beliefs. This is important as 
it highlights how the very belief that something is offensive may become the overarching 
grounds for why something is considered more broadly in society to be offensive. In other 
words, the assertion of offence becomes the argument for why something is offensive. 
Finally, the subject matter of the cartoon invites us to consider how we respond to instances 
where the rights of groups or identities conflict (or appear to conflict) with each another. For 
example, in figure 6, religious rights conflict with rights regarding gender and sexual 
orientation. In figure 6, the offence is provoked by the prospect of women bishops, although 
offence might equally be taken in light of this stance by those who believe women bishops 
should be ordained. Our preoccupation with the giving and taking of offence is, therefore, 
intensified by the voices of competing groups and positions within a discursive context.  
 
One of the central claims made by intertexual analysis is that to communicate with each other 
we must use pre-existing codes, concepts and conventions. In view of this, whilst the 
intention of the author is an important factor which will influence how a cartoon is read, the 
meaning of a text cannot be reduced solely to authorial intention. Instead, intertexual analysis 
regards the author of a text as the ‘orchestrator’ rather than the originator of the ‘already-
written’ (Barthes, 1977:21).  
 
A text is…a multidimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, 
blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations…The writer can only imitate a gesture that 
is always anterior, never original. (Barthes, 1977:146) 
 
If we view a cartoon as ‘a tissue of quotations’, how are we to determine conclusively 
whether a cartoon might be racially or religiously defamatory? In their discussion of the 
infamous Danish Muhammad cartoons, Levey and Modood (2009) distinguish between the 
use of caricature and stereotyping in cartoons: 
  
We think caricature is one thing, and stereotyping quite another. Caricaturing football 
hooligans, for example, carries no implication – and no chance of implying – that all football 
fans are hooligans. The contrary perception is too widely appreciated and entrenched. 
Stereotyping, however, trades on and reinforces prejudice. (Levey and Modood, 2009:440) 
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In practice, however, this distinction may be more difficult to delineate or identify. For 
example, various political cartoons which are critical of Israeli policy in the middle-east have 
been subject to accusations of anti-Semitism
179
.  These accusations are often grounded in the 
intertextual relationship between the cartoons and anti-Semitic tropes which have historically 
permeated visual depictions of Jews. 
 
 
Figure7.MartinRowson.TheGuardian,2006 
http://www.theguardian.com/cartoons/martinrowson/0,,1823933,00.html (Permission to use 
granted) 
 
Using a sample of 2000 anti-Semitic cartoons, Kotek ([2004:77] cited in Keane, 2008:855) 
divided the cartoons into different themes, including the blood libel motif
180
, zoomorphism 
and the “masters of the world” narrative. He focused upon cartoons appearing in the Arabic 
media in the 21
st
 century and argues that there is a continuation in the use of anti-Semitic 
themes and stereotypes which had previously been commonplace in European cartoons 
during the 20
th
 century.  
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 For example, in 2013, The Sunday Times was accused of racism when it published a cartoon by Gerald 
Scarfe of the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. The cartoon depicted Netanyahu building a wall with 
blood, in which Palestinians were trapped. The Board of Deputies of British Jews denounced the cartoon as 
‘shockingly reminiscent of the blood libel imagery more usually found in parts of the virulently anti-Semitic 
Arab press’. Rupert Murdoch subsequently apologised for the ‘grotesque, offensive cartoon’ and Gerald Scarfe 
is reportedly claimed to have regretted the timing of the publication of the cartoon on Holocaust Memorial Day. 
A discussion of the offence caused by the cartoon is available on the BBC website. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21239917   (Accessed 26 September 2014)  The cartoon image is also available 
online http://procartoonists.org/tag/benjamin-netanyahu/ (Accessed 26 September 2014) 
180
 The blood libel has a long history within anti-Semitic ideology. It originates in the Middle Ages and refers to 
where Jews were falsely accused of murdering Christian children to use their blood for the baking of Matzah 
bread. 
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In 1934 a Nazi cartoonist drew an octopus with a Star of David whose tentacles covered the 
globe; while [a] cartoon in the weekly La Revue du Liban
181
 shows an octopus with a Star of 
David on its body, its tentacles strangling Fatah, Jihad and Hamas. (Kotek, 2004: 79 cited in 
Keane, 2008:855) 
 
Figure 7 was drawn by Martin Rowson following the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese conflict (also 
known as the Lebanon War). It depicts the Stars of David worn over a knuckle duster which 
is used to punch the bloodied face and body of a young Lebanese boy (the cartoon also shows 
Hezbollah as a large hornet). However, it was also accused of relying on anti-Semitic 
imagery
182
. The cartoon demonstrates how signs remain open to interpretation, and thereby 
constitute ‘a floating chain of signifieds’ (Barthes, 1977:39). For example, the blood libel is 
undoubtedly used in anti-Semitic imagery. However, blood is also used to convey a point 
within many political cartoons, often with regard to the actions of politicians, states or other 
organisations. (For instance, figure 8 shows George Bush and Tony Blair with blood on their 
hands – a phrase very familiar within the language of political discourse, and a sign which is 
used in many cartoons to accuse politicians of causing deaths in political conflicts). 
 
Similarly, a sign like a national flag may be included in a cartoon to signify different things 
(for example, a flag might be used to signify imperialism, patriotism, or a value like 
‘freedom’). The Star of David has been used in anti-Semitic imagery as a signifier for all 
Jews. However, the Star of David also appears on the Israeli flag. Rowson argues that his 
cartoon uses the Stars of David to represent the State of Israel ‘rather than the symbol of 
worldwide Jewry’ (2009:53). In his discussion of self-censorship in public discourse, Loury 
describes how taking offence is an effective means of closing down debate, or discouraging 
others from expressing a precluded viewpoint (1994:429). In this context, the accusation of 
racism becomes a powerful means to delegitimise, or close down critique of Israel. Kotek 
([2004:77] cited in Keane, 2008:855) has explored how anti-Semitic tropes continue to 
pervade imagery in the 21
st
 century. Furthermore, anti-Semitism may also sometimes take the 
form of critique of Israel
183
.. However, this should not preclude critique of Israeli policy, or 
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 La Revue du Liban is an online Lebanese newspaper. 
182
 In his 2009 book, giving offence, Rowson describes receiving emails accusing him of anti-Semitism (p.53). 
183
 For example, the 2014 Israeli-Gaza conflict coincided with a steep rise in anti-Semitic attacks across Europe. 
In 2014, Eylon Aslan-Levy set up the online everyday anti-Semitism website in order to document anti-Semitic 
incidents. He argues in Jewish News online that ‘whatever fine line there was between anti-Israel activism and 
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prevent cartoons from deploying the same sorts of crude or brutal imagery which is used to 
comment upon politics and politicians more generally. 
 
 
Figure 8.  MartinRowson  TheGuardian,2006 
http://www.theguardian.com/cartoons/martinrowson/0,7371,1233190,00.html (permission to 
use granted) 
 
In 1973, Kemnitz (1973:84) highlighted the freedom of cartoons to suggest ‘what cannot be 
said by the printed word’. However, it may be worth re-assessing this assertion in light of our 
contemporary preoccupation with offence. This part of the chapter has focused upon how 
cartoons report the news, however, in doing so it also alludes to how cartoons can influence 
political and social matters as well as comment on them. (For example, the Gerald Scarfe 
cartoon described in the footnotes of this chapter generated a wider conversation on the 
nature of anti-Semitism). Today, the power of political cartoons to influence events and 
generate discourse is closely entwined with their power to offend. This power is partly 
grounded in the very nature of the medium which often relies on cruel depictions and 
mockery, delivered with ‘a forceful simplicity in expression’ (Gottschalk and Greenberg, 
2011:193).  In view of these factors, the following section of the chapter will focus directly 
on the events and issues which have arisen from the creation of ‘offensive’ political cartoons 
in the 21
st
 century. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
naked anti-Semitism has been blurred, as anti-Israel protest has spilled over into attacks on Jews’. [Online] 
Available at: http://www.jewishnews.co.uk/everyday-antisemitism-project/ (Accessed 29
th
 September 2014) 
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7.4 Creating Discourse 
 
7.4.1 Cartoons as creators of discourse 
 
Political cartoons have been described as ‘a visual or visual–verbal type of opinion news 
discourse’ (Swain, 2012:82). As such, rather than simply responding to broader socio-
political events, they also help to produce and circulate these events. In its discussion of the 
relationship between religion and political cartooning, this chapter outlined briefly the 
response following the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in the Danish 
newspaper Jyllands-Posten
184
. The Danish cartoons also prompted much discussion within 
liberal democracies surrounding the relationship between religious identity, self-censorship, 
and free expression. Much of this has focused upon practical and philosophical questions 
concerning how speech should be managed in view of the recognition that cartoons may 
cause serious offence to some; or, that they may be used to denigrate marginalised groups as 
well as those more powerful (see e.g. Ramadan, 2006; Cohen, 2012; Henson, 2011; Klausen, 
2009; Levey and Moodood, 2009; Malik, 2009). No overarching consensus has emerged 
from these debates as some positions continue to assert the primacy of free expression (e.g.  
Malik, 2009; Cohen, 2012) whilst others have cautioned against the use of ‘religious 
stereotyping’ within satirical imagery (e.g. Levy and Moodood, 2009:441). This chapter, 
however, is concerned primarily with how discourse surrounding questions of offence and 
religious belief is produced and understood. In particular, this section of the chapter considers 
how the discourse surrounding cartoon imagery has contributed to the appearance of a 
polarisation of opinion between Muslims and non-Muslims regarding what might constitute 
‘offensiveness’. Before considering this, however, it is worth recalling in more depth the 
events which led to the Danish Cartoon Crisis. 
 
7.4.2 Background to the Danish Cartoon Crisis 
 
On 30
th
 September 2005, the centre-right Danish daily broadsheet Jyllands-Posten published 
twelve cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad. The cartoons differ in the way they depict 
the prophet – for example, one cartoon directly targets Jyllands-Posten and declares that its 
‘journalists are a bunch of reactionary provocateurs’. Meanwhile, the cartoon that provoked 
most offence depicts the prophet with a bomb in his turban. The cultural editor of the paper, 
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 See Section 7.2.3 
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Flemming Rose, supported publication of the cartoons on the grounds of free speech, and 
claimed that a culture of self-censorship had emerged within Western liberal democracies 
which meant that Islam was not subject to the same level of examination, critique or ridicule 
as other religions. Rose cited various examples to support his claim, most notably the 
inability of the writer Kare Bluitgen to find an artist prepared to illustrate a children’s book 
on the life of Muhammad. Rose contacted 25 cartoonists and asked them to draw Muhammad 
‘as they saw him’185 stipulating that no cartoonists were permitted to remain anonymous. 
Twelve cartoonists agreed to submit the illustrations which were subsequently published on 
30
th
 September 2005. On the 14
th
 October 2005, a peaceful protest was held in Copenhagen 
against their publication and several imams representing a coalition of Danish Muslim 
organisations requested to meet with the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in 
order to explain their objections. Rasmussen refused to meet the representatives on the 
grounds that politicians had no business interfering with a free press. The imams then 
travelled to Egypt in December 2005 and presented the cartoons (including three additional 
inflammatory images
186
) at an Arab League meeting. The League issued a statement 
condemning the images and similar delegations to Lebanon and Syria contributed to further 
publicity, together with the use of campaigning against the cartoons via digital media. Global 
protests spread in January and February 2006 across many countries, leading to the torching 
of Danish embassies, over 200 deaths and attempts upon the lives of the cartoonists 
responsible for the offending images. The cartoons, therefore, infamously illustrate how 
images may be constitutive of an event, rather than simply reflective of it.  
 
7.4.3 Representational analysis and the Danish Cartoons 
 
Representational analysis has traditionally concentrated on the ways in which images or texts 
depict something (such as a particular group of people, or an event). This type of analysis 
typically focuses upon identifying how a group or an event is misrepresented within an image 
or text. For example, the Danish cartoon which showed Muhammad with a bomb in his 
turban, was widely criticised for appearing to depict him as a terrorist. In their analysis of the 
Danish cartoons, Levy and Modood also accuse the images more generally of unfairly 
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 Fleming Rose describes his communication with the cartoonists in an article written by him for The 
Washington Post in February 2006, in which he explains his reasons for publishing the cartoons. [Online] 
Available at:  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021702499_2.html 
(Accessed 01/09/2014) 
186
 The additional images included one of a man wearing a ‘pig mask’ which was later identified as having 
nothing to do with the prophet. Instead, Cohen (2012:93) describes it as showing ‘a French farmer, who was 
competing in [a] village’s annual ‘pig squealing competition’, complete with plastic snout and pig’s ears’.   
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‘targeting Muslims’ through their use of ‘hostile stereotypes’ (2009:443).   This part of the 
chapter will examine how stereotypes are reinforced through the ‘representational practices’ 
(Hall, 1997:259) at work within both visual imagery and written texts. However, it will view 
representation not simply as something which occurs after an event through, for example, the 
drawing of an image, or the writing of an article. It also regards representation as an 
important component of an event which contributes to its meaning.  
 
This way of viewing representation is particularly useful in view of the wider socio-political 
context surrounding the Danish cartoons. The UK press were unanimous in their decision not 
to republish the cartoons
187
. In their analysis of the press coverage surrounding these events, 
Meer and Mouritsen (2009:339) report that in the UK there was a ‘consistency between the 
different publications, broadsheet and tabloid, in their criticisms of Jyllands-Posten and the 
reproduction of the cartoons elsewhere in Europe’. This aspect of the Cartoon Crisis is 
integral to the analysis in this chapter.  Using Hall’s Representation model, the signifying 
practices (or practices that produce meaning) at work both in the aforementioned cartoon of 
Muhammad and the reporting of the decision not to republish the Danish cartoons in the UK 
are explored. Rather than seeking to uncover the ‘true’ meaning of the cartoons, this analysis 
is chiefly interested in how our ideas about them and the practices that emerge from these 
ideas bestow them with particular meaning(s).  
 
Hall maintains that although images do not possess any singular or fixed meaning, ideology 
can nevertheless attempt to ‘fix’ the meaning of an image, or text. He describes this ‘fixing’ 
of meaning as inextricably bound with the way in which power operates in society.  
 
Power, it seems, has to be understood here, not only in terms of economic exploitation and 
physical coercion, but also in broader cultural or symbolic terms, including the power to 
represent someone or something in a certain way – within a certain ‘regime of representation’. 
It includes the exercise of symbolic power through representational practices. Stereotyping is 
a key element in this exercise of symbolic violence. (Hall, 1997:259) 
 
Kurt Westergaard drew the cartoon of the prophet Muhammad with a ticking bomb in his 
turban. In a 2009 interview, Westergaard claimed that he had been trying to ‘show that 
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 Meanwhile, Carle (2006:82) points out that the cartoons were republished in newspapers in Germany, 
Holland, France, Italy, Norway and Spain ‘to express solidarity with Jyllands-Posten’. 
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terrorists get their spiritual ammunition from parts of Islam, and with this ammunition…they 
will kill people’188. The Westergaard cartoon has been described as (re)producing a particular 
stereotype, or way of viewing Muhammad and/or Islam as threatening or violent (see e.g 
Levey and Modood, 2009; Meer and Mouritsen, 2009). The media portrayal of Islam has 
received increasing attention within the academic community in the 21
st
 century (see e.g. 
Sheridan, 2006; Kundnani, A, 2007; Fekete, 2009; Poole, 2009; Esposito, J and İbrahim, K 
(2011); Petley and Richardson, 2011). Petley and Richardson refer directly to ‘a rise of 
hostile stereotyping’ in the post-9/11 era which emphasises the threat that Muslims pose ‘to 
our way of life’ (2011:167). In this sense, the cartoon fits within a certain ‘regime of 
representation’ whereby different ‘practices of representation’ (Hall, 1997:260) (such as 
cartoons, newspapers, TV programmes etc.) produce a form of knowledge about Muslims 
and/or Islam as threatening or ‘Other’.   
 
Hall also argues that ‘stereotyping reduces, essentializes, naturalizes and fixes ‘difference’’ 
which is then maintained through a strategy of ‘splitting’ whereby the ‘normal’ and 
‘acceptable’ are divided from the ‘abnormal and unacceptable’ (1997:258).  
 
Stereotyping, in other words, is part of the maintenance of social and symbolic order. It sets 
up a symbolic frontier between the ‘normal’ and the ‘deviant’, the ‘normal’ and the 
‘pathological’… what ‘belongs’ and what does not or is ‘Other’, between ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’, Us and Them. It facilitates the ‘binding’ or bonding together of all of Us who are 
‘normal’ into one ‘imagined community’; and it sends into symbolic exile all of Them – ‘the 
Others’ – who are in some way different.. (Hall, 1997:258) 
 
In their analysis of the climate within which Jyllands-Posten published the Muhammad 
cartoons, Levey and Modood describe the ‘prevailing situation [as] one in which Muslims in 
general are being marginalised, disproportionately targeted, and made vulnerable’ 
(2009:433).
189
 Within the context of domestic Danish politics, therefore, the Westergaard 
cartoon fixes ‘difference’ through stereotyping and maintaining the ‘symbolic frontier 
                                                          
188
  The full interview was with Adrian Humphreys in The National Post on 3rd October 2009. [Online] 
Available at http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=2061497#ixzz0SvzxULVo (Accessed 12 
September 2012) 
 
189
  A minority of the Danish population - approximately 4.8 % - are reported to be Muslim. [Online] Available 
at  http://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/emner/befolkning-og-befolkningsfremskrivning/folketal.aspx (Accessed 23 
August 2014) 
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…between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, Us and Them’ (Hall, 1997:258).  However, this section 
of the chapter argues that ‘difference’ is also maintained through the representational 
practices embedded in the response to the Muhammad cartoons within parts of our 
mainstream media. 
 
Imagery acts as a form of language which becomes invested with meaning in ways which are 
culturally conditioned and rely upon familiar signifiers and conventions.  The same image or 
content, therefore, can acquire different meanings within different discursive communities. 
For example, within Sunni traditions of Islam visual depictions of Muhammad are typically 
prohibited as they are associated with idolatry
190
. From this standpoint, irrespective of the 
‘offensive’ nature of the imagery, the very presence of such images would be deemed 
blasphemous and highly problematic. Ridanpaa asserts that the overriding interpretation 
placed upon the satirical Danish cartoons within the Western media ‘lay within the context of 
the Western religious world and its previous satires and not within the context and principles 
of the Muslim world’ (2009:733). Nevertheless, the UK press unanimously refused to reprint 
the cartoons
191
. How useful, therefore, is it to view the response of the UK media as residing 
firmly within the context of the ‘Western religious world and its previous satires’? In order to 
explore this further it is worth recalling the response to the cartoons from British national 
newspapers. The following newspaper editorials from 2006 outline the position taken by each 
paper explaining their decision not to republish the cartoons.
192
. All the editorials share the 
view that the cartoons should not be published because of the offence this would cause to 
Muslims. 
   
To duplicate these cartoons…has an element of exhibitionism to it…The offence destined to 
be caused to moderate Muslims should not be discounted…It cannot be valid for followers 
of a religion to state that because they consider images of the Prophet idolatry, the same 
applies to anyone else in all circumstances. Then again, linking the Prophet to suicide 
bombings supposedly undertaken in his honour was incendiary. (The Times 3 February, p.23.) 
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 This may help to contextualise why the writer, Kare Bluitgen was unable to find an illustrator for his 
children’s book on the life of Muhammad.  
191
 It is also worth remembering that support for Jyllands-Posten was by no means unanimous across the Danish 
media. Meer and Mouritsen (2009:339) point out that whilst some national newspapers (such as the popular 
tabloid Ekstra Bladet) supported the decision to publish the cartoons, others were critical of it - including the 
conservative-leaning broadsheet, Berlingske Tidende, and the left-leaning broadsheet, Information. 
192
 The newspapers chosen for this representational analysis are selected to reflect a cross-section of British 
daily newspapers. They include: (i) the right-leaning  broadsheet, The Times; (ii) the right-leaning ‘red-top’ 
tabloid, The Sun; (iii) the right-leaning ‘middle-market’ tabloid, The Daily Mail, and;(iv) the liberal-left 
broadsheet, The Guardian. 
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The cartoons are intended to insult Muslims, and the Sun can see no justification for 
causing deliberate offence to our much-valued Muslim readers. (The Sun 3 February, p.6.) 
 
…an obligation of free speech is that you do not gratuitously insult those with whom you 
disagree. While the Mail would fight to the death to defend those papers that printed the 
offending cartoons, it disagrees with the fact that they have done so. Rights are one thing. 
Responsibilities are another… (The Daily Mail 3 February, p.14.) 
 
The Guardian believes uncompromisingly in freedom of expression, but not in any duty 
to gratuitously offend. It would be senselessly provocative to reproduce a set of images, of 
no intrinsic value, which pander to the worst prejudices about Muslims. (The Guardian 4 
February, p.34) 
 
Different newspapers choose to emphasise some arguments and concerns more visibly than 
others (for example, The Times opted to provide a web link to the cartoons on the grounds 
that this balanced the right to free speech more carefully against the wish not to cause 
offence). However, the editorials are striking in their unanimity (for example, both the right-
leaning Mail, and left-leaning Guardian balance the right to free speech against the 
responsibility not to ‘gratuitously offend’ or ‘insult’ Muslims).   
 
Critical analysis has revealed how narratives of ‘difference’ or ‘Otherness’ are normalised 
and (re)produced within various political, popular cultural and media sources (see e.g. Lalioti, 
2005; Chauhaun, 2013; Grayson, 2013). Media representations of ‘difference’ may be 
maintained through written or spoken words, as well as imagery.  Hall’s model of analysis 
encourages exploration of the specific practices involved which allow a type of language
193
 
(whether words, sounds or imagery) to carry meaning, or reinforce ‘difference’.  This chapter 
argues that popular representations of Islam and/or Muslims have helped to maintain a 
‘symbolic frontier between…what ‘belongs’ and what does not or is ‘Other’…between Us 
and Them’ (Hall, 1997:257).  This is maintained, firstly, through crude or negative 
stereotyping which produces a particular regime of representation of Muslims as violent or 
radicalised. This form of stereotyping has been explored and documented by analysis of the 
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 Language is defined broadly by Hall as incorporating ‘any sound, word, image or object which functions as a 
sign’ (1997:19). He defines signs as ‘the general term we use for words, sounds or images which carry meaning’ 
(1997:18). 
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media portrayal of Muslims, especially in the post-9/11 era (see e.g. Poole, 2009; Morley and 
Yaqin, 2011; Alsultany, 2012). However, this thesis argues that the practice of representing 
Muslims as a distinct group who are collectively ‘offended’ by imagery such as the Danish 
cartoons also reinforces the ‘symbolic frontier’ between ‘Us and Them’. It argues that the 
signifying practices at work in the editorials used here as data naturalize ‘difference’ between 
Muslims and non-Muslims who are assumed to uphold distinct identities and values. 
However, an important distinction between this and the aforementioned negative stereotyping 
is that the 2006 editorials occupy a position which purports to protect Muslims from 
denigration or offence.  
 
The editorials agree unreservedly that the cartoons should not be shown as they are 
gratuitously offensive, or insulting to Muslims. However, Downs draws attention to how 
‘Muslim opinion is a complex tapestry, not a monolith’ (2011:609). He argues that  
 
Most Muslims in Europe accept and support the basic principles of liberal democracy, and 
many Muslim faithful had no problem with the cartoons; and many who had a problem 
disavowed any kind of legal or political reaction (Downs, 2011:609).  
 
The British newspapers, however, conceal this diversity of opinion and frame the affair as a 
clear conflict of interest between Muslims and free speech. They also contribute to the 
appearance of a polarisation of positions on freedom of expression which reinforces a 
homogenised view of both Muslim and non-Muslim opinion. For example, both The 
Guardian and The Daily Mail pronounce their commitment to free speech as they 
simultaneously outline their ‘responsibility’ not to offend Muslims. The Times editorial also 
identifies ‘moderate Muslims’ as a group it does not wish to offend by reprinting the 
cartoons. However, this way of classifying those who may be offended arguably reinforces a 
view of ‘moderate Muslims’ as a unified ‘offended’ group or community. 
 
Significantly, the firm line taken in the editorials against the giving of offence also sits 
awkwardly with some of negative news stories surrounding Islam and Muslims within British 
newspapers in recent years. For example, Poole has described The Daily Mail’s ‘construction 
of Muslims [as] explicitly negative’ (2009:135), and Meer and Mouritsen declare The Sun’s 
position on the Danish cartoons surprising as it is ‘rarely sympathetic to minority 
sensitivities’ (2009:324). How, therefore, do we make sense of the juxtaposition between the 
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preponderance of negative stories about Muslims in many British newspapers, and the 
simultaneous desire of these papers not to cause offence to Muslims by refusing to republish 
a series of cartoons which had generated a major international news story?  The explanations 
given by UK newspapers for their refusal to republish the cartoons have been criticised for 
being based more upon fear than the principled objections outlined in the various newspaper 
editorials examined here (see e.g. Carle, 2006; Malik, 2009; Cohen, 2012). Such fears may be 
well-grounded in view of the global reaction following the initial publication of the 
cartoons
194
. Within Denmark, numerous violent plots targeted Flemming Rose and 
Westergaard specifically, and the employees and property of Jyllands-Posten more generally, 
along with other newspapers that reprinted the cartoons. Many newspaper sellers also refused 
to distribute Jyllands-Posten (whether through fear, or principled objection). Within this 
context it is reasonable to suggest that British newspaper proprietors, editors, journalists or 
distributors held serious concerns about their own and others’ safety. However, this was not 
the main line of reasoning adopted by the editorials examined for this analysis. Their 
meaning, therefore, is partly evoked by what they do not say, or by the reader ‘knowing’ 
what is not said
195
.   
 
The data used in this representational analysis suggests there is an inconsistency in the desire 
to avoid offence with regard to the cartoons, and the way in which Muslims are often 
otherwise represented in many parts of the British press. In other words, the denouncement of 
‘offensive’ imagery has developed alongside the negative stereotyping of Muslims which is 
woven into popular narratives surrounding the cultural cohesiveness and distinct status of 
Muslims and/or Islam.  This is not to dismiss that real offence was caused to many Muslims 
as a consequence of the Danish cartoons, or to downplay the severity of the violence and 
response provoked by the cartoons internationally. However, the media discourse 
surrounding these events has contributed to narratives which homogenise Muslim opinion, 
and frame the affair as a straightforward clash between Islam and the liberal-democratic 
principle of free speech. This binary outlook also informs the increasingly emboldened 
backlash against multiculturalism which is predicated on a ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ (Lentin 
and Titley, 2012:123) involving the emergence of ‘parallel societies’ (ibid).  
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 Section 7.3.2 briefly describes the violence which followed internationally in the wake of their publication. 
195
 In their comparative analysis of the response to the Muhammad cartoons in the Danish and British press, 
Meer and Mouritsen point out that a ‘recurring theme’ in reader’s letters and blog comments to British 
newspapers was that the decision not to republish ‘was not, in fact, because of tolerance and restraint, but an 
outcome of intimidation and the threat of violence’ (2009:349). For a detailed description of their examination 
of reader response to the Independent and Guardian newspapers see pages 348-351 of their analysis. 
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This part of the chapter suggests that our preoccupation with group identity and identity 
politics has helped to shift focus away from the individualised dimension of disputes of 
offence. The data examined in the newspaper editorials represents Muslim opinion as 
monolithic and homogenised whilst ignoring the diversity of opinion within as well as 
between communities. The representational strategies at work within the editorials also 
attempt to secure discursive ‘closure’ around what might be considered offensive to Muslims 
as a group. However, the nature of offence remains highly subjective and there is no unified 
‘Muslim’ or ‘non-Muslim’ opinion regarding the cartoons, or whether the decision not to 
reprint them in the UK was justified. This thesis maintains that our preoccupation with 
identity politics and group membership undermines the significance of personal identity 
which is also embedded in disputes of offence. Whilst personal identity may sometimes be 
closely aligned with group identity, it is also felt or experienced in a multiplicity of ways. In 
view of this diversity of experience, the following part of the chapter examines the British 
web comic ‘Jesus and Mo’ and explores how attempts to ‘fix’ or create discursive closure 
surrounding matters of offence - including what is understood to be offensive on religious 
grounds - may be unsettled or challenged by competing voices.  
 
7.4.4 Background to the ‘Jesus and Mo’ web comic, and the denunciation it has provoked 
 
Jesus and Mo is a British web comic which describes itself as ‘dealing in religious satire’196. 
It was launched in 2005 and produces a weekly online comic strip which features the 
religious figures, Jesus and Muhammad
197
. In the comic strip, Jesus and Muhammad live 
together and sometimes visit their local pub where they engage in topical discussion with an 
atheist bar attendant (who is never drawn and is known simply as ‘Barmaid’). The cartoons 
consist mainly of critique, or ridicule of religion (including religious texts, beliefs and 
practices). They are created by an artist who uses the pseudonym, Mohammad Jones, in order 
to protect his real identity for reasons of personal safety.  
 
Although the cartoons have not ignited the global fury generated by the Danish Cartoons, 
several instances demonstrate how cartoon imagery has emerged as a battleground upon 
which contemporary battles over free expression and claims of offence are fought. Firstly, in 
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 This quote is taken from the Jesus and Mo webpage. [Online] Available at: http://www.jesusandmo.net/  
(Accessed 12
th
 September, 2014) 
197
 In some comic strips, Moses (the Abrahamic prophet) and the Hindu God, Ganesh, also appear. 
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2012 the University College London (UCL) Atheist Society published a frame from the web 
comic on their Facebook page in order to promote the society’s social events198. The UCL 
Student Union requested the removal of the cartoon on the grounds that students needed to 
‘understand the balance between freedom of expression and cultural sensitivity’199. Upon 
learning of this, the Atheist Society at the London School of Economics (LSE) also 
reproduced the cartoon on its Facebook page. Forty official complaints were made to the 
university objecting to the image and the Student Union issued a statement condemning the 
‘offensive nature of the content’ which they argued was ‘not in accordance with our values of 
tolerance, diversity and respect for all students regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality 
or religious affiliation’200 A petition in support of the right to display the image showing 
Jesus and Muhammad sharing an alcoholic drink in a pub gathered 3000 signatures. 
Following this, the UCL and LSE Student Union’s conceded that university societies 
maintained the right to advertise their events at their own discretion whilst reasserting their 
disapproval of the image. 
 
A further incident occurred in 2013, also involving the LSE. Members of the LSE Atheist, 
Secularist and Humanist Student Society were told they would be removed from the 
university Freshers’ Fair unless they covered up t-shirts they were wearing featuring a Jesus 
and Mo cartoon
201
. The LSE Legal and Compliance Team reportedly told the Atheist Society 
that wearing the t-shirts could be considered ‘harassment’ and could ‘offend others’ or create 
‘an offensive environment’202. After two students, who had been forced to cover up their t-
shirts, made a formal complaint to the university, the LSE issued an apology from its director. 
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 [Online] Available at: http://www.lulu.com/shop/mohammed-jones/jesus-and-mo-vol-2/paperback/product-
3915157.html (Accessed 10 August 2015) 
199
 The quotation is lifted from a Guardian article which was published on 13 January 2012 and titled 
‘Muhammad Cartoon row: student Atheist Society claims victory’. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/education/2012/jan/13/muhammad-cartoon-student-atheist-society 
(Accessed  13 September 2014) 
200
 The quotation is taken from a New Humanist article, published on 24 January 2012, and titled ‘Jesus and Mo 
cartoon censorship controversy reaches LSE’. [Online] Available at:  
http://blog.newhumanist.org.uk/2012/01/jesus-mo-cartoon-censorship-controversy.html (Accessed 13 
September 2014) 
201
 The t-shirt designs are available online at: http://www.godlessgifts.co.uk/#!product/prd1/1777436825/jesus-
%26-mo-fitted-t-shirt%3A-how-y%27a-doin%27%3F  and https://doinggod.wordpress.com/2014/02/04/times-
show-us-jesus-mo-its-the-price-of-freedom/ (Accessed 10 August 2015) 
202 This quote was reported in an article on the national secular society webpage, posted on 4 October 2013: 
‘LSE Student Society intimidated at Freshers’ Fair over “offensive” t-shirts’. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2013/10/lse-student-society-intimidated-at-freshers-fair-over-
offensive-t-shirts  (Accessed 14 September 2014) 
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Professor Craig Calhoun stated that ‘with hindsight, the wearing of the t-shirts on this 
occasion did not amount to harassment or contravene the law or LSE policies’203.  
 
Finally, the Jesus and Mo cartoons briefly became a national news item in January 2014 
when an image was tweeted by Maajid Nawaz
204
 (chairman of the counter-extremism think-
tank, the Quilliam Foundation and then a parliamentary candidate for the Liberal Democrat 
leader). Nawaz had appeared as a studio guest on an episode of The Big Questions 
205
 in 
which the cartoons were discussed (including the aforementioned incident at the LSE 
Freshers’ Fair). Nawaz has since stated that he posted the image on his Twitter account 
following his appearance on The Big Questions, in order to encourage a debate among 
Muslims about what is acceptable within their faith.  
 
Following his tweet, Nawaz received death threats and a petition was set up calling for him to 
be deselected as a parliamentary candidate
206
. Liberal Democrat leader, Nick Clegg, 
responded by stating that although he would not personally have tweeted the cartoon out of  
‘respect’ to people of all faiths, he defended the right of Nawaz to do so on the grounds of 
free speech, and refused to drop him as a parliamentary candidate
207
. 
 
7.4.5 A Semiotic study of the Jesus and Mo cartoons 
 
Semiology (which was described by Saussure as ‘the study of the role of signs as part of 
social life’ (1983:15)) is deployed as a foundation for this analysis of how meaning, or 
particular messages, are communicated through cartoon imagery. Drawing upon the 
relationship between denotative and connotative readings of the Jesus and Mo cartoons this 
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 The quote is an extract from the full apology, and is taken from the Guardian article ‘LSE apologises to 
students asked to cover up Jesus and Muhammad T-shirts’, which was published on 20/12/2013. [Online] 
Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/lse-university-apology-students-atheism-tshirt-
religion-jesus-muhammad (Accessed 14 September 2014) 
204
 The image is available online: https://homoeconomicusnet.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/20140127-
002048.jpg  (Accessed 14 August 2015). In his tweet Nawaz stated, ‘This image is not offensive and I’m sure 
God is greater than to feel threatened by it’. 
205
 The Big Questions is a BBC programme which debates moral, ethical and religious questions. 
206
 The petition described Nawaz as having posted ‘offensive and disrespectful images’ of ‘the Prophets 
Muhammad and Jesus’, and attracted over 20000 signatories. A counter-petition pledging support for Nawaz 
also attracted over 8000 signatories.  
207
 Nick Clegg gave his views during an LBC radio interview. His words were reprinted in an Independent 
article on 30/01/2014, ‘Nick Clegg will not drop Lib Dem candidate Maajid Nawaz who tweet a cartoon of the 
prophet Muhammad and Jesus’. [Online] Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/nick-
clegg-will-not-drop-lib-dem-candidate-maajid-nawaz-who-tweeted-a-cartoon-of-the-prophet-mohammed-and-
jesusclegg-will-not-drop-lib-dem-candidate-9095691.html   (Accessed 14 September 2014) 
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analysis uses Barthesian semiology to explore the steps through which the broader messages 
of the Jesus and Mo cartoons are communicated. In the cartoon used by the UCL Atheist 
Society Jesus and Muhammad are shown sitting in a bar together and sharing a drink. The T-
shirts worn by students at the LSE Freshers’ Fair displayed two images: firstly, Jesus is 
shown saying ‘Hey!’ to Muhammad, who replies by saying ‘How ya doing?’; and secondly 
Jesus and Muhammad are depicted with banners protesting against the drawing of prophets. 
Each cartoon includes the text ‘Jesus and Mo’ in order to make clear the identity of the two 
figures. However, their identity is also conveyed through the use of signifiers such as their 
religious attire (we recognise Jesus as he is wearing a crown of thorns; and Mohammad 
through his beard and turban). In the cartoon used by the UCL Atheist Society the bar pump 
and pint glasses also act as signifiers which suggest that both figures are drinking together in 
a bar or pub. The images displayed in the T-shirt designs also use text which provides 
anchorage as it allows the reader to choose between possible denotative meanings of the 
images. In particular, the text used on the banners carried by Jesus and Muhammad makes it 
clear that the cartoon is satirising religion
208
. A connotative reading, however, allows us to 
link this denotative description to one which looks at the way in which an image is 
understood, at a broader, more associative, level of meaning (Hall, 1997:164). In other words, 
the signs identified in the denotative reading are attached to a further set of signifieds. In 
exploring this wider cultural dimension, this thesis nevertheless maintains that meaning 
remains polysemic. Unlike traditional Saussurean models of semiotics, it is therefore 
primarily concerned with the complex ‘play’ of meaning at work within imagery rather than 
simply the analysis of language’s rules and laws.  
 
What messages, therefore, do the cartoons convey? The images used do not obviously mirror 
some of the crude or negative stereotyping previously highlighted by this chapter (such as the 
use of imagery linking Muhammad to terrorism, or extremism). Indeed, the image used on 
the t-shirt in which Jesus and Muhammad greet each other is striking in view of how 
innocuous the dialogue between the two religious figures is. In this respect, the literal 
meaning of cartoon (in which Jesus and Muhammad exchange a friendly greeting) also 
acquires the connotative meaning that an innocuous image is able to offend some believers. 
In a similar vein, the denotative reading of the image used by the student Atheist Society has 
already encouraged us to assume that Jesus and Muhammad are drinking alcohol. If we link 
                                                          
208
 The banners held by Jesus and Muhammad declare ‘stop drawing holy prophets in a disrespectful manner 
now!’; ‘Religion is not funny’ and ‘If this doesn’t work I say we start burning stuff’.  
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this to its wider cultural significance - or connotative meaning – then this depiction taps into 
and mocks religious prohibitions surrounding the consumption of alcohol. By displaying 
Jesus and Muhammad engaging in ‘everyday’ interactions (such as sharing a drink together, 
or greeting one another in a friendly manner) the connotative meaning of the cartoons is that 
religion (including its beliefs and practices) is treated with a particular reverence which satire 
should mock. 
 
Any analysis of how representation operates on a broader cultural level can also not ignore 
how the cartoons clearly disregard the Islamic taboo against depictions of the prophet 
Muhammad. From this, we may come up with the connotative message that such taboos are 
ripe for mockery. (The web comic also knowingly pokes fun at this prohibition by claiming 
that the Muhammad it uses is actually a ‘body double’)209. Finally, the use of textual 
anchorage in the image depicting slogans on banners makes explicit through a denotative 
reading that the cartoon is ridiculing religious based claims of offence, particularly its 
prohibitions upon ‘disrespectful’ drawings. Barthes (1977) had introduced the idea of 
anchorage primarily in relation to advertisements or photographs which appeared in 
newspapers, magazines or other visual forms of media. He argued that the main function of 
anchorage was ideological. (For example, the captions attached to newspaper photographs are 
typically presented as simply descriptive rather than ‘anchored’ to encourage a preferred 
reading). Indeed, Barthes was particularly interested in how the relationship between a sign 
(whether this takes the form of text or an image) and wider culture is deeply ideological 
(rather than relatively arbitrary, as in traditional Saussurean semiotics). According to Barthes, 
the two ‘orders of signification’ (denotation and connotation) combine to produce ideological 
myths about the world. These myths make dominant cultural and historical values appear 
‘natural’ or self-evident. The role of semiotic analysis, therefore, is to ‘denaturalise’ these 
myths.  
 
Does the ridicule of religion within the cartoons shown here help to circulate ideological 
myths about the world, and how usefully can these cartoons be viewed as upholding 
dominant cultural values? The Jesus and Mo web comic was created and surfaced within the 
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 The full interview  in which the Jesus and Mo cartoonist  makes this claim is available online at: 
http://www.jesusandmo.net/about/ (Accessed 15 September 2014) 
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context of our ‘post-secular’ society210. One feature of this society has been the reassertion 
within it of atheism and secularism as important and visible identities
211
. Emilsen (2012:524) 
argues that what distinguishes the ‘new atheist movement’ from earlier forms of atheism is 
‘the subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) ways it critiques and attacks Islam through its 
‘scattergun’ critique of religion in general’. The Introduction of this chapter points out how 
prejudice on grounds of religious and/or cultural identity has emerged as a significant trigger 
or factor within contemporary disputes of offence. Chapter Five of this thesis also highlights 
how our growing concern with disputes of this nature is reflected in some of the language  
used to debate these disputes, including the emergence of neologisms (such as 
‘Islamophobia’ or ‘Christophobia’212). Some of the prejudice directed at religious groups and 
believers is attributed to the newly galvanised atheist or secular ‘movement’, or what Fiala 
(2009) describes as ‘militant atheism’213. From this perspective, might the mockery of 
religion in the Jesus and Mo cartoons be viewed as fuelling a secular form of prejudice 
against religious groups, or those with strongly held religious beliefs? In particular, does its 
mockery of Islam (and Islamic norms) reinforce dominant cultural values or ideology through 
its targeting of a minority religion
214
?  
 
In order to answer this, it is worth returning briefly to the taboo against visual depictions of 
Muhammad which is adhered to by most Sunni traditions of Islam. In Shia Islam, however, 
images of Muhammad have been present historically within Islamic art, and there is no 
overall consensus across the faith over whether images should be prohibited.  
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 Section 7.2.2 describes in depth the idea espoused by Habermas (2008) that Western societies can today be 
usefully described as ‘post-secular’. 
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 This reassertion can be observed in the plethora of books published in the 21
st
 century which are critical of 
the role and powers of religion. They include The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins (2006), and God is Not 
Great (2007) by Christopher Hitchens. Many of the ‘New Atheists’, such as Richard Dawkins, also attract a 
high media profile and public following. 
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 Although the term ‘Christophobia’ is not part of our mainstream lexicon, it was used by MP Ian Paisley in a 
Commons debate to describe the vilification of Christian beliefs and values. It therefore, forms part of a wider 
narrative of the modern-day persecution of religious beliefs and believers.  
213
 Labels like ‘militant atheism’ are increasingly drawn upon in media and political discourse in the 21st 
century.  For example, in February 2012, the then Conservative chairman, Baroness Warsi, denounced Richard 
Dawkins in a speech as a ‘secular fundamentalist’ and warned that Britain was under threat from a rising tide of 
‘militant secularism’.  In her speech, she also argued that religion was being ‘side-lined, marginalised and 
downgraded in the public sphere’. In his study of ‘The Politics of New Atheism’ Schulyske (2013:788) refers to 
how terms such as ‘aggressive atheism’ are also evoked in academic discourse surrounding religious and ethical 
debates. 
214
 Of course, globally Islam is a major world religion adhered to by 1.5 billion people. The Jesus and Mo 
cartoons also ridicule religion more generally, although Jesus and Muhammad form its main focus. However, 
within the specific context of the UK, the cartoons choose to ridicule a powerful prohibition within a religion 
adhered to by a minority of its population.  
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Even though Islam is often conceived and presented as a religion that prohibits pictures, there 
are important differences between various regions, times and religious interpretations when it 
comes to the question of the representational and visual arts. (Larsson, 2011:50) 
In a similar vein, not all Muslims who entered the discussion surrounding the events 
provoked by the Jesus and Mo cartoons were offended by the images. Most notably, 
following the furore caused by his decision to tweet a Jesus and Mo cartoon, Maajid Nawaz 
claimed that he was ‘speaking up for Islam against the loudmouths who have hijacked it’215. 
Furthermore, the censorship of such imagery in parts of our mainstream media may help 
legitimise or privilege the position of those offended (or help to designate them as the 
authentic voice of an entire group or community)
216
. It is also notable that Jesus and Mo is a 
small online web comic and is not published in print form. (No British national newspaper 
has published a Jesus and Mo cartoon, although the small circulation atheist magazine The 
Freethinker used to publish one every month
217
) .The creator of the web comic also uses a 
pseudonym for reasons of personal safety and the website is regularly subject to online 
attacks.  This broader context suggests that it is misleading to view the imagery as reinforcing 
dominant cultural values or ideology. Nevertheless, despite Maajid Nawaz’s claim that the 
Jesus and Mo cartoons are ‘inoffensive’, others disagree and believe the imagery to be 
‘Islamophobic’ and/or insulting to those with religious faith more generally. The range of 
readings an image is open to, therefore, draws our attention to the subjective nature of 
offence and how disputes of offence are enacted around our personal feelings or beliefs, even 
when these are embedded within broader identities about group membership or religious 
identity.  
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 This quote is taken from a Guardian article written by Nawaz.on 28
th
 January 2014. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/28/speaking-islam-loudmouths-hijacked (Accessed 18 
September 2014) 
216
 For example, The National Secular Society (NSS) expressed concern when Channel 4 chose to pixelate the 
image of Muhammad in their coverage of the row over Maajid Nawaz’s use of the image on Twitter. In a letter 
to Channel 4, the NSS wrote ‘..you have become complicit in a trend that seeks to insidiously stereotype all 
Muslim people as reacting in one uniform way (generally presented as overly sensitive and potentially violent)’. 
In a responding statement, Channel 4 stated, ‘The senior editorial team decided that the showing of the entire 
illustration, whilst likely to cause offence, was not integral to the story, and therefore took the decision to 
pixelate’. [Online] Available at: https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/4569/channel-4-accused-of-censorship-
over-jesus-mo-story  (Accessed 18
th
 September 2014)  
217
 The Jesus and Mo cartoons are also used to illustrate the 2013 book by Russell Blackford, 50 Great Myths 
About Atheism. 
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7.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has drawn upon religion and religious identity in order to make sense of our 
preoccupation with the giving and taking of offence, including the relationship between the 
changing conditions of debate and the nature or character of debate. Analysis of the various 
data sources (including the controversies they have provoked) demonstrates how the assertion 
of offence contains a regulatory power which may be used (with varying degrees of success) 
to preclude or discourage ‘offensive’ forms of expression. The chapter also suggests that the 
very assertion of offence is increasingly taken as the grounds for why something is felt to be 
offensive more broadly. This regulatory aspect of ‘offence taking’ is manifest in various ways 
in some of the examples examined in this chapter: for example, the use of cartoon imagery to 
critique Israel may be discouraged by those who believe the imagery to be anti-Semitic 
and/or encourage an anti-Semitic viewpoint, whilst depictions of Muhammad are censored by 
the UK press as a consequence of the offence they continue to cause.  
An important focus of the chapter is how representational practices within our media avert 
attention from the individualised dimension at work in the taking of offence. For example, 
representational analysis has enabled this project to observe some of the ways in which 
distinctions are made between ‘Muslim’ and ‘non-Muslim’ positions, or between ‘secular’ 
and ‘religious’ identities. In this respect, the response to the Danish cartoon controversy on 
the part of the British press homogenises how those who share an identity (in this instance, as 
‘Muslims’) might construe and interpret ‘offensiveness’.  The newspaper editorials are, 
therefore, unanimous in their declaration that the cartoons are offensive to Muslims. This 
binary way of categorising entire groups can be observed more broadly in media and popular 
discourse surrounding the giving and taking of offence. For instance, disputes of offence are 
often understood as shaped by the competing interests and grievances of different groups so 
that categories like gender, class, ethnicity, or sexuality also become homogenised in ways 
which echo our conceptualization of religious identity. This in part is a reflection of the 
language of identity politics and of the power differentials it seeks to uncover, describe and 
challenge. However, this way of grouping together different identities may also obscure the 
diversity of opinion and experience within each group or amongst those who share a common 
identity. 
The data analysis also draws attention to the ways in which the changing conditions of debate 
impact upon how disputes of offence are enacted and perceived. Firstly, this thesis suggests 
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that the emergence of new media technologies (such as the online opportunities for debate 
created by Twitter or Facebook) has contributed to an intensification of pre-existing 
discussion and social contestation around what might constitute ‘offensiveness’.  For 
example, the controversy arising from the decision by Maajid Nawaz to retweet a Jesus and 
Mo cartoon propelled various viewpoints and arguments into the foreground of media 
discourse. However, the argument over whether or not it is blasphemous to depict the prophet 
Muhammad in visual imagery predates both the creation of Twitter and the Jesus and Mo 
website. In this sense, although the creation of new discursive opportunities can be viewed as 
helping to amplify or intensify the discussion of particular arguments, it is more difficult to 
claim that the very nature of debate has changed as a consequence of the changing conditions 
in which it takes place
218
. 
Secondly, the emergence of new discursive spaces also provides a stronger voice and 
platform for those who may once have been side-lined or marginalised within the traditional 
mainstream media. Crucially, the relatively democratised nature of new media technologies 
(like Twitter or the blogosphere) encourages a multiplicity of voices to participate in the 
process of creating discourse. For example, the cartoons which appear on the Jesus and Mo 
website are unlikely to have been published within our national press (particularly in the 
years following the Danish cartoon controversy). Similarly, the controversies provoked by 
the web comic encourage us to recognise the diversity of opinion and dissenting voices which 
prevail within (as well as between) communities, and cautions against the homogenisation of 
those who share a common identity
219
.  In summary, this chapter asserts that the significance 
of group membership and identity needs to be considered alongside the significance of this 
individualised dimension. It also aligns this with the regulatory power of the assertion of 
offence, whereby offence has become increasingly attached to the distress caused to our sense 
of selfhood or personal identity.  
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 The idea that social media has exposed forms of discourse which once remained ‘hidden’ with our ‘back-
stage’ selves is addressed by this thesis in Chapter Five using Goffman’s dramaturgical model.  
219
 This thesis has drawn attention to the diversity of opinion within groups or communities, however, it is also 
worth noting that this diversity of opinion will be influenced by the many factors which help to form an 
individuals’ identity such as their gender, age, class or sexuality. When considering disputes of offence, 
therefore, it also worth considering the significance of the intersectionality of these different factors. For 
example, the arguably ‘offensive’ and ‘non-PC’ creation of the character Vicky Pollard (who appeared in the 
popular sketch show Little Britain) has been explored in light of her representation as both female and working 
class (see Lockyer; 2010:101-103).  
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction: ‘the paradox of PC’ 
 
This project arose from an interest in the discursive formation of political correctness (PC) 
and in how the language of PC has become attached to an entire range of questions 
encompassing the politics of language, and disputes involving the giving and taking of 
offence. The central problem or paradox which initially guided the nature and direction of the 
research process is the largely disparaging way in which PC is typically viewed despite its 
purportedly progressive goals. The emergence of this paradox was examined in Chapter Two 
as part of a wider exploration of the discursive emergence of political correctness, including 
the different ways in which PC continues to be interpreted or understood. In pursuit of why 
this paradox has arisen, the project embarked on an examination of the available literature in 
Chapter Three which particularly sought to make sense of the overwhelmingly negative 
signification of PC. The chapter found that although this negative signification was largely 
attributed in the literature to a censorious component within political correctness (see e.g. 
D’Souza, 1991; Loury, 1994; Gitlin, 1997; Browne, 2006) there was little discussion of a 
further paradox: how does the powerful censoriousness which is attributed to PC co-exist 
alongside the popular expression and celebration within our wider culture of anti-PC rhetoric 
and sentiment? The focus of the research, therefore, expanded to also explore this paradox 
together with the tensions which continue to underlie how PC is understood as both a 
progressive political project and a censorious, or regressive, broader cultural phenomenon.  
This final chapter will use the thesis findings to consider the contribution to knowledge this 
project has made. In doing so it demonstrates how this knowledge contributes to the insights 
and critical observations gained through advanced research within the field of cultural 
sociology. It will also suggest how further research within this field might build upon some of 
the findings it discusses. The chapter begins by appraising how successfully the research 
process has made use of the conceptualisation of PC as a floating signifier – an approach 
which was outlined near the beginning of the research process (see Chapter Two) in order to 
avoid the pitfalls associated with labelling particular examples of language or behaviour as 
‘PC’ or ‘non-PC’. Secondly, it briefly discusses what was learnt from the review of the 
literature undertaken in the third chapter in light of how this part of the thesis contributed to 
the formation of its core research objectives in Chapter Four. Thirdly, the chapter describes 
the knowledge gained from this project and how it contributes to the current literature. This 
will include a summary of the key research findings, including how they were obtained. Each 
  173 
of the three core research questions are addressed in turn using the relevant knowledge 
acquired from the investigations undertaken in the data analysis chapters.  This core section 
of the chapter (see Section 8.4) argues that although the thesis findings do not suggest that a 
liberal orthodoxy pervades throughout contemporary discourse, the rules of debate have 
nevertheless shifted to reflect wider social and political change regarding how we view social 
problems like racism or sexism. However, it also argues that the rules of debate remain 
temporal and contextual and that the varying levels of PC present (and absent) in different 
discursive contexts contributes to a culture of inconsistency and uncertainty over what might 
constitute ‘offensiveness’. This section of the chapter will also argue that the focus in 
academic analysis and journalistic commentary on the relationship between disputes of 
offence and identity politics (especially the focus placed upon structural inequalities between 
different social groups) may overshadow the ways in which PC disputes contain an 
individualised component. In other words, the ‘right to offend’ and ‘the right to be offended’ 
are also increasingly grounded in the distinct ways in which individual identity is felt and 
exhibited. Finally, the chapter uses the implications of the thesis findings to suggest areas of 
future research. It suggests that in order to make sense of the disparate ways in which offence 
is understood, research might explore more directly the relationship between an audience and 
various ‘offensive’ forms of expression. This might involve questioning an audience about 
how they experience or understand the nature of ‘offensiveness’.  
 
8.2 ‘…political correctness [is] more easily recognised than defined…’220: How Political 
Correctness has been conceptualised throughout the thesis.  
 
Though this project arose from its interest in how PC is discursively aligned to a range of 
arguments and practices, it has also found that the alignment of PC to some seemingly 
disparate phenomena has produced particular challenges when attempting to research and 
make sense of what political correctness might actually mean. Defining certain words or 
behaviour as ‘PC’ or ‘non-PC’ suggests that PC can be identified using a readily observable 
checklist of words or measureable criteria. However, this way of categorising words and 
behaviour is itself part of the discursive process through which PC has emerged and which 
this thesis has sought to explore. For this reason, from the outset, the project has approached 
PC as a floating cultural signifier which is attached to different things by different people, 
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 This is taken from a longer quote by Hughes (2010:9) which describes the difficulties involved in defining 
political correctness. 
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within different discursive contexts.  PC, therefore, has been understood throughout the 
research process as a mobile cultural signifier which might be aligned to a number of 
signifieds: (i) a new politics of language; (ii) an authoritarian movement to be mocked; and 
(iii) a new politics of identity and political activism. This way of viewing political correctness 
- which was advanced and developed in the genealogy chapter - has proven to be a useful 
way of exploring how various meaning(s) become attached to the concept and language of 
PC. In a similar sense, the notion of ‘political incorrectness’ has been viewed as a signifier 
for the repudiation of the new politics of language and identity or as concurring with the 
signification of PC as an authoritarian movement to be mocked. Despite having approached 
political correctness (and political incorrectness) this way, the research process has not 
always found it easy or possible to separate PC as a discursive construct from some of the 
tangible phenomena to which it is often attached. For example, the data sources have used 
some material which has been labelled in journalistic commentary as ‘politically incorrect’. 
In describing particular jokes or instances of online discourse as ‘politically incorrect’ this 
thesis has also entered the labelling process although the jokes or phenomena it describes 
might be construed in any number of ways
221
. In this sense, the research process has 
reaffirmed the notion that PC is attached to a number of possible signifieds and that any 
overarching or conclusive definition of ‘PC’ is in practice difficult to sustain. However, this 
has also demonstrated that the very contestability of the label ‘PC’, together with its 
durability and elasticity as a powerful signifier of a range of phenomena, makes it worthy of 
in depth exploration.  
 
8.3 ‘a censorious movement to be mocked’222: Linking the negative signification of PC 
to the literature review and research objectives. 
 
Two overarching arguments made within the genealogy chapter helped to inform how the 
investigation of the literature was conducted. Firstly, the genealogical examination of the 
emergence of PC as a cultural signifier observed how PC was able to surface as an 
overarching label under which other signifiers (such as feminism or multiculturalism) could 
be placed and then viewed as constituting part of a ‘new’ broader political movement or 
hegemonic project. Secondly, many of the disputes or arguments which were discursively 
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 For example, the subjective nature of humour means that there is no necessary consensus over what might 
make a joke ‘politically incorrect’ despite this thesis having labelled particular jokes this way.  
222
 This is a reference to one of the principal ways in which this project has approached PC as a cultural signifier 
(see Chapter Two). 
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attached to political correctness - along with the people and practices identified as ‘PC’- 
preceded the reification of PC in the early part of the 1990s
223
. What is crucial with regard to 
the process of reification is that PC emerged as a powerful way of disparaging those labelled 
‘politically correct’: to be labelled thus was also to be labelled as ‘intolerant’, ‘easily 
offended’ or ‘censorious’.   
 
In view of this, the review of the literature in Chapter Three considered how academic 
analysis had made sense of the generally negative way in which PC is understood. 
Overwhelmingly, the negative signification of PC has been attributed in the literature to the 
censoriousness of PC rather than a repudiation of its purportedly progressive and non-
discriminatory goals
224
. The studies examined also drew attention to what was viewed as the 
excessive prioritisation given by PC to the policing of ‘offensive’ words and language (see 
e.g. Ehrenreich, 1992; Hall, 1994). This general acceptance of the censorious nature of PC 
across the political spectrum suggested that further analysis might investigate whether, how 
and to what extent PC censoriousness is manifest today within different discursive contexts. 
Where substantial analysis had taken place it had tended to use the field of sociolinguistics to 
ascertain how language has acquired an increasingly key role in the struggle for social or 
political change (see e.g. Cameron, 1995; Lakoff, 2000). However, analysis had not typically 
focused upon the relationship between political correctness and representation more 
generally, or sought to account for the increasing newsworthiness of disputes over the giving 
and taking of offence within public life
225
. Furthermore, although the literature had discussed 
how PC had acquired an overwhelmingly negative signification, there was little direct 
exploration of the positive signification of political incorrectness or the appeal of politically 
incorrect forms of expression within some levels of discourse. Finally, despite the changing 
conditions of debate over recent decades - which have been generated by a range of factors 
including political, cultural, technological or legal change - a significant portion of the 
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 For example, the examination in Chapter Two of the situation comedy Till Death Us Do Part demonstrates 
how what are often regarded as contemporary or ‘PC’ preoccupations over the nature of offence (in this case 
the use of racist language within popular entertainment) predate the emergence of the language of PC within 
everyday discourse. 
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 This position was articulated across the political spectrum within the available literature, including those on 
the political right (see e.g. D’Souza, 1991; Phillips, 1994) as well as various authors who self-identified as 
having a liberal-left political affiliation (see e.g. Hall, 1994; Loury, 1994; Gitlin, 1997). The idea that PC could 
not be legitimately associated with an excess of censoriousness was supported by only a minority of authors 
who both identified themselves as left leaning (see e.g. Wilson, 1995; Feldstein, 1997).  
225
 In particular, there was little discussion in the available literature of the high profile given to disputes of 
offence within the reporting of stories as news. 
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literature was written as the language of PC initially emerged within mainstream discourse in 
the early part of the 1990s. This thesis, therefore, has attempted to address the relationship 
between the changing conditions of debate and how disputes of offence are produced and 
enacted today within a number of different levels of discourse.  
 
8.4 Drawing conclusions regarding the ‘paradox of PC’ 
 
8.4.1 ‘…political correctness…is liberal in its aims but often illiberal in its practices… 
(Hughes, 2010:4)’:226Has PC generated a liberal orthodoxy?  
 
The quote by Hughes which introduces this part of the chapter makes a familiar claim against 
PC which has guided how the first core research question (along with its sub-questions) was 
composed. The core question asked how are we to account for the meaning(s) attributed to 
PC, particularly the common assertion that it has engendered a form of liberal orthodoxy 
within wider society. In order to answer this core question, further sub-questions asked how a 
liberal orthodoxy might be identified and whether the conditions of debate suggested that 
particular viewpoints are precluded or stigmatised in any way. The final sub-question also 
asked what the nature of the relationship was between the discursive contexts in which 
discourse takes place and how the giving and taking of offence is more broadly understood.  
Chapter Five addressed the first research question and its sub-questions using case studies 
which drew upon source material embedded within the production and circulation of news. 
Using The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian newspapers as data sources, the first case 
study rejected the assertion that a liberal-left or politically correct orthodoxy had taken hold 
across this area of the broadsheet media. However, it also identified different attitudes and 
approaches within each paper towards free expression which suggested that in particular 
circumstances the ‘liberal’ Guardian was more circumspect in its view of free expression 
than the ‘conservative’ Telegraph. This concluding chapter argues that the censorious 
element exposed within The Guardian emanates from a particular view of the role of power 
within society.  This view of power largely concurs with the conceptualisation of language 
outlined by Cameron in the literature review which described language as a ‘shaper of ideas’ 
(1995:122) that has power to influence as well as reflect broader attitudes and structural 
inequalities.  
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 This is taken from a longer quote addressing the meaning of PC within the book A History of Semantics and 
Culture by Hughes (2010:4). 
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In order to identify how the paradox of a ‘liberal orthodoxy’ might be recognised, the first 
case study considered whether there was a consensus or uniformity across all four articles 
used as source material which adhered to a liberal-left political agenda
227
. In view of how PC 
is a signifier for a politics of language and a censorious movement to be mocked, the study 
also looked for evidence of the preclusion of particular viewpoints or ‘illiberal’ utterances 
within the content of each article. Unsurprisingly, as a newspaper which identifies itself with 
the politics of the modern liberal-left, The Guardian articles expressed support for anti-racist 
principles and greater social equality. However, both articles were also reticent in their 
commitment to free expression in circumstances where they felt this might reinforce social 
inequalities or forms of social stereotyping. Most notably, cartoons which had recently 
appeared in the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo were criticised for reinforcing anti-
Muslim prejudice
228
. Both Guardian articles also displayed a concern with ‘offensive’ forms 
of expression or representation: the aforementioned satirical cartoons and the sale of golliwog 
toys at a seaside arcade. In this sense the articles demonstrate why a paradox remains at the 
heart of how PC continues to be understood. In other words, the study showed how the 
‘liberal’ aim of anti-discrimination becomes aligned with the ‘illiberal’ practice of precluding 
‘incorrect’ speech or forms of expression. 
 
Viewed in isolation, the source material from The Guardian suggested why PC might be 
viewed more broadly as having inculcated a form of liberal orthodoxy within our mainstream 
media. However, this position was more difficult to sustain when viewed alongside the 
source material from The Daily Telegraph. Both Telegraph articles explicitly denounced 
‘political correctness’ on the grounds that it was responsible for suppressing free speech and 
proscribing ‘incorrect’ viewpoints. However, the study also found that any suppression of 
‘incorrect’ viewpoints was asserted rather than demonstrated in both articles.  For example, 
whilst expressing the view that Islamist terrorism is a fundamental threat to Western values, 
the Telegraph journalist, Peter Mullen, simultaneously referred to how his views had ‘long 
remained unsayable’ because they were not ‘PC’. Furthermore, although both Telegraph 
articles declared their hostility towards political correctness, they nevertheless partook in the 
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 By using the term ‘liberal-left’ I mean to refer broadly to the principles associated with the contemporary 
political left which have emerged from identity politics over recent decades (including principles such as anti-
racism, opposition to homophobia or support for group rights).  
228
 The article had commented on the decision of the magazine to print cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in 
2012 following the violent protests against the anti-Islamic film ‘The Innocence of Muslims’ (see Chapter Five). 
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taking of offence, a proclivity more commonly attributed to the ‘politically correct’. 
However, rather than expressing offence at racism or other forms of prejudice, The Telegraph 
journalists were offended by number of other targets, many of which they described as 
‘politically correct’.  These targets included the ‘biased’ news coverage of the BBC; 
‘Guardianistas’; the politician George Galloway and supporters of Julian Assange229.  
 
Although the research findings rejected the idea that a liberal orthodoxy pervades 
contemporary broadsheet journalism, this concluding chapter nevertheless argues that the 
findings reaffirmed the claim that liberal principles may become attached to censorious 
practices
230
. In the articles examined in The Guardian newspaper, censoriousness arose from 
an aversion to causing offence to groups considered to be less powerful or discriminated 
against in some way. Causing offence (as a consequence of the use of ‘offensive’ forms of 
expression or the sale of racist items like golliwog dolls) was also felt to contribute to 
underlying structural inequalities and wider patterns of discrimination between different 
groups
231
.  In this respect, this conclusion suggests that as the distinction between tangible 
discrimination against people (in terms of, for example, the unequal treatment of different 
groups) and what is considered to be offensive to some people has become less clear, social 
contestation over the nature of offence has simultaneously intensified.  
 
However, this thesis also argues that the critique of PC has a propensity to conflate cultural or 
linguistic change which has been led by real change in attitudes towards social problems like 
racism or sexism with the imposition of a new form of censoriousness or orthodoxy of 
thought and expression. For example, the review of the literature outlined studies which 
critiqued PC as a phenomenon which closes down debate through the misuse of labels such 
as racism or homophobia (see e.g. Green; 2006; Browne, 2006). However, the disapproval of 
golliwog dolls expressed in The Guardian article mirrors an increasing lack of acceptance of 
racism or racist imagery more broadly within society. In other words, the disavowal of racist 
forms of expression or representation does not necessarily arise from a ‘liberal’ form of 
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 In the newspaper articles the BBC and Guardian are directly criticised for their ‘political correctness’ (see 
Chapter Five). 
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 This argument is made explicitly by Hughes (2010) at the start of this part of the chapter, however, it is an 
argument which has been reiterated more generally in the case against PC examined in the literature review (see 
e.g. Hall, 1994; Loury, 1994; Gitlin, 1997) 
231
 For example, The Guardian also referred to how police had taken action against those displaying golliwog 
dolls on the grounds that they incited racial hatred. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/sep/21/golliwogs-vile-throwback-tory-mps  (Accessed 8
th
 
January 2015) 
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censorship which is imposed upon an otherwise ‘illiberal’ majority. Nevertheless, the 
subjective and contestable nature of offence also suggests why PC remains discursively 
aligned with censorious practices. The view that cartoons in the magazine Charlie Hebdo are 
‘unhelpful’ (see Chapter Five) embodies the equivocal approach towards free expression 
which is sometimes attributed to PC. In this instance, The Guardian article directly linked the 
cartoons to wider anti-Islamic feeling across Europe. However, this position also invites 
further consideration of how forms of expression or representation come to be regarded more 
generally as ‘offensive’ to entire groups232.  This matter is revisited in the conclusions drawn 
from the third research question to be discussed in this final chapter. However, the 
conclusions drawn from the first research question begin to suggest that our concern with the 
structural inequalities between different groups may have encouraged a homogenised or 
generalised view of what members of different groups deem to be ‘offensive’. 
 
In the review of the literature (see Chapter Three) PC is also overwhelmingly viewed as 
having emerged from the politics of the liberal-left. Although this project explored how the 
politically left-leaning Guardian has critiqued ‘offensive’ forms of expression, it has also 
explored how The Telegraph has taken offence over a range of disparate matters and 
concerns. In this sense, although the journalists writing in both newspapers were offended by 
different things, the taking of offence became the manner in which their arguments were 
made. This conclusion therefore recommends that our understanding of disputes of offence is 
broadened so that opposition to political correctness (as deployed in The Telegraph articles) 
is recognised as sharing a propensity to take offence more typically attributed to the ‘PC’ 
liberal-left.  Furthermore, both Telegraph articles also stigmatised opposing viewpoints 
through their use of the negative signification of PC. Ironically, therefore, the accusation of 
‘political correctness’ has become a strategy for precluding or stigmatising ‘PC’ opinions in a 
way which mirrors the censorious practices ascribed to PC.  
 
The first research question was also interested in considering how the discursive context in 
which debate takes place impacts upon its rules and conditions including how the giving or 
taking of offence is more widely understood.  The second case study, therefore, undertook an 
analysis of a different form of political discourse at work within the institutional setting of 
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 This issue with specific regard to the Charlie Hebdo cartoons was powerfully reignited following the murder 
of Charlie Hebdo cartoonists in Paris in January 2015. One of the principal issues discussed following the 
killings has been whether some of the cartoons used in the magazine were racist.  
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Parliament. It argued that within this formal setting demonstrable support for any form of 
prejudice was discouraged by those MPs engaged in political debate. However, it also argued 
that the language of PC had helped to create a less readable discursive environment rather 
than one in which a liberal orthodoxy is rigorously adhered to or reinforced. The study 
produced a thematic examination of the various arguments made by Members of Parliament 
involved in the debate in the House of Commons in 2013 which led to the legalisation of 
same sex marriage. It found that arguments both for and against the bill relied chiefly upon 
the themes of equality, rights and discrimination in order to support their case. Crucially, 
throughout the parliamentary debate, MPs opposed to same sex marriage were nevertheless 
eager to distance themselves from accusations of homophobia. In other words, MPs holding 
an arguably ‘non-PC’ opinion expressed this opinion within a discursive context which 
reflected the outcome of a lengthier process of linguistic, social and political change 
independent of the debate itself. In this respect, this concluding chapter argues that the 
language of PC has changed the conditions of debate in that politicians are unwilling or 
unable to make demonstrably homophobic pronouncements
233
.  However, within the House 
of Commons, the conditions of debate on this occasion also permitted different voices to be 
heard and MPs did not seek to preclude any particular opinion from discussion. 
 
Nevertheless, many MPs opposed to same sex marriage argued that their views were unfairly 
stigmatised by their political opponents as ‘homophobic’ and ‘bigoted’. In this respect, the 
rules of debate were felt by some politicians to discourage the expression of an unpopular 
viewpoint held by a minority of the politicians present. This is important because it illustrates 
how the belief that viewpoints are stigmatised contributes to our preoccupation with 
‘offensiveness’ together with the expansion of victimhood. In the literature review, Browne 
(2006), Green (2006) and Saunders (2011) described how opinion is policed and viewpoints 
precluded in order to gain political advantage through claiming the status of ‘victimhood’. 
These authors have described PC as a product of identity politics in which ‘victimhood’ is 
asserted in order to silence political opponents or stigmatise them as bigots. However, the 
second case study found that many MPs who opposed the same sex marriage bill also 
adopted a language of victimhood in order to support their position. Conservative authors 
such as Green (2006) have argued that victimhood is generated through the misapplication of 
words such as homophobia directed towards the purportedly homophobic in order to discredit 
                                                          
233
 Chapter Five provided an examination of how mainstream British politicians are less able or willing to rely 
on homophobic arguments than was once the case. 
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them.  However, this thesis argues that the debate in Parliament demonstrates how those 
labelled as homophobic may also constitute part of a wider propensity to draw upon ‘victim 
status’ (Green, 2006:45) as a way of making a point or argument. In this instance those 
opposed to same sex marriage constitute the ‘victim group’ as a consequence of holding an 
unpopular or politically incorrect opinion. The Literature Review chapter has highlighted 
how the conceptualisation of victimhood developed by Green (2006) downplayed the 
significance of inequalities such as racism or sexism within modern society. However, this 
concluding chapter also argues that strategies more typically attributed to the ‘politically 
correct’ are identifiable when observing the way in which politically incorrect viewpoints are 
articulated. In other words, the use of victimhood is a strategy which resonates beyond what 
is commonly recognised as ‘PC’ opinion.  
The research findings from the first two case studies rejected the view that PC had imposed a 
liberal orthodoxy across contemporary discourse, whilst also accepting that the rules of 
debate within formal political discourse had shifted to accommodate wider social and 
political change regarding how we view racism, sexism or homophobia. This concluding 
chapter has also suggested that the assertion of offence and language of victimhood is not 
exclusively utilised by people and practices typically labelled ‘PC’. Instead, it argues that 
these strategies are also adopted by those who pronounce their opposition to political 
correctness or express viewpoints which would be regarded more generally as politically 
incorrect.  
The third case study undertaken in the news discourse chapter began to address how 
technological changes have influenced the nature of debate and it is therefore revisited in 
more detail in Section 8.4.3 of this chapter. Its findings, however, echoed the general 
unwillingness to endorse racism or homophobia in any way within the context of formal 
political discourse.  The study had explored discourses of offensiveness and drew upon the 
BBC news coverage of the ‘Twitter Storm’ arising from the appointment in 2013 of England 
and Wales’s first Youth Police and Crime Commissioner, Paris Brown. The BBC reporting of 
Paris’s tweets lends weight to the assertion that particular viewpoints or attitudes are today 
discouraged within ‘official’ forms of discourse. In this instance, the discouraged viewpoints 
included tweets deemed to be racist, sexist and homophobic. However, the third case study 
also drew attention to the difference between what is regarded as acceptable within the 
relatively ‘formal’ context of news reporting and what might be commonplace within 
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everyday discourse. In doing so it highlighted the endurance of politically incorrect language 
on the social media site Twitter – a site which has become notorious for its contribution to the 
generation and discussion of disputes over the giving and taking of offence. In examining the 
relationship between the nature of debate and the context in which it is held, the study made 
use of the distinction between our front stage and back stage selves - a notion advanced by 
Goffman (1959) in his dramaturgical model of social interaction.  The case study argued that 
what may once have remained largely confined to our one-to-one interactions or our ‘back 
stage’ selves has now acquired a presence and permanency on the ‘front stage’ as a 
consequence of the use of sites such as Twitter. In the case of the Paris Brown Twitter Storm, 
one level of discourse (the ‘formal’ world of news reporting) expressed a disavowal of 
another level of discourse (the ‘informal’ or less regulated world of social media). Paris’s 
tweets demonstrate that politically incorrect utterances continue to form a part of everyday 
social interaction despite the shifting conditions of debate described in this thesis. In view of 
this, the second research question sought to account for the purpose and appeal of politically 
incorrect forms of expression. 
8.4.2 ‘My favourite noise in comedy is the laugh followed by the sharp intake of breath’234: 
What is the appeal of politically incorrect discourse? 
Despite the increasing intolerance of racist or homophobic language outlined in the previous 
part of this chapter, the second research question directly addressed the enduring presence 
and allure of politically incorrect forms of expression within some levels of discourse. The 
thesis therefore asked how we should characterise or identify political incorrectness and 
account for its popularity within some discursive contexts. In view of the aforementioned 
disdain for racist or homophobic language, it also asked what strategies enable politically 
incorrect language and rhetoric to nevertheless continue to be accepted or legitimised. 
Finally, the project asked whether any overarching meaning could account for its appeal. The 
thesis chose to answer these questions primarily through an examination of contemporary 
popular British comedy - undertaken in Chapter Six - for two principal reasons. Firstly, 
contemporary comedy has produced various forms of humour described as ‘politically 
incorrect’ within popular or journalistic discourse. Secondly, comedy can be distinguished 
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 This quote is from Jimmy Carr and is taken from a newspaper interview in 2009 in which he discussed his 
style of humour, especially in view of the offence generated by a joke he had made that year about the 
Paralympics. (The joke was examined in Chapter Six). [Online] Available at: http://www.ablehere.com/latest-
disability-news/275-paralympics-joke-was-totally-acceptable.html (Accessed 27th January 2015) 
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both from the ‘formal’ nature of political discourse explored in the previous case studies, and 
from the ‘informal’ and relatively unregulated nature of discourse generated by social media. 
Popular comedy therefore widened the scope of the project to include a different level of 
discourse from that previously considered in Chapter Five.  
The research findings concluded that political incorrectness had emerged as a signifier which 
is attached to a number of meaning(s). (In this respect, the label mirrors how political 
correctness has been understood throughout this project as a floating cultural signifier). The 
label ‘politically incorrect’ is therefore generally attached to the rejection or critique of the 
politics of language and of identity previously outlined in the genealogy chapter (Chapter 
Two). However, Chapter Six also argued that the appeal of humour described in journalistic 
discourse as ‘politically incorrect’ could not be reduced to any singular meaning or one set of 
associations. Instead, it claimed that humour popularly described as ‘politically incorrect’ 
signified a polyphony of voices: (i) those which critiqued or drew attention to social problems 
like racism or sexism rather than celebrated them; (ii) those that used irony carefully as a way 
of rehabilitating racist or sexist content and/or deflecting critique of it, and (iii) those which 
unambiguously celebrated the expression of politically incorrect utterances. The thesis also 
argued that a comic performance may move between different voices making any 
overarching reading of its meaning difficult to obtain.  
 
In view of these findings, this concluding chapter argues that the language of PC has 
contributed to the emergence of a more complex and less readable discursive environment. 
(In this sense, the findings concur with the analysis previously undertaken of parliamentary 
discourse in which politicians are described as using the language of PC in order to support 
the ‘non-PC’ position of opposition to same sex marriage). However, the meaning of 
language embedded within the comic discourse examined in this project is clouded in 
different ways.  Rather than using the language of PC to legitimise politically incorrect 
beliefs or positions, comic ‘incorrectness’ has become legitimised as a consequence of our 
underlying assumptions about the essentially ‘correct’ values of a comic performer and their 
audience. In other words, the use or assertion of irony has become a tool with which 
politically incorrect utterances maintain the potential to be legitimised, rehabilitated and 
immunised from critique. In this respect, the comedy chapter reaffirmed the position taken in 
the literature review with regard to the rehabilitative power of irony to legitimise ‘offensive’ 
material (see e.g. Finding, 2008; Hunt, 2010).   
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However, this thesis has also suggested that notions of ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ forms 
of ‘offensive’ humour are increasingly attached to who tells and enjoys a particular joke or 
performance as well as what the joke is, or how it is told. It used Bourdieu’s capital theory in 
order to account for this and support its claim that a comic (or audience) in possession of 
higher levels of cultural capital is generally granted greater freedom to engage in and enjoy 
non-PC humour
235
. Higher access to cultural capital resources, therefore, helped explain why 
Jimmy Carr is thought of as ‘edgy’ whilst Chubby Brown is simply ‘offensive’.  Firstly, 
Brown was found to lack the various symbolic markers
236
 which have helped legitimise the 
‘offensive’ comedy of Carr. These markers included Jimmy Carr’s ubiquitous media profile, 
his acquisition of respected comedy awards and self-identified status as a ‘liberal’.  Secondly, 
although Brown is a very popular comedian, he was found to lack the social capital
237
 which 
has enabled Jimmy Carr to maintain his prominent media profile. Thirdly, the use of 
linguistic capital (the ability to use language - such as speech patterns or dialects - viewed 
more broadly as legitimate) also legitimised the ‘offensive’ comedy of Carr  and enabled him 
to be perceived as ‘edgy’, ‘challenging’ and ‘dark’ where Brown was viewed as  simply 
‘crude’ or ‘regressive’. Crucially, cultural capital also gave post-alternative comics (like 
Jimmy Carr or Frankie Boyle) the skills and knowledge to distinguish between which 
politically incorrect jokes remained truly taboo and which could be rehabilitated as ‘edgy’ or 
‘challenging’238.  
 
The higher cultural capital resources of the post-alternative comic, therefore, were found to 
be transmutable into a wider social acceptance of a comic’s ‘ironic offensiveness’ 
irrespective of how a joke is told or constructed. To demonstrate this, the project used 
examples which illustrated how comedians have become progressively more confident to 
remove irony from the joke telling process itself.  For example, Chapter Six discussed the 
now infamous joke told by Frankie Boyle on his 2010 Channel Four show Tramadol Nights 
                                                          
235
 Cultural capital refers to the values, dispositions and knowledge which give people advantages within 
society. Chapter 4 outlined capital theory in more depth before Chapter 6 used it to help answer the second 
research question. 
236
 Symbolic markers are acquired from symbolic capital which refers to the advantages accrued through status 
or reputation (see Chapters 4 and 6). 
237
 Social capital refers to the advantages gained from valuable connections between groups or individuals (see 
Chapters 4 and 6).  
238
 For example, the comedy chapter pointed to how ‘edgy’ comedians were generally happier to engage with 
some ‘taboo’ topics rather than others. In particular, white stand-up comedians remained cautious of material 
which might be construed as racist.  
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about Harvey Price. In this joke, the presence of irony rested upon the assumptions made 
about Frankie Boyle as a performer, including how he and his humour should be interpreted. 
This is significant as it suggested that our understanding of irony has become less dependent 
upon how carefully irony is signposted within the construction of a joke and more about who 
tells or enjoys the joke. Of course, the aforementioned joke did cause offence to many people, 
as have other ‘offensive’ jokes told by contemporary ‘edgy’ comedians. Nevertheless, the 
post alternative comics explored in this thesis are also mainstream figures who are defended 
as ‘dark’ or ‘taboo-breaking’ – a defence rarely made for the obviously ‘unenlightened’ pre-
PC comic. 
 
Using Bourdieu’s capital theory, the comedy chapter therefore concluded that comedy 
labelled as ‘offensive’ or ‘politically incorrect’ is granted legitimacy where it is assumed that 
the post-alternative comic and their audience possess the cultural capital skills which with to 
distinguish between ‘edgy’ comedy which is ‘ironic’ and the straightforwardly regressive 
humour of  the ‘pre-PC’ comic like Chubby Brown. However, although capital theory allows 
us to make sense of why some forms of ‘offensive’ humour are legitimised, how can we 
account for the emergence in recent years of the ‘new offensiveness’ explored in Chapter 
Six?  In other words, why have a cluster of legitimised forms of ‘offensive’ comedy become 
so popular at this particular point in the post-alternative comedy era, especially in view of our 
wider social disavowal of racist, sexist or homophobic discourse?  This concluding chapter 
argues that two underlying conditions have made this possible. Firstly, it suggests that the use 
of irony (either as a way of critiquing forms of bigotry or deflecting criticism of contentious 
material) has acted as a gateway for humour which chooses to remove irony from the process 
of joke telling and appears superficially to allow the ‘old’ offensiveness to morph into the 
‘new’. Within this discursive climate, it is increasingly difficult to ascertain what meanings(s) 
really underlie ‘ironically’ sexist or homophobic material. The comedy chapter began with an 
historical overview of the relationship between PC and British comedy in which it outlined 
overarching shifts within British comedy which it mapped as ‘pre-PC’, ‘PC’ and ‘post-PC’ 
eras. This mapping exercise also recognised how popular comedy in the ‘post-PC’ era has 
deployed irony in order to discuss or ridicule racism, homophobia or sexism whilst ensuring 
that the basic principles of anti-racism or anti-sexism remained in place. This concluding 
chapter argues that this provided a point of emergence from which the modern ‘edgy’ comic 
could appear and create a form of humour which is less careful to signpost irony: 
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nevertheless, such humour has continued to be defended as ‘ironic’ whilst objections to it are 
dismissed as ill-founded or as ‘missing the point’.  
The second condition which made the ‘new offensiveness’ possible is our ‘official’ 
acceptance of principles such as non-racism or non-sexism (as observed in the case studies 
examined in the news discourse chapter of this thesis). The comedy chapter used Bakhtinian 
dialogism to explore whether contemporary ‘edgy’ comedy could be regarded as a playful 
subversion of principles like these. The research findings claimed that discourse surrounding 
political correctness has enabled jokes which would once have been viewed as problematic to 
be discursively rehabilitated as transgressive or ‘edgy’. The findings also cautioned against 
viewing comedy which unambiguously targets those less powerful as challenging or 
carnivalesque. This concluding chapter suggests that the process of discursively rehabilitating 
jokes which target those less powerful as ‘edgy’ or ‘subversive’ has contributed to a wider 
confusion in society about what might constitute ‘offensiveness’. Ironically, the ‘acceptable 
incorrectness’ of the post-alternative comedian is attributed at least partially to the broader 
triumph of political correctness. In other words, because shifting attitudes have made us 
aware that homophobia or sexism are unacceptable, utterances which appear to be 
superficially homophobic or sexist lose their power to reinforce prejudice. Of course this also 
rests upon the assumption that we do all share a common disdain for homophobia or sexism. 
It also presents a problem when we seek to account for the appeal of politically incorrect 
humour. The methodological framework adopted by this thesis eschewed the use of 
interviews or other methods of directly questioning how an audience might view some of the 
comic material it has used as data.  Instead, it has undertaken a thorough analysis of the social 
practices at work which help legitimise or stigmatise ‘offensive’ comedy and considered how 
humour popularly identified as ‘politically incorrect’ becomes attached to a number of 
different meanings. However, this research process has also reaffirmed that there is no easy 
way of discerning whether (or to what extent) an audience views a superficially sexist or 
homophobic joke ‘ironically’ regardless of whether that joke is told by the ‘edgy’ post-
alternative comedian or the ‘old school’ comic such as Chubby Brown. This is particularly 
pertinent in view of the previously described shift in the nature of comic discourse defended 
as ‘ironic’. How, for example, do we know that an ‘edgy’ audience who laugh at jokes which 
unambiguously rely upon negative stereotyping or the targeting of those less powerful does 
so ironically?  
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It is worth reflecting upon the conclusions made in this part of the chapter by considering 
briefly a Twitter Storm which arose in November 2014 concerning the ‘offensive’ humour of 
the comedian ‘Dapper Laughs’239.  Dapper Laughs has caused offence primarily because of 
the misogynistic content of much of his material
240
.  Unlike Chubby Brown he is a young 
comedian and therefore not a product of the pre-alternative comedy (or ‘pre-PC’) era: 
similarly, the audience Dapper Laughs was able to attract through social media are 
overwhelmingly young adults. Both the initial popularity of Dapper Laughs and the backlash 
he subsequently generated force this thesis to reflect upon some of the general assumptions 
and arguments drawn upon in this concluding chapter. Firstly, the sudden demise of 
O’Reilly’s career as a consequence of the offence he caused demonstrates that today’s 
comedians are not immune from censure despite the increasing elasticity with which the 
‘irony’ defence is invoked. Although O’Reilly has posthumously defended Dapper Laughs as 
a ‘character’ act rather than a straightforward endorsement of ‘laddish’ or misogynistic values 
he has not generally been able to utilise the defence of irony as successfully as other 
contemporary comics. Secondly, allowing for the subjective nature of offence (together with 
the subjective nature of what might constitute ‘good’ or credible comedy), the inability of 
O’Reilly to successfully rely upon the defence of irony reaffirms how legitimised forms of 
‘offensive’ comedy are attached to cultural capital resources. O’Reilly lacks the linguistic 
capital to convince that he is ‘edgy’ or ‘challenging’ and the young audience he acquired via 
social media are generally working class and therefore less likely to be credited with the 
cultural capital skills required to appreciate ‘edgy’ comedy241. Thirdly, the assumption that 
we share a disdain for sexist or regressive values is problematized as a consequence of our 
greater exposure to people’s ‘back-stage’ selves through social media sites like Twitter. The 
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 ‘Dapper Laughs’ is the performing name of comedian Daniel O’Reilly. Dapper Laughs became known 
through social networking and social media sites (including Facebook, Twitter and the video sharing service, 
Vine).  He acquired a significant following on social media and in September 2014 he was also given his own 
show on ITV2 entitled Dapper Laughs: On the Pull. Following a tweet posted by Dapper Laughs in which he 
complained about a poor review he had received, a Twitter Storm took place involving his fans and those 
offended by his misogynistic jokes and ‘laddish’ brand of humour. An online petition requesting ITV to drop his 
show also gathered over 68000 signatures. In November 2014 ITV announced they would not be renewing 
Dapper Laughs: On the Pull and a forthcoming tour was also cancelled. O’Reilly also announced that he was 
‘retiring’ the character Dapper Laughs in view of the offence he had caused although he has subsequently posted 
a video on You Tube resurrecting the character.  
240
 His humour has also included homophobic and racist references, although these have been less central to his 
act. 
241
 This factor has been alluded to in some of the journalistic commentary on the moral controversy surrounding 
Dapper Laughs. For example, whilst critical of his comedy, Hugo Rifkind also points out ‘his fans are 
predominantly young, white working-class men; a part of society outperformed by almost every other. When 
they leer at women in the street, chances are those women have far better prospects than they do’.  [Online] 
Available at: http://www.spectator.co.uk/columnists/hugo-rifkind/9367042/you-shouldnt-watch-dapper-laughs-
but-you-really-shouldnt-let-the-likes-of-me-stop-you/ (Accessed 27
th
 January 2015) 
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problem of internet ‘trolling’ (which encompasses various forms of verbal abuse) has 
generated much discussion in the 21
st
 century. In the Twitter Storm arising from the case of 
Dapper Laughs, it is doubtful that the sexist attitudes expressed by fans of Dapper Laughs on 
Twitter - including the vituperative way in which many were expressed - can be dismissed as 
largely ‘ironic’.  
 
Chapter Five of this thesis described how the conditions of debate within ‘official’ forms of 
discourse (such as parliamentary discourse) discouraged any apparent support for racist or 
otherwise ‘incorrect’ viewpoints. The ‘officialdom’ of PC, therefore, helped this project make 
sense of why some of the comedy explored in Chapter Six is felt to be subversive or ‘edgy’. 
Meanwhile, the label ‘politically incorrect’ continues to be used as a signifier for a range of 
comic voices. Within the ironic context in which these voices speak, this conclusion also 
argues that the intention of a joke along with how it is understood by an audience is not 
always clear. More broadly, this ambiguity of meaning contributes to wider social 
contestation and confusion about what is or is not ‘offensive’. In order to make sense of this 
ambiguity and confusion it may be worth considering in more depth the myriad of ways in 
which offence is taken or understood by different people. 
 
8.4.3 ‘Offence, both given and received, hinges on the dynamic conflict between values, 
held by different cultures, groups, individuals or generations.’ (Rowson, 2009:5): Why are 
we preoccupied with disputes of offence? 
 
The third research question continued to explore our concern with disputes of offence, 
particularly in light of the changing conditions of debate over recent decades. In doing so, it 
sought to build upon some of the matters raised in the research findings previously outlined: 
in particular, it continued to observe the social contestation arising from the contextual and 
subjective nature of ‘offensiveness’.  The third core research question, therefore, asked how 
we should make sense of our enduring preoccupation with the giving and taking of offence, 
including the discussion this generates within the mainstream media. The first sub-question 
asked what the relationship is between the nature of debate surrounding ‘offensiveness’ and 
the changing conditions of debate – especially those driven by new media technologies. 
Finally, the second sub-question asked whether the participatory character of many discursive 
spaces has helped to facilitate a culture of competing rights surrounding the giving and taking 
of offence. The cartoon chapter (Chapter Seven) directly explored the issues raised by the 
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third research question and its sub-questions, although the knowledge obtained from all three 
data chapters has contributed to the research findings and conclusions outlined in this final 
part of the thesis.  
 
The research findings suggest that our preoccupation with disputes of offence is sustained by 
various factors, some of which co-exist in a symbiotic manner with one another.  Firstly, 
Chapter Seven argued that the assertion of offence has acquired a regulatory power over the 
rules of debate which may be used to discourage unfavourable or ‘offensive’ forms of 
expression
242
. The chapter also suggested that the assertion of offence is especially powerful 
as it may be taken as grounds for why something is accepted as offensive more generally. In 
this respect, the assertion of offence becomes a way of creating discursive closure around a 
particular issue or point of discussion. However, the attempt to create discursive closure may 
also generate disquiet precisely because the nature of offence remains highly contestable and 
subjective. The quotation from the cartoonist Martin Rowson at the start of this part of the 
chapter draws attention to how the giving and taking of offence rests upon a ‘conflict 
between values’ held by different people. This thesis has previously noted how some forms 
of expression have become less socially acceptable as a consequence of changing values 
which have emerged from broader social and political change
243
. However, as there is no 
overall consensuses regarding the acceptability of many contentious forms of expression, 
disputes of offence continue to preoccupy us.  
 
The literature has generally focused on how PC has contributed to an increased sensitivity 
surrounding the giving of offence within the public arena (see e.g. Loury, 1994; Gitlin, 1997; 
Browne, 2006). This might be observable in the way in which MPs wished not to be viewed 
as homophobic or bigoted in anyway in the parliamentary discussion examined in Chapter 
Five. However, much of the comic discourse used as data in this project explicitly rejected 
contemporary fears concerning the giving of offence. This conclusion argues, therefore, that 
our preoccupation with the nature of offence is also sustained by the assertion of the right to 
offend. It suggests that although our ‘official’ selves may have developed a greater sensitivity 
about how we should speak or interact with others, the celebration of ‘the right to offend’ 
within some levels of discourse has also helped to sustain moral controversies and social 
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 For example, the cartoon chapter described how the cartoonist Martin Rowson had been criticised for anti-
Semitism as a consequence of having drawn cartoons which were critical of Israeli policy in the middle-east. 
243
 For example, Section 8.4.1 discusses how golliwog dolls are generally viewed by today’s generation as 
racist. 
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dilemma regarding what utterances should or should not be socially acceptable. For example, 
Chapter Six recognised how many disputes of offence arising from contemporary 
controversial comedy arose from the use of humour which would once have been 
marginalised as regressive in the post-alternative comedy era
244
. In this respect, these disputes 
are embedded within a discursive environment which has arguably become less PC in recent 
years.
245
 The controversies arising from non-PC comedy, therefore, cannot necessarily or 
solely be attributed to our increased sensitivity surrounding the use of racist or sexist 
language. Instead, these controversies are also discursively aligned with the rehabilitation of 
non-PC forms of humour as ‘edgy’ or ‘taboo-breaking’. This project views this rehabilitation 
- which is underpinned by the (re)assertion of the right to offend in the ‘post-PC’ comedy era 
- as an important factor which sustains the newsworthiness of disputes of offence. In this 
respect, our preoccupation with offence is bolstered by contemporary discourse - such as that 
of the ‘edgy’ comedian - which revels in the symbiotic relationship between the giving and 
taking of offence. More generally, the comic ‘incorrectness’ observed in this project forms 
part of  a wider social and discursive practice in which ‘daring to offend’ is celebrated as an 
important victory for freedom of speech and expression under a presumed PC orthodoxy
246
. 
The relationship between the changing conditions of debate - particularly those which have 
emerged as a consequence of new media technologies - and the nature of debate has also been 
addressed in this project
247
. This conclusion has discussed how the Paris Brown Twitter 
Storm illustrates that our ‘back stage’ and ‘front stage’ selves (and thereby our ‘private’ and 
‘public’ selves) are increasingly entwined. The emergence of new media technologies has 
therefore placed discourse which was once primarily retained within the ‘back stage’ into the 
‘front stage’ and therefore the wider public arena. Social media has undoubtedly contributed 
to our preoccupation with ‘offensiveness’ as it has provided a relatively unregulated space 
within which people are encouraged to participate in discussion and argument. In this respect, 
social media has provided people with more opportunity both to offend and be offended. 
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 I am referring here particularly to some of the forms of comedy described as ‘edgy’ in journalistic discourse 
which celebrate the use of politically incorrect rhetoric and remove irony from the process of joke telling.   
245
 Of course, the comedy chapter also discussed at length how modern ‘incorrectness’ is nevertheless defended 
as ‘ironic’ or ‘knowing’. 
246
 The celebration of the non-PC as ‘freedom-loving’ and ‘anti-authoritarian’ can be observed within popular 
culture beyond the humour used as data in this project. For instance, the sacking of Top Gear presenter Jeremy 
Clarkson by the BBC in March 2015 (following an incident in which he physically attacked a Top Gear 
producer) contributed to his reputation amongst many as an anti-establishment figure out of step with the ‘PC’ 
credentials of his employer. This reputation has been sustained by many ‘incorrect’ utterances Clarkson has 
made throughout his career.  
247
 It is worth noting, for example, that many of the moral controversies provoked by modern comedy have 
acquired a high media profile in part as a consequence of the activity they have generated on social media. 
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However, the emergence of social media may have helped to intensify prior arguments - or 
provided them with greater exposure - rather than necessarily indicate any fundamental shift 
in how the positions people hold are formed as a direct consequence of their engagement with 
new discursive spaces
248
. This conclusion, therefore, suggests that the changing conditions of 
debate allow us to observe more directly some of the positions which arise regarding a 
controversial issue together with how these positions are articulated
249
. Importantly, the 
democratised nature of social media also foregrounds the diversity of opinions there might be 
regarding a particular issue of social contestation. 
 
This exposure to a range of opinion is potentially illuminating in light of the conclusions 
drawn in the cartoon chapter.  The chapter argued that representational practices may 
contribute to the apparent homogenisation of how those who share a particular identity might 
define or interpret the nature of ‘offensiveness’. To demonstrate this it considered how 
distinctions were made between ‘Muslim’ and ‘non-Muslim’ identities during the process of 
news reporting. Using Hall’s representation theory, the data analysis found that British 
newspaper editorials in the aftermath of the Danish Cartoon Crisis represented Muslim 
opinion as monolithic and irrevocably distinct from the values upheld by non-Muslims. The 
data analysis also suggested that this binary way of viewing social difference weakens our 
ability to recognise how opinion is diverse, instead encouraging us to view opinion as largely 
reducible to the position presumed to be taken by a wider social group who share a common 
identity. An important consequence of the user generated nature of social media is that it 
alerts us to this diversity of opinion and problematizes the binary way of viewing social 
difference which is sometimes reinforced by representational practices at work within 
traditional forms of media.  
 
This project therefore suggests that disputes of offence should be understood as containing an 
individualised dimension which sits alongside a wider dimension encompassing the politics 
of group membership and group identity. In doing so, it argues that structural factors 
involving power differentials between different groups continue to underpin disputes arising 
from the giving or taking of offence on grounds such as racism, religious identity or 
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 This of course is not to say that opinions are not formed or influenced by communication via social media. 
Rather that social media has become another vehicle or means through which opinion is exchanged and 
explored.  
249
 Although this thesis has argued that social media allows us to explore its users’ opinions and gives access to 
people’s ‘back stage’ selves, it also acknowledges that it only grants access to the ‘back stage’ selves users are 
prepared to share with others. 
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homophobia. In this sense, the struggles over the use of language or representation which 
have been explored in this project represent a wider struggle over who has power in society. 
The imbalance of power which the politics of language and identity has sought to challenge 
continues to be reflected in our everyday usage and understanding of concepts like racism, 
sexism or homophobia.  However, the significance of group rights (including what might be 
considered ‘offensive’ to a particular group) should be explored alongside the diversity of 
opinion which exists within and across different groups regarding what is or is not 
‘offensive’. In addition, any analysis of power differentials between different groups should 
also recognise the complexities of power struggles within a group or between those who share 
a common identity
250
.  
 
The critique of PC described in the literature review and investigated in the main body of this 
thesis has, however, chosen to focus largely upon a different understanding of the 
significance of power. This understanding has been less interested in how language may be 
used to reinforce power differentials between different social groups and instead has focused 
upon how taking offence has the power to control what can and cannot be said. Examination 
of some of the data sources used in this project has reaffirmed how taking offence allows a 
regulatory power to be exercised over the rules of debate
251
.  Our preoccupation with the 
giving or receiving of offence, therefore, remains embedded in the complex relationship 
between different ways of viewing the power of language. However, this project also 
suggests that we consider more closely how notions of group rights or victimhood are utilised 
to regulate debate.  PC has typically been viewed in the literature as involving the avoidance 
of language or behaviour deemed as ‘offensive’ or detrimental to historically disadvantaged 
groups (see e.g. Hall, 1994; Loury; 1994; Green, 2006).  However, the research findings 
reveal that the assertion of offence is utilised in more complex and variable ways. For 
example, Chapter Five observed how politicians opposed to same sex marriage adopted a 
language of victimhood in order to support their position in the parliamentary debate on this 
issue. It also observed how religious rights were invoked by different politicians in order to 
both support and oppose the legalisation of same sex marriage. In these instances, the 
language of victimhood was adopted by those opposed to a policy intended to engender 
                                                          
250
 For example, the cartoon chapter recognised how British Muslims responded in different ways to the 
publication (and subsequent non-publication) of the Danish cartoons of the prophet Muhammad. However, 
despite this, British national newspapers represented Muslim opinion as homogenous.  
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 The regulatory power of offence taking has been explored more directly in the cartoon chapter. However, this 
is a trend which can be observed more generally in campaigns to inhibit the expression of unfavourable 
viewpoints of forms of expression. 
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greater legal and social equality, and religious rights cited to support conflicting opinions.  
This conclusion, therefore, contends that the discourse surrounding PC - including that which 
encompasses our preoccupation with group identity and the politics of language - may 
overshadow how the ‘right to offend’ or ‘to take offence’ are also attached to the many ways 
in which individual identity is felt and experienced. In particular, it recommends that we also 
consider how the assertion of offence is grounded in the hurt offence is felt to cause to our 
personal identity (including the distinct and variable ways in which this is attached to broader 
notions of group membership, such as religious, ethnic or gender identity).  
 
Finally, this conclusion suggests that the contemporary preoccupation with offence, including 
its ongoing newsworthiness, has encouraged a culture of competing rights in which different 
voices assert their right to offend or be offended. This culture is observable in various ways. 
Firstly, Chapter Six found there was a symbiotic relationship between the right to offend and 
be offended surrounding disputes over the ‘offensive’ nature of modern ‘edgy’ comedy. This 
relationship can be observed more generally in the battle between today’s veneration and 
vilification of anti-PC rhetoric and discourse
252
. Secondly, Chapters Five and Seven suggest 
that competing notions of group rights are used in order to influence debate or decision 
making. For example, Chapter Five observed how the debate in the House of Commons on 
same sex marriage encouraged some participants to pitch gay rights against religious rights. 
Within this context, some MPs felt that same sex marriage was an affront to their religious 
rights or freedoms
253
. Thirdly, the data analysis chapters also suggest that competing 
positions exist within different groups (or amongst those who share a common identity) 
regarding what is or is not offensive, although our concern with identity politics and group 
rights may have drawn the focus of debate away from this. (For example, despite the attempt 
to pitch gay rights against religious rights, some politicians used their religious faith to argue 
in favour of same sex marriage). Despite our preoccupation with group identity, the user led 
nature of modern media technologies has provided a greater exposure to this diversity of 
opinion. One consequence of this is that traditional forms of media may potentially emerge as 
more sensitive to the diversity of viewpoints which continue to contribute to our 
preoccupation with disputes of offence.  
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correctness from sources such as tabloid newspapers or popular figures like the TV presenter, Jeremy 
Clarkson. 
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 The intertexual analysis of cartoons in Chapter seven also drew attention to how religious rights may be 
pitched against gender equality. 
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8.5 Looking towards ways of exploring offence and the politics of self-hood. 
 
A key question arising from the research findings is how the giving or taking of offence 
should be managed within a society which purports to value both the principle of freedom of 
expression and social equality between different groups and individuals. This question is 
particularly important in view of how the opportunities to offend or be offended have 
expanded in recent years along with the willingness of people engage in these opportunities. 
It also highlights the precarious or disputable nature of the aforementioned principles. Firstly, 
what we say or how we express ourselves is subject to various legal, social or contextual 
constraints and secondly, our general acceptance of formal equality between different groups 
nevertheless sits alongside the perseverance of different forms of social inequality. One of the 
ways in which social inequality is felt to be sustained is by forms of expression which some 
people find offensive. However, the imposition of discursive closure around ‘offensive’ 
forms of expression does not erase ‘offensive’ ideas or help us grasp whether or why 
expression which offends may also cause harm. 
 
In view of this, future research might investigate more directly the relationship between 
‘offensive’ forms of expression (such as the telling of sexist jokes or the exhibition of 
contentious imagery) and their audience.  In choosing to examine data from popular cultural 
and media sources this thesis opted not to directly question the consumers, readers, critics or 
fans of these sources. However, doing so might also enable us to engage more meaningfully 
with how, whether and why offence is given and taken
254
.  In particular, it would allow 
analysis to probe how offence is attached to the ways in which personal identity is felt and 
experienced. This might also facilitate greater understanding of disputes of offence in which 
different values and identities appear to be in conflict with one another – an occurrence likely 
to be increasingly common as more people wish to engage in such disputes. Of course, this 
approach would also involve wrestling with the less readable discursive environment which 
this project identified as having emerged alongside the language of PC. Within this 
environment unconcealed endorsement by people of racism or other forms of prejudice has 
become less socially acceptable. In addition, despite the prevalence of disputes of offence 
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 For example, this conclusion has pointed out that it is difficult to make any generalised claims about 
whether an audience views the ‘offensive’ jokes of a comedian ironically without initiating a direct 
engagement with that audience.  
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many people remain unwilling to confess that offence is in fact taken as they wish not to be 
labelled ‘PC’. Nevertheless, if we are to understand the ways in which offence is attached to 
the politics of self-hood, research might consider more closely how people view or engage 
with ‘offensive’ forms of expression. 
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